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Abstract
Kim, Daewon. PhD. The University of Memphis. December, 2012. Investor
Disagreement on Corporate Spin-Offs News. Major Professor: Dr. Chong Soo Pyun.
This study analyzes temporal trading volume surge associated with a firm’s public
announcement of its spinoff divesture. Combining Miller (1977)’s static difference-ofopinion (DO) model with Banerjee and Kremer (2010)’s dynamic DO model, this study
investigates the effects of investors’ differential interpretations of spinoff announcements
on price changes for 221 corporate spinoffs in the U.S from 1964 to 2005. We measure
the ex-ante level of DO as the degree of DO about a firm’s value in a typical trading day
prior to a spinoff announcement, and the event level of DO as the changed level of DO
triggered by investors’ differential interpretations of its spinoff announcement. We find
that spinoff announcements spark a sudden and sharp increase in the level of DO. This
increase is positively correlated with abnormal returns generated by the announcements.
Consistent with the notion of investors’ limited attention, the ex-ante level of DO is
negatively related to disagreement shock. Further, defining the ex-ante level of DO as
disagreement factor, we validate its statistical significance after controlling for other
known determinants for these returns in the entire study period. For the first study period
between 1964 and 1991, we confirm the results of prior studies on the effects of a change
in industrial focus and the relative size of a spun-off on the abnormal returns. For the
second study period from 1992 to 2005, all these factors are found insignificant. Only
variable that consistently accounts for the cross-sectional variation in the abnormal
returns for both periods is disagreement factor.
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Part 1
Introduction and Overview
Trading volume behavior around an informational event typically display
abnormally high level of trading volume on the date of the event and gradual attenuating
or declining trading volume during a period, usually a few days, following the event.
This behavior is not easily explained by the traditional asset pricing models based on the
assumption of rational expectations in which agents share common priors and interpret
information homogeneously. Departing from this assumption of rational and
homogeneous agents, Banerjee and Kremer (2010) develop a dynamic difference-ofopinion model in which investors have heterogonous beliefs and interpret information
differently. In particular, focusing on a change in the level of disagreement induced by an
infrequent, yet a material event, Banerjee and Kremer’s model is able to explain those
patterns in trading volume without assuming exogenous noisy processes typically
employed in noisy rational expectations models.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of changes in the levels of
differences of opinion (henceforth DO) on stock prices around corporate spinoff
announcements. We apply Banerjee and Kremer’s idea of changes in DO levels to
Miller’s (1977) static DO model to predict prices changes. Guided by dynamic DO
models, we measure several (trading) volume-based proxies for what we define as the exante level of DO or the disagreement factor of a sample firm, which reflect the level of
disagreement about the firm’s value on a typical trading day prior to its spinoff
announcement. Alternatively, we consider the disagreement factor as a firm-specific
characteristic defined by heterogeneous investors. We document that these proxies
1

account for a large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns generated
by the announcements using a sample of corporate spinoffs announced during a 41-year
period from 1964 to 2005. This finding results because changes in the levels of DO occur
in the manner that is consistent with the notion of limited attentions on the part of
investors. Moreover, controlling for other known sources for the abnormal returns
reported in the literature on corporate spinoffs, we find that these sources are no longer
associated with the abnormal returns for our 41-year of study period. Only disagreement
factor is able to consistently account for the cross-sectional variation in these returns.
Our choice of spinoff announcements is motivated by Moeller, Schlingemann,
and Stulz (2007). They note that the announcement of an acquisition effectively increases
the shares of an acquirer for trading (i.e., the float), which implies a shift in the supply
curve of the acquirer’s stock in Miller (1977)’s model. This increased float has to be
absorbed by investors who hold less optimistic opinions about the bidder. Thus bidders
with higher levels of DO (i.e., steeper slopes of the demand curves) should earn lower
abnormal returns. Consistent with this implication, Moeller et al. document a negative
relationship between the levels of DO and acquirer abnormal returns for the case of
equity offer but not cash offer. In contrast to an acquisition announcement, a spinoff
announcement made by a firm does not involve an increase in its float, yet has a potential
to incur substantial disagreement among investors about the prospect of the firm1. This

1

Miller (1977) illustrates an example in which a steelmaker and a meatpacking firm individually
will be valued higher than a merged firm (i.e. a meatpacking-steelmaking firm) in his model. He explains
that those who have high opinions about either meatpacking or steelmaking firm alone would not value the
merged firm as high as they do for a standalone firm. Thus, less optimistic investors will buy the shares of
the merged firm.
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allow us exclusively look at changes in the level of DO and its implications on price
reactions days surrounding spinoff announcements.
Our analytical framework is based on a simple adaptation of a change in the level
of DO into Miller’s model. In this model in which short-sales constraints are binding, it is
the level of DO about the value of a firm that causes the demand curve for the firm to be
downward sloping. Thus, the slope of the demand curve increases with disagreement
about its value among investor. If the firm’s announcement of spinoff spurs large
disagreement among investors, this event raises the slope of the demand curve. We
interpret this jump in the level of DO as a change in the slope of demand curve. To
measure a change in the level of DO, we consider a two-period setting: the pre-event (the
250-trading-day period before the announcement of a spinoff) and the event period (the
3-trading-day period around the date of the announcement). From each period, we
estimate the ex-ante and the event level of DO for the firm.
We propose the following three hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 states that the event
level of DO should be larger than the ex-ante level of DO. As a baseline test for
Hypotheses 2 and Hypothesis 3, we test whether there is a sudden increase in the level of
DO sparked by a spinoff announcement. Given that the level of DO spikes up, which
implies a (upward) shift in the slope of the demand curve (i.e., a steeper slope), in the
event period, Hypothesis 2 states that the disagreement shock should be positively
correlated with announcement abnormal return. The disagreement shock defined as the
difference between the event and the ex-ante level of DO is also translated to the
magnitude of a change in the slope of the demand curve. Hence, sample firms with
greater disagreement shocks relative to their ex-ante levels of DO are expected to earn
3

larger abnormal returns. Finally, Hypothesis 3 states that the ex-ante level DO is
negatively correlated with the disagreement shock. This proposition is based on the idea
of limited attention which states that cognitively overloaded investors pay attention to
only a subset of information (e.g., Hirchleifer & Teoh, 2003; Peng & Xiong, 2006).
Because of this type of cognitive constraint, a firm that is out of investors’ attention,
perhaps due to infrequent coverage by the media, would have a low ex-ante level of DO.
In other words, it is less susceptible to heterogeneous interpretations by investors because
it is rarely reported by the media. However, when the announcement of a spinoff, which
is very likely to receive wide and intense media coverage, becomes publicly, a firm
characterized by a lower ex-ante level of DO is expected to incur larger disagreement
relative to its ex-ante level of DO than is a firm with a high ex-ante level of DO.
For the construction for proxies for the ex-ante and the event level of DO, we note
that as the event period lasts for three days, a proxy for both levels of DO should be
comparable to properly estimate a change in the level of DO. That is, since the latter
reflects the changed level of DO on the announcement date of a spinoff, the former
should reflect the normal level of DO on a typical trading day prior to the announcement.
We use daily trading volume turnover as a basic variable for estimating a proxy for
disagreement. Our use of trading volume is based on recent developments in dynamic DO
models in which disagreement is the key variable that drives the positive correlation
between trading volume and overpricing (e.g., Hong, Scheinkman, & Xiong, 2004;
Scheinkman & Xiong 2003). In other words, the level of trading volume for a firm
contains information about the degree of investor disagreement about the firm’s value.
Specifically, we follow the estimation methods developed by Garfinkel (2009). The focus
4

of his methodology is to isolate a part of trading volume after controlling for the other
parts related to the market-wide and the mean level of firm-specific trading volume or
information-related trading on a particular day. We refer these estimators as the (trading)
volume-based measures of DO (VDO). We employ five different VDOs including daily
volume turnover, and estimate them each day during the pre-event and the event (see
Section 4.C for the measurement details of VDOs). Our preliminary analysis of statistical
characteristics of daily estimates of VDOs shows that these estimates in the pre-event
period have stable normal distributions. This result allows us to properly take an average
of daily estimates of a VDO in the pre-event period, and meaningfully define it as a
proxy for the ex-ante level of DO or an ex-ante DO proxy. Similarly, we define the threeday mean of daily estimates of a VDO in the event period as a proxy for the event level of
DO or an event DO proxy.
It is commonly accepted in the investment literature that a high level of trading
activity is widely regarded as a sign of a stock’s market liquidity (e.g., Brennan, Chordia,
& Subrahmanyam, 1998; Datar, Naik, & Radcliffe, 1998). Because our ex-ante DO
proxies are based on VDOs that are essentially geared to estimate extra portion of trading
volume, we attempt to establish our ex-ante DO proxies as an indicator for the level of
DO rather than for liquidity. Comparing with five popular proxies for liquidity (i.e.,
dollar trading volume, firm size, the effective spread, and the standard deviation of return
residuals), we find that none of our ex-ante DO proxies (except volume turnover) is
related to these liquidity proxies. Interestingly, we also find that the ex-ante DO proxy
based on volume turnover is strongly positively related to the effective spread and the
residual standard deviation. This result is the opposite of the notion that high volume
5

turnover is a sign of liquidity. But dollar trading volume has the expected signs with the
effective spread and the residual standard deviation as a proxy for liquidity. Apparently,
volume turnover (i.e., a ratio of the number of share traded to shares outstanding), or our
basic ingredient for estimating the other VDOs, contains information more than, or
perhaps other than market liquidity about the sample firms.
In addition, we check the robustness of our ex-ante DO proxies by comparing
them with the extant DO proxies (i.e., breadth of ownership by Chen, Hong, & Stein,
2002; the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts by Diether, Malloy, & Scherbina,
2002); the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts on the long-term earnings growth by Moeller
et al., 2007). We find that our proxies are not significantly related to these extant
disagreement proxies. One exception is the relationship between the ex-ante DO proxy
based on volume turnover and the dispersion of analysts’ long-term earnings growth for
which we find a significant correlation. Since the dispersion of analysts’ earnings
forecasts is often used as a proxy for liquidity by researchers, we show that it is more
closely related to liquidity at least in our sample. In particular, dollar trading volume is
highly negatively correlated with the dispersion measured based on analysts’ earnings
forecasts, consistent with the notion that they both represent liquidity. However, volume
turnover is not related to the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts, but it is
significantly associated with the dispersion in analysts’ long-term earnings growth. Thus,
our results suggest that the information content of volume turnover is the degree of
disagreement among investors about the value of a sample firm.
Furthermore, we find that the ex-ante DO proxy based on volume turnover has a
significant negative correlation with the pricing indicators (i.e., book-to-market ratio and
6

earning-to-price ratio). Consistent with the central prediction of DO models, this result
lends further support for our ex-ante DO proxy that it captures the cross-sectional
variation in the degrees of overpricing, or the ex-ante levels of DO, of the sample firms.
For ex-ante DO proxies based on the other four VDOs, though their correlations with the
liquidity proxies are non-existent, their relationship with the extant DO proxies is
insignificant. Nevertheless, given their strong relationship with the ex-ante DO proxies
based on volume turnover, their empirical relevance as proxy for disagreement will be
validated by testing the hypotheses.
The test results of the three hypotheses are as follows. For Hypothesis 1, we find
that there is a sudden increase in the level of DO in the announcement period (i.e., the
event level of DO). The mean values of ex-ante DO proxies are about zero. However,
event DO proxies spike up such that their mean values hover about 0.65. Indeed, the
announcement of a spinoff is a significant information event that invokes huge
disagreement among investors. Measuring the disagreement shocks (i.e., ex-ante level of
DO minus event level of DO), we find that they are significantly and positively related to
announcement abnormal returns as it is postulated in Hypothesis 2. This result
substantiates our analytical setup that a change in the level of DO triggered by a public
announcement of a spinoff can be interpreted as a shift in the slope of a demand curve in
Miller’s framework. Moreover, this evidence suggests that the VDOs employed in this
study adequately capture investor disagreement. That is, by extrapolating the ex-ante and
the event level of DO from daily estimates of VDOs, we are able to examine the effect of
a change in the level of DO on price reactions around the spinoff announcement. Finally,
consistent with Hypothesis 3, we find that the lower the ex-ante level of DO, the greater
7

the disagreement shock. Across the sample, the correlation between the ex-ante levels of
DO and the disagreement shocks is negatively significant regardless of the choice of a
VDO. More importantly, this result implies that it is a negative correlation between the
ex-ante level of DO and the disagreement shock that gives rise to a negative correlation
between announcement abnormal returns and the ex-ante levels of disagreement. We find
the evidence in support of this implication. Therefore, the ex-ante level of DO can be a
potent determinant that can be helpful in understanding for the cross-sectional variation
in the abnormal returns.
In Part 2, we broaden our investigation by extending the bivariate analyses in Part
1 to multiple regression analyses. We test whether the cross-sectional variation in
announcement abnormal returns can be accounted for with our key variable, the ex-ante
level of DO, when controlling for other known sources for these returns reported in the
literature. We rename the ex-ante level of DO as disagreement factor in Part 2. We select
the following three factors or determinants that have received strong empirical coverage
as the sources for the abnormal returns: relative size which is a portion of a parent’s
assets assigned to its spun-off subsidiary, the level of information asymmetry ex ante, and
focus factor which indicates whether a (parent) firm split up a related or unrelated
subsidiary to its core business (i.e., focus-increasing or non-focus-increasing spinoff).
Note that since spinoff announcements have shown to generate, on average, positive
abnormal returns—we also verify this stylized fact in Part 1, these returns are often
referred to as wealth gains or wealth effects.
Prior to multivariate analyses, we examine two control variables individually:
information asymmetry and focus factor because we find that the evidence for the effect
8

of both variables on wealth gains are inconclusive in the literature. Our preliminary
analysis of information asymmetry finds that there is a significant deterioration in all the
proxies that we employ for information asymmetry from the pre-spinoff to the postspinoff period. Moreover, this exacerbation in information asymmetry is more severe for,
and limited to, focus-increasing firms. Our finding rejects the information hypothesis
proposed by Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), while it is consistent with the
result of Huson and MacKinnon (2003). For focus factor or industry focus hypothesis, we
show that there is no difference in wealth gains whether a sample firm is engaged in
focus-increasing or non-focus-increasing spinoff with our full sample. But, noting that
most of empirical studies on the industry focus hypothesis cover the spinoff
announcements made before the year of 1992 (e.g., Daley, Mehrotra, & Sivakumar, 1997;
Desai & Jain, 1999; Krishnaswami & Subramaniam, 1999), we confirm the hypothesis
that only focus-increasing firms earn significantly positive abnormal returns, while nonfocus increasing firms’ abnormal returns are, on average, not statistically different from
zero for the first study period from 1964 to 1991. However, in the second study period,
we find no statistically significant differences in abnormal returns between focusincreasing and non-focus-increasing firms. Investors’ responses are equally positive to
both types of spinoff.
In cross-sectional regressions with the full sample, we find that announcement
abnormal returns are significantly negatively related to disagreement factor after
controlling for the known determinants for these returns. This result validates the
implication of Hypothesis 3 in which we suggest disagreement factor as a potent
explanatory variable for the abnormal returns. Moreover, disagreement factor adds
9

explanatory power as large as that provided by all the control variables combined. The
economic effect of the relationship between disagreement factor and the abnormal return
is substantial. For instance, when there is one standard deviation increase (from the mean)
in disagreement factor, the abnormal return decreases roughly by 1.11%. However,
confirming the results of the preliminary analyses of information asymmetry and focus
factor, we find that these determinants no longer explain the abnormal returns for our full
sample of spinoffs.
We also analyze the relationships between disagreement shock and the control
variables (including disagreement factor) because the information content of some of
these variables can be the sources engendering disagreement in the announcement period.
We show first that disagreement shock is larger for a firm with a lower disagreement
factor in the confirmation of Hypothesis 3. Second, disagreement shock is also larger for
a firm that has a lower level of information asymmetry ex ante, that engages in focusincreasing spinoff, and that splits up a larger portion of its assets to its spun-off subsidiary.
If investors perceive that a firm is mired by a higher level of information asymmetry, they
seem to inhibit expression of their disagreement and refrain from trading based on their
own interpretations.
Finally, in the sub-period analysis, our regression results substantiate the findings
of previous studies in that focus factor and relative size jointly explain the cross-sectional
variation in announcement abnormal returns for the first study period from 1964 to 1991.
But in the second study period from 1992 to 2005, these two determinants become
insignificant. In both sub-periods, we find no evidence for the information hypothesis that
the level of information asymmetry ex ante is not related to the abnormal returns. Only
10

variable that remains significant in both study periods is disagreement factor, which
consistently negatively related to the abnormal returns, and thus account for a significant
faction of the cross-sectional variation in these returns.
Our study adds to the literature largely in two distinctive ways. First, many
empirical studies test the implications of DO models—mainly Miller (1977)’s proposition
that the overpriced stocks due to investor disagreement forecasts low expected returns—
in a static cross-sectional asset-pricing test at an aggregate market level (e.g., Chen et al.,
2002; Diether et al., 2002; Piqueira, 2006). However, we focus on a particular corporate
event, namely the announcement of a spinoff, and show the relevance of Miller (1977)’s
framework to which we adopt a change in the level of DO (Banerjee & Kremer, 2010) for
understanding the joint behavior of trading volume and overpricing around the
announcement. Furthermore, our results suggest that information content of daily trading
volume turnover is about either more than, or other than, conventionally accepted proxy
for the market liquidity of a stock. Thus, a firm-specific level of DO in the pre-event
period as well as in the event period can be inferred from trading volume turnover.
Secondly, our study adds to a recent development in the application of DO models
to corporate finance. For example, Moeller et al. (2007) study the effect of the level of
DO about a bidder on its abnormal return around the acquisition announcement, while
Chatterjee, John, and Yan (2012) examine the effect of the level of DO about the target’s
equity value on the takeover premium that a bidder has to pay for the target. These
studies focus on changes in the float (or the supply curve), assuming no changes in the
demand curve. In contrast, our investigation of spinoffs sheds light on potential effects of
changes in the demand curve induced by heterogeneous interpretation on various
11

significant corporate events (e.g., earnings announcements) since these events also tend
to generate similar patterns: excessive trading volume on the event date and a gradual
decline of trading volume over a few days after the event date.
More importantly, the prior literature has examined sources for wealth gains
generated from spinoff announcements (i.e., motives for spinoffs) based on the
assumption that managers act rationally to maximize the shareholder value—most likely
because their compensations are tied to this, and thus rational investors react positively to
spinoff decisions. However, these motives—value creation through a spinoff by reducing
information asymmetry, by focusing on core business, or by splitting up a large portion of
assets to a spun-off— at best have limited power to explain wealth gains. In particular
none of these motives are related to announcement abnormal returns associated with
spinoffs occurred since 1992. But, our key result suggests that understanding behavioral
characteristics of investors proves to be critical for analyzing the effects of their reactions
to the announcement of a spinoff on price changes. As we show, not only because
investors have different priors and interpret information differently, but also because they
react to the announcement in the manner that is consistent with the idea of limited
attention, disagreement factor can account for a significant fraction of the cross-sectional
variation in announcement abnormal returns. In this sense, our research is related to a
branch of behavioral corporate finance which emphasizes the effect of investor behavior
that is less than fully rational (Baker & Wurgler, 2012).
One interesting implication of the dissertation that we will tackle in future
research is whether managers engage in a spinoff to create value or more correctly
overpricing by catering to investors who hold the most optimistic views on either a parent
12

or its subsidiary. The presence of disagreement among investors implies that the sum of
the parent’ and the subsidiary’s value as separate entities can be greater than the current
value of the combined firm. If informed managers are aware this situation, they will
exploit such less-than-rational investor behavior to increase the firm’s value. A research
on this topic would show that not only does investor disagreement have a temporal
impact (triggered by the announcement of a spinoff) on contemporaneous overpricing,
but also might affect the long-term values of the parent and the spun-off subsidiary.
Restatement of Miller’s Analytical Framework
We consider Banerjee and Kremer (2010)’s dynamic model in the context of
Miller (1977)’s static model. As the former model is focused on a change in the level of
difference of opinion driven by an information-driven event, we interpret this sudden
change in disagreement among investors as a change in the slope of the demand curve for
a stock in Miller’s framework.
Figure 1 illustrates how the market price of a stock is determined in Miller’s
model in which the main two constructs are the existence of disagreement among
investors and short-sale constraints. Suppose, in period t, a fixed number of firm A’s
stock is available for trading at

(i.e., the float). Within the traditional asset-pricing

paradigm in which investors have an identical estimation of the expected return from the
stock, or they agree on its value, its market price is set at P0. The demand curve for the
stock is flat because there is no disagreement regarding the value of the stock among
investors. However, the presence of disagreement induces a downward-sloping demand
curve shown as Curve A in the figure, and the price is set at PA. Now, Stock A is owned
by the optimists (i.e., a small subset of the entire investor population) who have the
13

highest valuation for the stock. Consequently, PA is greater than P0 because PA reflects
the valuation of those optimists rather than that of the average valuation of investors. But,
under no restrictions in short sales, the price would fall back to P0.

Figure 1. Price Reactions from a Change in the Level of Differences of Opinion in the
Announcement Period
Assume further that we have firm B which is identical to firm A in characteristics,
but it differ only in the degree of disagreement in investors’ belief such that investors
disagree less about the value of firm B than they do about that of firm A. If there are no
differences of opinion or no short-sales constraints, stock B would also be priced at P0.
But, those constraints are a market reality, and thus the pessimists are unable to arbitrage
mispricing away by selling the stock short due to high costs of or institutional constraints

14

against engaging in short-sales.2 However, compared to firm A, a lower divergence of
opinion for firm B reduces the steepness of its demand curve, or the slope of its demand
curve at (

) shown as Curve B, and therefore the market price of firm B is

determined at PB. Note that PB is lower than PA because firm A has lower level of
disagreement than does firm B.
We define

(where i = A or B) as the parameter for the level of DO in a

period prior to the announcement of a spinoff and label it as the ex-ante level of DO.
Suppose that the announcement cause investors to interpret information content of the
announcement heterogeneously, thereby increasing the level of disagreement, or causing
a jump in disagreement since this announcement can be reasonably regarded as an
infrequent, but a significant information event that invokes widely differential
interpretations from investors. We define this elevated level of disagreement as

,

which we label as the event level of DO. In turn, changes in the levels of DO
(

) for both firm A and B implies corresponding changes in the slopes

of their demand curves.
Therefore, by adapting a change in the level of DO (from the pre-event to the
event period) into Miller (1977)’s model, we derive testable hypotheses by examining
relationships between

and

, and their effect on prices during the

announcement period. Hereafter, we will use the level of DO and the slope of a demand

2

Hong et al. (2006) state that the assumption of investors (even large institutions such as
mutual funds) who face short-sales constraints is eminently plausible. They report that there are
about 70% mutual funds that are prohibited to take a short position as stated in in SEC Form NSAR (Almazan, Brown, Carlson, & Chapman, 2004). Moreover, a majority of equity mutual
funds (79%) does not use any synthetically devised short position, for example, with options and
futures (Koski & Pontiff, 1999).
15

curve (in the absolute magnitude) interchangeably since the “downwardness” in the slope
arises only in the presence of DO.
Testable Hypotheses
In this study we follow the SEC definition of a corporate spinoff: the creation of
an independent public company from its parent firm. This form of divesture involves
neither a dilution of equity nor a transfer of ownership from the current equity holders.
Therefore, the shares of the spun-off unit are distributed to the current shareholders of the
parent firm on a pro rata basis and there should be no change in the supply of the shares
(i.e., the float of the parent) unless there is hoarding of stocks by corporate insiders or
informed investors who anticipate an imminent corporate spinoff. Additionally, there
should be no abrupt and significant change in the demand a priori for the parent firm’s
stock by the firm’s existing shareholders.
In contrast to an acquisition, a spinoff does not involve an increase in the float,
and yet a public announcement of corporate spinoff has all ingredients for substantial
disagreement among investors.3 If a spinoff announcement by a sample firm spurs a
large disagreement among investors about the prospects of the firm following the
divesture, the announcement raises the slope of its demand curve in the context of
Miller’s model in a two-period setting encompassing a pre-announcement and a postannouncement periods. This in turn allow us to analyze a change in the level of DO and
its implications on price reactions days surrounding a spinoff announcement based on

3

Miller (1977) illustrates an example in which a steelmaker and a meatpacking firm
individually will be valued higher than a merged firm (i.e. a meatpacking-steelmaking firm) in his
model. He explains that those who have high opinions about either meatpacking or steelmaking
firm alone would not value the merged firm as high as they do for a standalone firm. Thus, less
optimistic investors will buy the shares of the merged firm.
16

Miller’s (1977) proposition that given the constraint of short sale, the price of the stock
will reflect the valuation of the optimists while that of pessimists is not registered into the
price since they stay away from the market. In this study, we use a sample of 235 firms
which announced a spin off during the 41 year period from 1964 to 2005 to test the
following hypotheses (The sample selection criteria are detailed in Section 5.A).
Hypothesis 1. The level of DO in the event period should be larger than that in the preevent period.
Provided that firm A (in Figure 1) announces its decision to spin off one or more
of its business units, consider a situation where investor would re-evaluate the firm’s
value by without disagreement. More specifically, the announcement does not induce a
change in the level of DO, or

and

. In this case, there would be an upward

shift in its demand curve shown as Curve A0, given that spinoff announcements generate
wealth effect. Then, its price is set at PA0 when there is no change in the level of DO, but
P01 when there is no disagreement in the first place. Suppose that the announcement also
spurs a large disagreement among investors causing a jump in the level of DO in the
event period. In turn, the slope of firm A’s demand curve changes so that its curve moves
to Curve A2. We consider that the effect of a change in the level of DO on the price
would be much larger than or dominate that of other rational factors that drives
revaluation of the firm. Therefore, in Part 1, we focus on relationship between changes in
disagreement and price changes. But in Part 2, we will control for other known
determinants for price changes prompted by spinoff announcements.
Given a sudden hike in the level of DO in the event period and assuming two
) for firm A, the stock price of firm A is set

different event levels of DO (
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at

at Curve A2 and

at Curve A1 in Figure 1. Apparently, the larger the

change in the level of DO, the larger is the accompanying change in price from the
announcement. Note that it is the differential changes in the level of DO
, and thus the changes in the slope of the demand
curve (from Curve A to Curve A2 or A1), that results in the differential price changes
. By defining the change in the level of DO (∆
) as the disagreement shock, we have the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2.Unconditional on the ex-ante level of difference of opinion, or equivalently
the slope of demand curve in the pre-event period, there should be a positive correlation
between disagreement shock and abnormal return in the announcement period
This hypothesis is a modified version of the prediction of Banerjee and Kremer’s
(2010) model, the prediction that is solely based on the event level of DO that stock
. But by modifying Banerjee and Kremer’s

return is increasing in the magnitude of

result into Miller’s model, we derive the size of disagreement shock by explicitly taking
into account of

. Thus we can propose a more cogent hypothesis as compared to

Banerjee and Kremer’s model prediction. More importantly, we argue that this
hypothesis will show that (i) whether it is disagreement that causes a downward-sloping
demand curve and (ii) whether the interpretation of the level of DO as the magnitude of
the slope of a demand curve is relevant for our analysis.
We derive additional empirical implications by postulating a relationship between
and

, and the impact on announcement returns resulted from this

relationship. We consider the idea of limited attention (e.g., Hirchleifer & Teoh, 2003;
Peng and Xiong, 2006) which states that cognitively overloaded investors pay attention to
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only a subset of information. Hong and Stein (2007) suggest that if a public
announcement of information is released in an attention-grabbing manner (e.g., a wide
coverage by news media), perhaps because of weighty consequence of information
content of the announcement, these investors’ reactions will result in large responses in
price and trading volume. Limited and sporadic attention of investors also implies that a
firm with less frequent arrival of news or limited coverage by the media prior to the
announcement could be a firm with a low level of DO. In the DO model of Scheinkman
and Xiong (2003) in which investors interpret news differently, a greater stimulus of the
news results in higher disagreement and more trading, as investors’ valuations fluctuate
more. Thus, if a spinoff announcement is released in an attention-grabbing fashion, we
propose that relative to the ex-ante level of DO, a firm characterized by a lower ex-ante
level of DO will trigger a greater level of differential interpretation of the announcement
than a firm with a higher ex-ante level of DO. In other words, the disagreement shock, or
the magnitude of a change in the slope of the demand curve, would be larger for a “lower
disagreement firm” than for a “higher-disagreement firm.”
Hypothesis 3. The ex-ante level of DO is negatively correlated with the disagreement
shock in the event period
The importance of this hypothesis is that no correlation between the two variables
would suggest that

, or the pre-event slope of the demand curve, has no

connection to price changes in the announcement period. Then, as discussed for
Hypothesis 2, announcement abnormal returns depend only on the slope changes caused
by spinoff announcements, or the sizes of the disagreement shocks, ∆ . However, if
there is a negative relation, it implies that a firm with a lower
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or a flatter pre-

event slope of the demand curve will incur a greater magnitude of ∆

or a change in the

slope. Furthermore, if a lower-disagreement firm is affected by a greater disagreement
shock (i.e., a larger jump in the level of DO during the event period relative to its ex-ante
level of DO) than a higher-disagreement firm, then the former should earn a higher
abnormal return than the latter.
Therefore, we draw an important implication for the cross-sectional variation in
abnormal returns in the announcement period, which is resulted from the posited
relationship between the ex-ante level of DO and the disagreement shocks. If
and ∆

are negatively correlated, this relationship suggests a negative correlation

between the ex-ante level of DO and the abnormal returns. Thus, the ex-ante level of DO
can be a significant factor for understanding the cross-sectional variation in the abnormal
returns.
Methodology
A. Empirical Issues and Event-Study Design. Testing the hypotheses developed in
the preceding section, our primary focus is to define a proper measure that captures the
level of DO in the pre-event and the event period, namely

and

. To

examine an empirical relationship between the ex-ante and the event levels of DO
requires that a proxy we use should have comparability, especially for measuring a
change in the level of DO. Since
announcement day of a spinoff,

should reflect the level of DO in the
should be measured to mirror a normal degree

of disagreement in an ordinary trading day. When these conditions are met, we can
properly estimate the disagreement shock or the magnitude of a change in the slope of the
demand curve from the pre-event period to the event period.
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However, the extant proxies developed to measure disagreement (breadth of
ownership in Chen et al., 2002) and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts in
Diether et al., 2002) are infeasible within our analytical parameters. First, the data used
for both proxies are recorded in a low frequency (monthly for the dispersion and
quarterly for breadth of ownership). Second, these two proxies—breadth of ownership
and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts—are employed in testing the predictive
power of the level of DO for stock returns in the Miller (1977)’s static setting, implying
that they may not be able to capture a change in disagreement driven by a flash
information event such as a sudden public announcement of a corporate spinoff.
However, the progress in the literature (Harrison & Kreps, 1978; Hong et al.,
2006; Scheinkman & Xiong, 2003) that develops dynamic models with disagreement
provides theoretical ground for using trading volume to derive the level of investor
disagreement. These models generate a speculative component in prices (i.e., bubble or
overpricing) accompanied by excessive trading volume and volatility when investors are
overconfident (i.e., a source of disagreement). Hence, the main prediction of these
dynamic models is a positive correlation between the level of trading volume and the
degree of overpricing. That is, the higher the level of disagreement or the greater the
volatility in disagreement, the more intensive the trading activity and the higher the price.
In other words, trading activity contains information about the level of DO regarding the
value of the stock in question among investors.
Strictly speaking, there is no theoretical ground in Miller’s (1977) static model for
mapping trading volume to divergence of opinion, because investors do not change their
initial positions until liquidation (Hong & Stein, 2007). However, dynamic DO models
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provide an alternative venue for studying the effect of disagreement on the joint behavior
of volume and overpricing. Due to the importance of these dynamic models for our study,
we review studies on dynamic disagreement models in the next section. But for now,
based on the prediction drawn from these dynamic models, that is a positive correlation
between trading volume and overpricing, we use daily trading volume turnover as a basic
ingredient for the estimation of both

and

. Furthermore, we follow

Garfinkel (2009) whose model isolates a part of volume turnover after controlling for the
known determinants of trading volume, such as market-wide trading volume and average
level of firm-specific trading volume. We refer to these estimators as the volume-based
measures of DO (VDO). We employ five different VDOs including daily volume
turnover and estimate them each trading day during the pre-event and the event period
(see Section 4.C for the details for the measurement of VDOs).
To measure

and

, we define the pre-event period as a 250-trading-

day period ending 11 trading days prior to a spinoff announcement date or the window of
(260-AD, 11-AD) where AD is the announcement date. The event period is defined as a
three-day period surrounding AD, the window of (AD-1, AD+1). To measure

,

we extrapolate it by computing the mean of daily estimates of a VDO over the pre-event
period. Thus, for firm i, the ex-ante level of DO is defined by
_

Similarly, we estimate

∑

,

by calculating the three-day mean of daily estimates of a

VDO over the event period.
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(3)

∑

(4)

,

Recall that our purpose is to derive the value of

that reflects the degree of

disagreement among investors about a firm’s value on a typical trading day. With
sufficient data points (250 observations for a VDO) that have a well-behaved stable
empirical distribution, which we will show in Section 7, we argue that the mean of daily
VDO estimates in the pre-event period properly captures the representative or normal
level of DO in the ordinary trading day.
B. Literature Review for Measuring Disagreement with Trading Volume. Harrison
and Kreps (1978) publish the initial work on speculative markets in a dynamic setting
with heterogeneous agents. In their model, under the assumptions of heterogeneous
expectations and no short-sales conditions, they demonstrate that speculative behavior
(i.e., bidding up the price) is engendered by the anticipation that an agent can resell a
stock to other more optimistic investor at a higher price in the future. The equilibrium
price reflects not only the valuation of the optimist but also the resale option so that he
pays above his own valuation in anticipation of future capital gain. While their model sets
a ground for overpricing of an asset in a speculative market with agents with divergent
opinions, it does not provide a theoretical connection that link asset price and trading
volume.
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Hong et al. (2006) extend the insights of
Harrison and Kreps (1978) and analyze the link between price and trading volume in
dynamic setting in which heterogeneous beliefs and short-sale constraints are the main
ingredients. Specifically, Schinkman and Xiong (2003) develop a model in which
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overconfident investors’ speculative behavior leads to overpricing of a stock, increased
trade frequency and ensuing excessive price volatility. In their model the mechanism by
which trading volume is generated is through the crossing effect that occurs whenever the
valuation of the stock by other investors exceeds a current owner’s valuation. This effect
is intensified when some exogenous factors, for example frequent arrival of news about
the stock, exacerbate disagreement among investors. In turn, constrained by the market
reality of short-sale restrictions, the stock will be more overpriced. The key insight in
their model is that the level of DO is not a variable that is exogenously given, but rather
endogenously driven in a dynamic setting, and it is being manifested in trading volume.
Therefore, the central prediction of dynamic DO models is that trading volume is
positively correlated with the extent of overpricing. This pricing implication of trading
volume, hence, gives a basis for using it for estimating the level of disagreement.
Following the theoretical work of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Mei,
Scheinkman, and Xiong (2004) empirically investigate the joint effect of heterogeneous
beliefs and short-sale constraints on trading volume and price with a unique data set from
Chinese stock markets from 1994 to 2001.4 With a sample of 73 Chinese company stocks,
they find that monthly share turnover of Class A shares are 4.7 times larger than those of
Class B, and at the same time the average premium (i.e.,

1) for

Class A shares is 422%. In a regression analysis, controlling for risk and liquidity, they

4

The data consists of 73 stocks that have twin shares (i.e., Class A and B) with equal
payoffs and voting right. During the sample period, short sales were illegal, there were no
derivative market for equity, and the reopening of the stock market was a fertile ground for
speculative trading similar to the IT boom in the U.S in the late 1990s due to a dominant
participation of less experienced individual investors. Class A shares were only available for
domestic investors, while Class B only for foreigners.
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report a significant and positive correlation between A-share turnover and A-share
premium over B-share: monthly A-share turnover explains on average 20% of the crosssectional variation in the A-share premium. Their findings lend empirical support for the
implications of dynamic DO models in that trading activity driven by disagreement is
positively related to overpricing and, thus, it explains the cross-sectional variation in
overpricing.
Intuitively, large trading volume might simply be a manifestation of a liquid stock.
According to the liquidity premium hypothesis, a stock with low trading costs is expected
to have high trading volume and low return. There is a large body of literature studying
the effect of liquidity on stock returns. Some representative works from this area include
Datar et al. (1998) on trading volume turnover, Brennan et al. (1998) on dollar trading
volume, and Amihud and Mendelson (1986) on bid-ask spreads. Among them, using
trading volume as a proxy for liquidity, Brennan et al. (1998) examine the effect of nonrisk factors on expected stock returns. Controlling for the known non-risk factors (size,
momentum, price, and book-to-market ratio), they document a significant and negative
relation between risk-adjusted returns and dollar trading volume. Moreover, Amihud
(2002) shows that stocks with higher illiquidity (measured by the ratio of daily return to
daily trading volume) have higher returns in the subsequent period. In other words, stocks
with higher trading volume tend to be stocks with lower illiquidity. So, these stocks earn
lower future returns than do stocks with lower trading volume.
These studies suggest that there are two competing explanations for the link
between trading volume and contemporaneous changes in price. In DO models, higher
trading volume due to a higher level of disagreement causes overpricing, hence
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forecasting a lower return. In liquidity-based models, stocks with low trading costs are
liquid assets. Thus, all else equal, these stocks are expected to have high trading volume
and low returns. On the other hand, illiquid stocks are expected to have low trading
volume and high returns because investors require compensation for the liquidity risk
inherent in these stocks (Hong & Stein, 2007).
Piqueira (2006) attempts to isolate the implications of DO models from the
liquidity hypothesis. Noting that the standard measures of liquidity (i.e., proportional
quoted and effective bid-ask spread) perform poorly in a cross-sectional regression of
stock returns, she derives a measures of illiquidity that better reflects information
asymmetry (i.e., price impact) than the bid-ask spread normally does. Controlling for
illiquidity as well as size, book-to-market, and momentum, she shows that monthly
volume turnover in the current month (de-meaned by the average turnover over previous
three months) is negatively related to stock returns in subsequent months for a sample of
NYSE and NASDAQ stocks for a period from 1993-2002. Specifically, she finds that one
standard deviation increase in monthly turnover forecasts 0.75 % decrease in monthly
stock returns for NASDAQ samples and 0.35% for NYSE samples. When annualized, a
predicted decline in expected returns is equivalent to roughly to 9% for NASDAQ and
4.25 % for NYSE stocks. Furthermore, even among liquid stocks, a group of NYSE
stocks in the largest size quintile, turnover still enters significantly in the cross-sectional
regression. If turnover is a proxy for liquidity, she argues, the effect of turnover on
returns should be negligible among very liquid stock.
C. Volume-Based Measures of Differences of Opinion (VDOs). In the previous
section, we review theoretical and empirical DO literature that provide rationale for using
26

daily trading volume as a proxy for the level of DO among investors for a given stock. It
stands to reason that an empirically more relevant proxy for the divergence of opinion
from trading volume can be measured if we can isolate a portion of trading volume
generated from disagreement. This would also require a testable equilibrium model of
trading volume, which is still in quest in the literature.5
While there is a lack of a testable equilibrium model for trading volume, Gafinkel
(2009) develops statistical measurements for the level of DO using trading volume,
which he refers to as volume-based measures of DO (VDO). Using the propriety data on
investors’ orders for stocks in NYSE, he constructs a benchmark for the level of DO for
each sample based on the notion that the optimal order submission strategy (i.e., limit vs.
market order) and the optimal price requested (in the case of a limit order) are directly
related to private valuations by investors or their reservation prices (Handa, Schwartz, &
Tiwari, 2003).6 Thus, he argues that a distance between the requested prices on two
adjacent orders can be used for measuring the divergence of opinion on the value of a
stock. Using a sample of NYSE stocks from January to March 2002, he finds that the
volume-based measures of DO have the highest power in explaining the cross-sectional
variation of the benchmarks relative to other DO proxies such as return volatility or the
5

Though Lo and Wang (2000) develop a model for trading volume within a framework of
traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), it only captures trading volume generated by
portfolio rebalancing needs. They concede that a complete or a unified model would have to
incorporate such factors as information asymmetry, idiosyncratic risks, transaction costs, and
other forms of market imperfections.
6

Following an order executed at price A, either a market order will hit the current bid or
ask quote, or a limit order will be submitted. If the incoming order is a market order, Garfinkel
(2009) assumes the requested price equals to price A, implying no divergence on the valuation of
the stock. In the case of the incoming limit order with the bid or ask price worse than the current
quote, the distance between the previous trade price and limit order price mirrors divergence on
the value of the stock.
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dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Further, his principal component analysis
shows that only the volume-based measures contribute to and correlate positively with
the first common component of the benchmark.
Following Garfinkel’s (2009) estimation methods, we start with daily volume
turnover of a stock which is defined as the ratio of the number of shares traded to the
number of shares outstanding at the end of the trading day. We further transform it by
taking the natural logarithm of daily volume turnover (henceforth log turnover), denoting
it as LNTOi,t .7 From LNTOi,t, we subtract the market-wide log turnover (MKLNTOi,t),
which gives the market-adjusted log turnover or MATOi,t. To measure the market-wide
log turnover for day t, we compute a value-weighted average of daily log turnovers of all
ordinary common stocks in NYSE and AMEX.8 Following Tkac (1999), we further
correct for the on-average level of idiosyncratic aspects (or the on-average firm-specific
deviation from the market turnover) of a firm’s trading volume by subtracting the average
of MATOi,t over a 200-day period prior to day t from MATOi,t. Hence, we have the first
VDO, which we call it the unexplained volume and label it as UVi,t .9 It is given by

7

Lo and Wang (2002) show that the most proper measures for trading activity is volume
turnover under a reasonable assumption that all investors hold the same relative proportion of
risky assets all the time (i.e. two fund separation theorem). Hence, they argue that it provides the
sharpest empirical implications.
8

Tkac (1999), deriving volume implications by extending on a traditional ICAPM model ,
shows that 20% of a sample of large NYSE and AMEX stocks have volume turnover ratio that
are not significantly different from that of the market. In addition, she finds that about half of the
sample stocks exhibits significant positive time-series correlation between the samples’ turnovers
and market turnovers. Her results suggest that adjustment for the market-wide trading volume is
appropriate when studying the behavior of individual stocks’ trading volume.
9

While MATOt roughly measures trading volume generated by firm-specific factors, those
factors may include some factors other than difference of opinion, notably idiosyncratic liquidity
(i.e., unrelated to the market-wide trading volume) and trading motived by investors with private
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For the second VDO, we employ a market model for log turnovers analogous to a
market model for stock returns. A support for the use of the model comes from the work
of Tkac (1999) and Lo and Wang (2002). In particular, building an equilibrium model for
turnover assuming a K-funds separation theorem, Lo and Wang show that turnover has a
linear K-factor structure. And their principal component analysis for turnovers of
NYSE/AMEX stocks for the period from 1962 to 1996 show that the first component
explains between 70% and 85% of the variation in turnover. Thus, we estimate a onefactor market model for log turnover over the 200-day period as in the measure of the
unexplained volume.
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where REDSi,t is a residual part of volume for firm i on day t. A close look at equation 6
reveals that it is similar to the unexplained volume in that the intercept term captures the
on-average portion of turnover specific to the firm. However, the coefficient

,

captures the firm-specific sensitivity to the market-wide turnover.10

information. This implies that UVt is a measure of a deviation of those aspects from the normal
level (i.e., a 200-day moving average of MATO) on day t. Therefore, we concede that the
unexplained volume is not a perfect measure of the portion of trading volume due to difference of
opinion, being not able to attribute it entirely to trades engendered by investors with differing
opinions. Nevertheless, given the evidence of Garfinkel (2009) and the lack of an equilibrium
model for trading volume, we consider the unexplained volume to be a proper proxy for investor
divergence of opinion.
10

Recall that we subtract the market turnover in calculation of the unexplained volume,
thereby implicitly assuming the beta in the market model equals to one. However, by estimating
the beta for each sample stock with the market model, we consider it could be more empirically
based than the unexplained turnover (Tkac, 1999).
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Finally, the third VDO is the standardized unexpected volume. As Garfinkel
(2009) notes, UV and RESD assume that new information about stock i arrived on day t,
which changes investors’ mean valuation of the stock and stimulate trades, has the same
effect on trading volume on day t as in our estimation period of (t-200, t-1).To control for
the effect of the arrival of new information on trading volume on day t, we estimate the
following equation:

,

,

,

,
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,
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,

,

(7)

,

This model is built on the empirical evidence that trading volume is related differently to
price changes, depending on the sign and the magnitude of a price change (e.g., Karpoff,
1987; Kim & Verrecchia, 1991, 1994). We assume a linear relationship between price
changes and trading volume, which is captured by

,

and

,

for positive and negative

price changes respectively. The superscripts on the absolute value of a daily return
indicate whether the return is positive or negative on day t. The intercept captures the
mean level of liquidity-driven trading volume specific to the firm. Hence,

,

represents

the portion of trading volume that is not related the average level of the firm’s liquidity
and the information effect on trading volume due to the arrival of news. Finally, we scale
,

with the standard deviation of the residuals (

,

) to get the standardized unexplained

volume or SUVi,t on day t.
Sample of Corporate Spinoffs
A. Sample Selection. We draw the initial sample of firms that successfully
completed spinoffs from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) distribution
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file for the period between 1991 and 2005.11 In the CRSP distribution file, the firms that
engage in spinoff are identified with one of the following four distribution codes: 3762,
3763, 3764, and 3765. There are a total of 255 distribution records with those codes in
the initial sample of which 13 cases have two distribution records for the same spinoff.12
After taking account of the double entries of spinoffs, our sample consists of 242 spinoffs.
Among those spinoffs, approximately 96% (232 out of 242), have the distribution code of
3763. This code is identified as tax-free spinoff in CRSP. We focus on non-taxable
spinoffs or 232 sample firms in this study to maintain homogeneity of the sample.
We extend our sample by combining the sample collected by Vijh (1994) for the
period between 1964 and 1990, which is comprised of 113 parent firms that spin off 121
subsidiaries. To maintain integrity of the sample, we follow the sampling procedures of
Vijh (1994) as closely as possible. His sampling procedure requires identifying clean or
bona fide spinoffs from the initial sample. Thus, a spinoff is defined as a corporate
divesture decision that involves separation of a subsidiary or a division from its parent
firm by distributing the shares of the subsidiary to the current shareholders of the parent
on pro-rata basis. The separation is such that the parent firm does not hold any shares of
the subsidiary; 100 % of ownership is transferred to the current shareholders of the parent,
and the subsidiary is established as an independent publicly traded company in the
market after the completion of spinoff. To select the firms that meet the definition of a

11

Since the distribution file does not report the announcement date, we instead use exdates recorded in the distribution file as the cut off for removing the firms whose ex-dates precede
the year of 1991. It is because we extend our sample by combining Vijh (1994)’s sample that has
the last records of the ex-dates in 1990. Therefore, our sample starts with firms that have the exdates of spin-off distribution in 1991 and ends in 2006.
12

A distribution may involve both cash and share or two spun-off units.
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clean spinoff, which requires the detail of a spinoff transaction, we search articles on
Dow Jones News Wire and the Lexis-Nexis database by querying the name of a sample
firm and using the keyword: spin off or spin-off. We eliminate firms that meet any of the
following criteria:
1) The announcement date or the detail of a spinoff transaction is not available.
2) A spinoff distribution is actually new issuance of another class of share by the
same firm.
3) Spinoffs involve distribution of the shares of other publicly traded firms that
are not subsidiaries of parent firms.
4) Spinoffs are equity carve-outs in which firms engage in an initial public
offering of a fraction of the total shares of a subsidiary to be spun off, and later
the remaining fraction is distributed to the current shareholders.
5) Either a parent or a subsidiary is merged or acquired by another firm
immediately after spin-off.
6) The spinoff is partial in which a parent holds a portion of ownership of its
subsidiary.
7) The sample stocks with CRSP share code other than 10 and 11 (common stocks
of firms incorporated in the U.S) are discarded. The eliminated stocks include
ADRs (American Depository Receipt), Units, and SBIs (Shares of Beneficial
Interest).13

13

The key variable for our study is trading volume that is the base ingredient for
measuring proxies for DO. In the literature that studies trading volume (e.g., Chordia, Roll, &
Subrahmanyam, 2011; Lo and Wang, 2000), securities other than ordinary equities are usually
removed due to different trading characteristics that make it difficult to interpreting their trading
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For the initial samples, the ex-dates and the distribution or the payment dates, and
the record dates are unambiguously recorded in the CRSP distribution file, coinciding
with the dates reported in media coverage. Because the announcement dates of spinoffs
are not recorded in CRSP distribution file, we identify the announcement dates of the
sample firms by searching relevant articles in Dow Jones News Wire and the Lexis-Nexis
database up to two years before the ex-dates. Imposing the seven elimination criteria
above, we identify the final sample of 120 parent companies of which 9 sample firms
spin off two independent subsidiaries in a single instance, hence creating a total of 129
subsidiaries. Finally, combining Vijh (1994)’s sample which covers the period from 1964
to 1990, our final sample consists of 233 parent firms that announced and successfully
completed the spin-offs of 250 independent subsidiaries for the sample period from 1964
to 2006.
B. Sample Distribution. In Table 1, we report the distribution of the sample firms
over the study period. The study period is divided into the seven sub-periods, each of
which lasts for five years except the first sub-period that lasts for seven years. Few
spinoffs occurred before 1976. However, the activity picked up in the subsequent years,
and peaked during the 5-year
period from 1986 to1990 with 53 announcements reported. In the final three sub-periods,
the spinoff activity declines from the peak, and seems stabilize at 30 to 40 range
afterwards.
Out of 221 samples, 173 firms are listed on either NYSE or AMEX (about 78% of
the sample) and 48 firms on NASDAQ at the time they publicly announced spinoff.
volume in usual sense. Therefore, to make sure of the comparability of the volume-based DO
proxies across the sample, we choose only ordinary equities.
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Table 1. Sample of Spinoffs from 1964 to 2005
The table reports the number of spin-offs for the seven five-year sub-periods over the entire sample period from 1971
to 2005; the first sub-period spans seven years from 1964 to 1970. The initial sample of 255 firms is drawn from CRSP
distribution file for the period from 1991 to 2005, and only non-taxable (distribution code of 3763) spin-offs are
selected. The sample elimination criteria are applied to the initial sample (See Section 5.A). After applying the criteria,
we have 120 parent companies. Combining with Vijh (1994)'s sample of 101 parents†, which covers the period from
1964 to 1990, the size of the sample becomes 221. The announcement dates and the details of spin-offs are identified
by searching relevant news reports in Dow Jones News Wire and Lexis and Nexis database. Exchange listings for the
parents are by the spinoff announcement dates and for the subsidiaries by the ex-dates. We classify a parent firm as a
focus-increasing spinoff if its two-digit primary SIC code is different from that of the spun-off. Otherwise, we classify
it as a non-focus-increasing spinoff.
Time period

1964 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
Total

Announcement

NYSE/AMEX

Parent (Subsidiary) Parent (Subsidiary)
1 (1)
1 (1)
7 (7)
5 (6)
17 (17)
10 (8)
30 (35)
20 (18)
53 (56)
45 (29)
30 (32)
26 (16)
39 (43)
33 (31)
44 (47)
33 (29)
221 238
173 138

NASDAQ
Parent
(Subsidiary)
0 (0)
2 (1)
7 (9)
10 (17)
8 (27)
4 (16)
6 (12)
11 (18)
48 100

Change in Focus
NonPercentage
Increasing increasing of Increasing
0
1
0%
6
1
86%
14
3
82%
23
7
77%
36
17
64%
24
6
78%
27
12
67%
19
25
43%
149
72
67%

†Among the sample firms in Vijh (1994), the subsidiaries of nine parent firms have their first trading dates preceding
the spinoff announcement dates. This suggests that those spinoffs are either a distribution of a publicly traded firm
owned by a parent or a distribution of the carved-out shares. Since they fall into the sample elimination criteria, we
discard those firms. In addition, three more firms are removed because they were either merged or acquired prior to the
ex-dates.
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Table 1 also presents the numbers of subsidiaries separated from their parents. While 205
firms spun off one single subsidiary, 15 firms created two subsidiaries, and one spun off
three subsidiaries, making the total number of the subsidiaries to 238. As can be observed
in the Table 1, more subsidiaries are listed on NASDAQ than either NYSE or AMEX.
In the last column, we report the percentages of the parents that engage in focusincreasing spinoffs. It is well known in the spinoff literature that a firm experiences a
positive price response upon the announcement of spinoff when the firm separates a
subsidiary that is unrelated to the main business of the parent. Daley et al. (1997) initially
document significantly larger announcement abnormal returns
for focus-increasing firms than for non-focus-increasing firms. Desai and Jain (1999)
further investigate the effect of focus-increasing spinoffs on long-term stock performance
as well as operating performance. They find that focus-increasing spinoffs have
significantly higher long-run abnormal stock returns and improvements in operating
performance than non-focus increasing spinoffs. Following Desai and Jain (1999), we
define a focus-increasing spinoff as a firm that creates a subsidiary whose two-digit
primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code is different from that of the parent.
Otherwise, we classify a firm as a non-focus-increasing spinoff.14 In all sub-periods
except the last, a majority of the sample is a focus-increasing or cross-industry spinoff.
The preponderance of focus-increasing spinoffs in the sample suggests that refocusing
strategy is one of primary motivations behind spinoff decision, and thus investors
respond to this type of corporate re-structuring positively as documented in the literature.
14

Desai and Jain (1999) define two alternative measures of “industrial focus”; a change
in the Herfindahl index calculated using sales, and the change in the number of segments from the
year before the announcement to the year of the completion of the spinoff. They report that about
90% of their samples are insensitive to the definition of focus used.
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C. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample. To draw a broad picture of the sample
characteristics, in Table 2 we present the descriptive statistics for the market
capitalizations (i.e., firm size) of the sample. For a (parent) firm, the pre-spinoff size is
the product of its price and shares outstanding by the end of the month prior to the month
of the spin-off announcement (henceforth month-1). Likewise, the post-spinoff size of the
parent and its subsidiary is measured as of the end of the month of the ex-dates
(henceforth ex-date month). Because the sample period spans 41 years, the usual sense of
firm size in terms of raw dollar value might be misleading. For this reason, in each year
we assign a sample firm—based on its size by the end of the year prior to the spinoff
announcement year—to one of the size deciles. The size deciles are formed based on
market capitalizations of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms in CRSP by the same year
end.
In terms of the size deciles, only about 9 % of the sample is included between the
second and the fifth decile, while the rest (91 %) are all clustered in the sixth and the
tenth decile. Moreover, 54 % of the sample belongs to the largest size decile, showing
extreme skewness in the distribution of firm sizes. In Table 2, therefore we segment the
sample firms into the two size categories: Group-large for firms in the tenth decile and
Group-small in the remaining deciles (i.e., decile nine to two) respectively. We also
deflate sizes with the GDP deflator, setting year 2005 as a base year.
Before spinoffs, for Group-large the mean of firm sizes (pre-spinoff sizes) is
$12.8 billion and the median is $4.3 billion, suggesting that even in the largest decile
there is an extreme positive skewness in the distribution. The mean of pre-spinoff sizes
in the remaining deciles is $496 million, which is only 3.9 % of that of Group-large. By
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
The sample consists of 221 spinoff announcements undertaken by the publicly traded U.S
firms from 1964 to 2005.The market capitalization of a parent firm is computed as
follows: (1) by the end of the month prior to the month of the spinoff announcement (i.e.,
the pre-spinoff parent size) and (2) by the end of the month in which the ex-date occurs
(i.e., the post-spinoff parent size); the market capitalization of the subsidiary is calculated
as in (2). A sample firm based on its market capitalization by the end of the year prior to
its spinoff announcement year is assigned to one of the deciles constructed with the same
year-end market capitalizations of the universe of NYSE/AMEX/NSADAQ firms. The
parent firms are further classified either as Group-large to which the firms assigned to
decile 10 belong or as Group-small to which the firms assigned to decile 2 to 9 belong.
The combined market value is the sum of the post-spinoff parent size and the subsidiary's
size. Relative size-pre is the ratio of the market capitalization of a subsidiary to the prespinoff parent size. Relative size-post is the ratio of the market capitalization of a
subsidiary to the combined market value.
Obs
Mean Median
Min
Max
Std
Panel 1: Mkt. capitalization by the end of the month prior to the spinoffannouncement (in millions 2005 dollars)
Group-large (decile 10)†
105
12,813
4,308
401 148,517 23,187
Group-small (decile 2-9)
115
496
240
10
6,792
786
Panel 2: Mkt. capitalization by the end of the month of the ex-date (in millions
2005 dollars)‡
Group-large†
Parents
105
11,979
3,762
154 120,750 22,413
Subsidiaries
1,780
671
43
14,581
2,653
Combined
13,759
4,897
Group-small
Parents
115
371
155
2
3,161
517
Subsidiaries
211
85
2
1,953
357
Combined
582
274
Panel 3: Relative-size ratios
Relative size-pre
Group-large
106
0.250
0.124
0.004
3.041
0.388
Group-small
115
0.500
0.371
0.020
2.560
0.452
Relative size-post
Group-large
106
0.207
0.117
0.005
0.962
0.231
Group-small
115
0.375
0.324
0.021
0.907
0.257
†
The market value of Lucent Technology deceased by $122 billion from month-1 to exdate month (as a combined firm). Thus, including it makes the change in the mean of the
market value of Group large -$217 million. Because of the undue influence of Lucent
Technology’s loss in market value, Lucent Technology is excluded in calculation of the
statistics for Group-large in Panel 1 and 2.
‡
The subsidiaries of 16 parent firms did not begin to be traded by the end of the month of
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the ex-date. In these cases, we use the market capitalizations by the ends of the months in
which they started to be traded.
ex-date month, the mean of the post-spinoff sizes of the parents in Group-large decline by
about $834 million (approximately 6.5 %) from month-1, while that of the parents in
Group-small decrease by $125 million (approximately 25.2 %). The larger percentage
decline in the mean size of Group-small suggests that smaller firms tend to spin off a
larger portion of their assets to their newly created subsidiaries than do larger ones.
When comparing the mean of the pre-spinoff sizes of the parents with that of the
post-spinoff sizes as combined firms (i.e., the sum of the market capitalization of the
parents and their subsidiaries by ex-date months), the market values of the sample firms
in Group-large and Group-small increase on average by $946 million and $86 million,
respectively, from month-1 to ex-date month. Though the average dollar value gain in
market value for Group-large from month-1 to ex-date month is about 11 times greater
than that of Group-small, the percentage gain (i.e., the change in the average market
value from month-1 to ex-date month divided by the average market value of the sample
as of month -1) of Group-small (about 17.3 %) is more than two times larger than that of
Group-large (about 7.4 %). Hence, this observation seems to suggest the role of firm size
in market value gain. That is, smaller firms tend to spin off larger portions of assets, and
experience much greater proportional increases in their market value from month-1 to exdate month.
However, given the extremely skewed distribution of the firm sizes of the sample
and the 41-year study period, the inferences drawn based on the market values of the
sample firms might be tenuous because of the undue influence of extreme observations
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and exogenous factors affecting the U.S stock market in general over the entire study
period. To mitigate these concerns, instead of firm size we employ the relative size of a
subsidiary defined as the ratio of the size of a subsidiary to the size of its parent. The
literature on corporate spinoffs documents that abnormal returns around spinoff
announcements are positively associated with the relative sizes of subsidiaries (e.g., Hite
& Owers, 1983; Krishnaswami & Subramaniam, 1999; Miles & Rosenfeld, 1983).
Therefore, because of the importance of the effect of the relative size on the
announcement returns, we consider it worthwhile to analyze it, particularly in the context
of the firm size group (i.e., Group-large and Group small). Following Subramaniam and
Krishnaswami (1999), we define the relative size of a subsidiary as the ratio of the market
capitalization of the subsidiary at its ex-date month to either the market capitalization of
its parent at month-1 (Relative size-pre) or to the combined market value of the parent
and the subsidiary at the ex-date month (Relative size-post).
In Panel 3, we present the distribution of the relative sizes of the subsidiaries for
both size groups. In terms of Relative size-pre, the firms in Group-large spin off on
average 25 % of their assets, while those in Group-small split 50%. Alternatively, when
the relative size is measured with the value of the combined firm by the end of ex-date
month (i.e., Relative size-post) the ratios of both groups decline to 20.7% for Group-large
and 37.5% for Group-small. But regardless how the relative size is measured, the
evidence suggests first that small firms spin off a larger percentage of their assets. We
also note that Relative size-pre and Relative size-post differ only in the denominator in
both ratios (i.e., pre-spinoff firm value versus post-spinoff combined firm value). If
Relative size-pre is larger than Relative size-post, it indicates an increase in the
39

shareholder value of a parent firm from month-1 to ex-date month. As can be seen in
Panel 3, the difference between Relative size-pre and Relative size-post (= 50% minus
37.5%) for Group-small is much larger that for Group-large (= 25% minus 20.7%). In
other words, the mean positive gain in firm value from month-1 and to ex-date month (as
a combined firm) is far greater for firms in Group-small. Thus, in addition to the fact that
smaller sample firms tend to spinoff a larger percentage of their assets as we discussed
above, we conclude that the difference in the market value gain between Group-small and
Group-large from month -1 to ex-date month strongly hints at the potentially significant
effect of firm size on firm value.
D. Value Gain and Firm Size effect. We explore further the relationship between
the pre-spinoff firm sizes and the value gains of the sample firms in the cross-section of
the sample. Note that in the previous section we roughly inferred the relationship by
comparing averages of two size groups. For a sample firm, we compute the value gain as
a change in the market value (in dollar) of a sample firm from month -1 to ex-date month.
In addition, the percentage value gain is measured by dividing the change in the market
value by the pre-spinoff parent’s market capitalization. It is analogous to a buy-and-hold
return earned by an investor who purchases the stock at the end of month -1, receives the
share of the subsidiary at the payment date, and holds the share of the parent and its
subsidiary until the end of the ex-date month.
In Table 3, we present the mean of the market value gain in dollar and in
percentage for Group-large and Group–small. While the market value gain in Grouplarge is as much as 12 times larger than that in Group-small, the percentage gain of
Group-small is more than 1.8 times larger than that of Group-large. Given that the
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Table 3. Value Gain and Firm Size
The sample consists of 221 spinoff announcements undertaken by the publicly traded U.S
firms from 1964 to 2005. The market value gain in dollars is measured by subtracting the
pre-spinoff parent’s market capitalization from that of the combined firm. The percentage
gain is computed by dividing the market value gain by the pre-spinoff parent market
capitalization. The pre-spinoff market capitalization is the product of the share
outstanding and the closing share price of a sample firm by the end of the month prior to
the spinoff announcement month (i.e., month-1). The combined market value is the sum
of the market capitalization of the parent and its subsidiary, which are measure by the end
of the month of completion of the spinoff (i.e., ex-date month).The Spearman correlations
in Panel A are calculated by the simple correlation between the pre-spinoff sizes and the
percentage gains. A market model for daily returns is estimated over the pre-event period,
(AD-260, AD-11), to compute abnormal returns in the three-day event period, (AD-1,
AD+1) where AD is the announcement date. In Panel B, the Spearman correlations are
between the pre-spinoff parent sizes and relative size-pre, and relative size-post. Relative
size-pre is the ratio of the market capitalization of a subsidiary by the ex-date month to
the market capitalization of the parent as of month-1. Relative size-post is the ratio of the
market capitalization of a subsidiary by the ex-date month to the market capitalization of
the combined firm (i.e., the parent's size plus its subsidiary's size) by the ex-date month.
The statistical significance of the difference in the means and in the median is estimated
using the parametric t-test and the nonparametirc Wilcoxon rank-sum test respectively.
For the t-test, we assume unequal group variance. a,b,c indicate the significance at the 1, 5,
10% level, respectively.
Panel 1. Market value gain (from month -1 to the ex-date month) and 3-day CAR
Market Value Gain
$ (in million)†

Percent

‡

Obs
Corr Mean Median Mean Median Positive
Group-large (decile 10) 105
980
352 14.22
7.98
59
Group-small (decile 2-9) 113
81
25 25.19
14.73
71
b
Difference: Group-small - Group-large
10.97
6.75
a
512
52 19.91
10.52
All samples
-0.17
Panel 2. Spearman rank correlation (Pre-spinoff parent size, Relative
size)
Pre
Group-large

-0.28a

Group-small

-0.16c

All samples
Panel 3. Spearman rank correlation
Group-large
Group-small
All samples

-0.45a
(Market value gain in %, Relative size)
Pre
Post
0.14
-0.10
a
0.50
0.14
0.09
0.37a
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Table 3. Value Gain and Firm Size, Continued
Panel 1. Market value gain (from month -1 to the ex-date month) and 3-day
CAR
3-Day CAR
Percent
Obs
Group-large

‡

Corr

105

Group-small
113
Difference: Group-small - Group-large

Mean

Median

Positive

2.46

2.12

68

4.19
1.73c

3.43
1.31c

70

All samples
-0.13b
3.36
2.57
Panel 2. Spearman rank correlation (Pre-spinoff parent size, Relative size)
Post
Group-large

-0.23a

Group-small

-0.18c

All samples
Panel 3. Spearman rank correlation

-0.42a
(3-day CAR, Relative size)
Pre
Post
a
0.30
0.22b
0.17c
0.10

Group-large
Group-small

All samples
0.26a
0.18a
Including Lucent Technology in Group-large, the mean market value gain is -$194,
which severely distorts the distribution. Hence, we report the mean and median of the
market value gains in dollar by excluding Lucent Technology.
‡
Three parent firms have insufficient data (less than 60 trading days) in estimation of the
parameters of the market model for daily returns. These firms are dropped from the
sample, which decreases the sample size from 221 to 218.
†

percentage gain is more relevant as a measure of the wealth increase for shareholders, we
test for the differences in the mean and in the median of the percentage gains between the
two size groups and find that while the difference in the mean is not significant, that in
the median is significant at the 5% level.
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Since we segment the samples roughly into two size groups, we test whether the
effect of firm size on the percentage value gain holds across the sample firms. As can be
seen in Panel 1 in Table 3, across all the sample firms the Spearman correlation is -0.17
and significant at the 1% level. This finding suggests that the pre-spinoff parent size is
significantly inversely related to the market value gain from month-1 to ex-date month.
However, as it takes on average 261 and 245 calendar days for Group large and Groupsmall from month-1 to ex-date month, the negative correlation between the market value
gain and the pre-spinoff firm size might reflect notably small-firm premium among other
confounding factors. But, the calculation of the Spearman correlation between the market
value gain and the pre-spinoff firm size in each size group shows that only Group-large
has a significant correlation equal to -0.20 at the 5% level, while no correlation exists for
Group-small. It appears that the inverse relationship between the value gain and the prespinoff firm size arises not because of general outperformance of small firms but because
of the pre-spinoff firm size itself. Therefore, for the sample of spinoffs, the size of a firm
is an important factor that affects the shareholder’s wealth at least for a period from
month-1 to ex-date month.
An interesting pattern which we discussed in the previous section (Panel 3 in
Table 2) is a negative relationship between the sizes of the parents and the subsidiaries.
Either in Relative size-pre or Relative size-post, the ratio was always higher for firms in
Group-small. Simply put, small firms are more likely to break up a larger fraction of their
assets than do large ones. To examine whether this observation holds across the sample
firms, especially for firms in Group-large, we compute the Spearman correlation between
the pre-spinoff parent firm sizes and the relative size measures. In Panel 2 of Table 3, we
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report the Spearman correlations for both size groups and the whole sample. Regardless
of the measurements of Relative size, the correlations are significant at the 1% and the 10%
level for Group-large and Group-small, respectively. For the whole sample, the
correlation is highly negative and equals to -0.45 for Relative size-pre and -0.42 for
Relative size-post. Thus, we confirm an inverse relationship between a parent firm’s size
and the size of its spun-off subsidiary.
Notice the fact, that the pre-spinoff sizes of the parent firms are negatively related
not only with the market value gains but also with their subsidiaries’ sizes, implies a
positive correlation between the value gains and the relative sizes of the subsidiaries. As
can be seen in Panel 3, the percentage value gains are strongly associated with Relative
size-pre (correlation = 0.37), though for Relative size-post the correlation is not
significant, albeit it is found in the correct directional sign. As we discussed, the literature
on corporate spinoff documents a positive relationship between the relative size of
subsidiary and the announcement abnormal returns, which is often referred to as the
wealth gain. In the same panel, we also report the correlation between the three-day CAR
and the subsidiaries’ relative sizes (see Section 10 for the details on the measurement of
abnormal returns). Consistent with the literature, we find that, regardless of the measure
of relative size of a subsidiary, a strong positive correlation exists between the
announcement abnormal returns and the relative sizes. Thus, the proportion of the assets
that a parent firm decides to spin off have a positive effect on the announcement
abnormal returns as well as the market value gain.
Consequently, we argue that there exists a connection between the pre-spinoff
size of the parent firms and the announcement abnormal returns given our finding that the
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smaller the size of a parent firm, the larger is the size of its subsidiary. In Panel 1 of
Table 3, we present the means and the medians of the three-day CAR for both size groups,
and test for the differences in CAR between two size groups. On average, the firms in
Group-small earns on average 1.73% more than those in Group-large in three days
surrounding the announcement of spinoff. The difference in the mean is significant at the
10% level. This inference is not influenced by outliers as the nonparametric test of the
difference in the median also shows the same result. In addition, across the sample, the
negative relation between CAR and the pre-spinoff firm size holds with the correlation of
-0.13, which is significant at the 5% level.
Therefore, we infer from Table 3 that the effect of the relative size of a subsidiary
on the positive abnormal returns in the announcement period as well as on the value gain
from year-1 to ex-date month originates from the same source; namely the pre-spinoff
size of the parent firms. In other words, the positive correlation of the relative sizes with
the announcement abnormal returns as well as with the value gain could in fact be the
firm-size effect.
Market Characteristics of the Sample Firms
As we discussed in Section 4.C, daily trading volume is used as a basic ingredient
from which daily volume-based measures of difference of opinion (VDOs) are estimated.
Therefore, we first investigate the characteristics of daily trading volumes along with
other relevant market characteristics of the sample firms prior to spinoff announcements.
For each sample firm, we obtain daily data on return, price, number of shares traded, and
the number of shares outstanding from the CRSP. While trading volume is the number of
shares traded on a particular day, volume turnover is the ratio of the trading volume to the
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Table 4. Summary Statistics of the Sample Firms' Stock Market Characteristics
This table presents the summary statistics of firm characteristics of the sample of spinoffs.
The sample consists of 221 spinoff announcements undertaken by the publicly traded U.S
firms from 1964 to 2005. To be included in the table, a sample firm must have at least 80%
of daily data for the pre-event period, which is a 250-trading-day period ending 10 days
before the announcement of a spinoff. On day t for a sample stock, daily trading volume
is the number of shares traded, volume turnover is the ratio of daily trading volume to the
number of the shares outstanding, and log turnover is the natural logarithm of volume
turnover. The reported figures are the cross-sectional means of the summary statistics
(mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis) for the pre-event period. The samples
are sorted into four size groups. Group 1, which is the smallest, consists of firms with
size decile 1 to 6, Group 2 with size decile 7 to 8, Group 3 with size decile 9, and Group
4 with size decile 10. A sample firm based on its market capitalization by the end of the
year prior to its spinoff announcement year is assigned to one of the deciles constructed
with the same year-end market capitalizations of the universe of
NYSE/AMEX/NSADAQ firms.
Mean
Std
Skewness
Kurtosis
Size Group
Obs†
Trading volume (in 1,000)
1
23
35
48
4.43
32.62
2
37
79
79
4.51
35.35
3
41
167
158
4.23
31.30
4
105
1,295
850
3.58
25.84
All samples
206
712
484
3.97
29.39
Raw turnover (%)
1
23
0.26
0.38
4.49
33.13
2
37
0.30
0.31
4.54
35.73
3
41
0.33
0.39
4.30
32.15
4
105
0.38
0.31
3.58
25.93
All samples
206
0.34
0.33
4.00
29.73
Log turnover
1
23
-6.97
1.34
-0.60
1.77
2
37
-6.68
0.99
-0.25
1.11
3
41
-6.43
0.89
0.03
0.50
4
105
-6.03
0.60
0.28
0.90
All samples
206
-6.33
0.81
0.04
0.96
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Table 4. Summary Statistics of the Sample Firms' Stock Market Characteristics,
Continued
Size Group
Obs†
Mean
Std
Skewness
Kurtosis
Return (%)
1
23
0.17
3.22
0.41
5.08
2
37
0.01
3.09
0.34
5.46
3
41
0.03
2.60
0.12
5.05
4
105
0.04
2.15
0.09
4.71
All samples
206
0.05
2.53
0.18
4.95
Price
1
23
10.54
6.90
-1.60
9.50
2
37
16.85
4.23
-1.09
12.90
3
41
23.04
5.22
-0.84
10.78
4
105
40.03
5.22
0.21
-0.33
All samples
206
29.19
5.23
-0.44
5.36
†
To be included in the table, a sample firm must have at least 80% of daily data during
the pre-event period. The size of the sample decreases to 206 from the sample size of 218
in Table 3. The exclusion of 12 samples is due to non-availability of daily trading volume
data for NASDAQ samples prior to Nov 1, 1982.
number of the shares outstanding on that day. We further transform volume turnover by
taking the natural logarithm of the volume turnover to get log turnover.
The literature on trading volume tends to study exclusively NYSE/AMEX stocks,
and suggests a separate investigation between NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ stocks.15 In
our study we include NASDAQ firms by adjusting the overstatement of trading volumes
on NSADAQ firms. Following Anderson and Dyl (2005), we scale down raw turnover of
NASDAQ sample firms by 38% after 1997 and by 50% before 1997. Though this

15

Because our samples include firms listed on NYSE/AMEX (173) and NASDAQ (48),
trading volumes are not comparable across the sample firms. It is primarily due to different
market structure of these exchanges. Specifically, NASDAQ is a dealer’s market in which a
dealer is one side of every transaction, therefore a transaction being double counted. In contrast,
NYSE and AMEX are auction markets in which a majority of transactions are between actual
buyers and sellers
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procedure would make NASDAQ firms’ turnovers roughly comparable with those on
NYSE, it is admittedly a very rough approximation.
In Table 4, we present the summary statistics of various daily trading activity
measures (trading volume, volume turnover, and log turnover) and of other firm
characteristics (return and price) during the pre-event period. The sample firms are
sorted into the four size groups based on the size decile assigned to each sample firm.
Group 1, which is the smallest, consists of firms with size decile 1 to 6, Group 2 with size
decile 7 to 8, Group 3 with size decile 9, and Group 4 with size decile 10.
Consistent with the previous studies on trading volume (e.g., Llorente, Michaely,
Saar, & Wang, 2002; Lo & Wang 2000), trading volume and volume turnover increase
with firm size as does the prices of the sample firms despite the small sample size of our
study. As can be seen in Table 4, across the sample, trading volume is far more variable
than volume turnover. While the mean trading volume of Group 4 is approximately 36
times higher than that of Group 1, it is 1.4 times for volume turnovers.
Recall that volume turnover is a scaled version of trading volume. For a stock,
while trading volume is a raw number of the shares traded, volume turnover is the ratio
that measures the intensity of trading activity after taking account of all the shares of the
stock available for trading. Even though both measures of trading activity are generally
accepted to measure “trading activity,” the information content contained in them might
be different as it is suggested by dissimilar distributional characteristics between trading
volume and volume turnover across our sample firms. Furthermore, the distribution of
daily trading volume and volume turnover are highly non-normal with positive
skeweness and fat tails. In contrast, the distribution of log turnover approximates a
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normal distribution with skewness and kurtosis close to zero in all size groups, though
Group 1 and 2 exhibit modest leptokurticity. This suggests that in contrast to large firms,
small firms tend to have extremely high as well as low level of trading activity in
particular days during the pre-event period.
A. Trend in trading volume. As our study covers a 41-year period, an important
statistical issue in our analysis is whether the cross-sectional variation in volume-based
measures of DO of the sample is stationary or non-stationary.16 For example, consider
two hypothetical firms, which are similar in their characteristics, but different only in the
calendar dates of their spinoff announcements. If there is a secular time trend in a volume
turnover series, using it to examine its cross-sectional implications for temporal abnormal
returns without controlling for the trend may lead to incorrect inferences.
To examine a secular time trend in trading activity, we segment the study period into
seven sub-periods, each of which spans a five-year period starting from 1971 and ending
2005. Panel 1 of Table 5 shows the mean of daily trading volumes, turnovers, and log
turnovers over the pre-event period for each of the sub-periods. In each of the three
different measures of trading activity, there is a significant and clear upward trend,
particularly for trading volume. While the average daily turnover is 0.08% in the first
sub-period, it continues to rise over time, reaching 0.5% in the last sub-period. An

16

Lo and Wang (2000)’s study on trading volume of NYSE/AMEX common stocks for
the period from 1962 to 1996 documents a upward time trend not only for the weekly log market
turnover but also log turnovers in individual stock levels, albeit weak upward time trend. (See
Figure 1 and Figure 3 in their paper). Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2011) whose sample
period from 1993 to 2008, roughly following Lo and Wang (2000)’s study period, show that
increase in monthly trading volume turnover is not merely an artifact of indexation and firm size.
Specifically, they demonstrate that both S&P 500 (large cap) stocks and non-S&P 500 (small cap)
stocks experience a positive and significant (approximately two folds on average) increase in
turnover from the first period 1993-2000 to the second period 2001-2008.
49

Table 5. Various Measures of Trading Activity of the Sample, 1971-2005
This table presents the sub-period means of various measures of trading activity (trading
volume, volume turnover, and log turnover) of the sample. The sample consists of 221
spinoff announcements undertaken by the publicly traded U.S firms from 1964 to 2005.
To be included in the table, a sample firm must have at least 80% of daily data during the
pre-event period. On day t for a sample stock, daily trading volume is the number of
shares traded, volume turnover is the ratio of daily trading volume to the number of the
shares outstanding, and log turnover is the natural logarithm of volume turnover. Each
sample firm is assigned to one of seven sub-period groups based on the year prior to its
spinoff announcement year. In each sub-period, the reported figures are the crosssectional averages of the means of daily trading volumes, volume turnovers, and log
turnovers over the pre-event period. A sample firm based on its market capitalization at
the end of the year prior to its spinoff announcement year is assigned to one of the deciles
constructed with the same year-end market capitalizations of the entire
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms.
Trading volume in
Raw turnover
Log
Size
(1,000)
(%)
turnover
Period
Obs
Panel 1. All samples
1971 - 1975
6
1976 - 1980
9
1981 - 1985
26
1986 - 1990
52
1991 - 1995
30
1996 - 2000
38
2001 - 2005
44
Panel 2. NYSE/AMEX only
1971 - 1975
6
1976 - 1980
9
1981 - 1985
20
1986 - 1990
44
1991 - 1995
26
1996 - 2000
32
2001 - 2005
33

17
44
66
153
207
923
2,161

0.08
0.33
0.24
0.28
0.26
0.41
0.50

-7.56
-6.45
-6.73
-6.51
-6.44
-6.07
-5.81

9.8
8.9
8.5
8.9
8.8
8.9
8.4

17
44
73
161
229
1,014
2,388

0.08
0.33
0.27
0.29
0.27
0.35
0.46

-7.56
-6.45
-6.65
-6.48
-6.41
-6.13
-5.77

9.8
8.9
8.8
9.1
9.0
9.2
8.8

increase of volume turnover in this magnitude over the study period cannot be simply
attributed to the differential composition of the sample firms in each sub-period. Note
that the average firm sizes, which are calculated with the size deciles of the sample firms,
are comparable across the sub-periods, indicating the effect of firm size on turnover is
insignificant.
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In Panel 2, we present the same statistics as in Panel 1, but for NYSE/AMEX
sample firms only. Though the number of NASDAQ firms in every sub-period is small
relative to that of NYSE/AMEX, an overstatement of trading volume is apparent even
after applying the adjustment factors to volume turnovers of NASDAQ firms. Particularly,
the mean daily turnover for all sample firms is 0.41% in the sixth and 0.50% in the last
sub-periods. However, for the NYSE/AMEX samples the mean daily turnover decreases
to 0.35% and 0.46%. In the analyses to follow, if there is a case in which the volume
overstatement of the NASDAQ sample firms becomes an issue as to have a material
effect on inferences for the whole sample, we report a result for the entire sample firms,
and NYSE/AMEX and NADSDAQ sample firms separately.
Throughout our study, we use detrended time-series of daily log turnovers to
measure an additional volume-based proxy for DO. During the pre-event period, daily log
turnovers are detrended with a 200-trading-day moving average. Specifically, for a day t
the detrended log turnover is

,

,

∑

,

(9)

We simply use a 200-trading-day moving average to remove a trend in log turnover.17

17

Our choice of a moving average follows the detrending method of Llorente et al.
(2002). In their study of the dynamic volume-return relation, they detrend daily log turnovers of
individual NYSE/AMEX stocks with a 200-trading-day moving average for the sample period of
1993-1998. Of course, because our samples are distributed over a 41-year period detrending
uniformly by a moving average might not be appropriate. However, Lo and Wang (2000)
document that the time-series properties of detrended turnovers are substantially different
depending on the method used, and find that imposing structural models for detrending volume
turnover does not render satisfactory results. Therefore, we hold on to a simple detrending
procedure of using a 200-trading-day moving average.
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Summary Statistics of VDOs
As discussed in the methodology section, for each day in the pre-event period we
estimate five VDOs (LNTO, Detrend, UV, RESD, and SUV). Though the VDOs are
dynamic, changing daily, our purpose is to extrapolate the degree of divergence of
investors’ opinion about the value of a sample firm on a typical trading day in the preevent period or

. To do so, we proposed the mean of daily VDO estimates in the

pre-event period as the proxy for the ex-ante level of DO.
The cross sectional means of the summary statistics for daily VDOs estimates are
presented in Table 6. As in Table 4, we again form the four size groups based on the size
decile of each sample firm. The skewness and kurtosis indicate that all daily VDO
estimates of each size group appear to approach a normal distribution. Given the
approximate normality of the empirical distributions of VDOs, we can meaningfully
measure the ex-ante level of DO for a sample firm from daily estimates of these VDOs as
the ex-ante level of DO reflects the average (normal) degree of disagreement about a
sample firm in an ordinary trading day. Therefore, the ex-ante level of DO can be
considered as a firm-specific characteristic prior to the announcement of a spinoff.
Nevertheless, on surface,

can be seen as the mean level of extra portion

of daily trading volumes, hence one may argue that it indicates market liquidity. In
finance literature, a high level of trading volume is generally associated with market
liquidity of a stock, and is often used as a proxy for market liquidity. In Table 6, the mean
of log turnover is increasing in firm size group. As firm size is also widely used by
researchers as a liquidity proxy, a positive relationship between log turnover and firm
size seems to indicate that these two variables are proxies for liquidity. However,
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Table 6. Summary Statistics of Five Daily VDOs during the Pre-Event Period
The table presents the descriptive statistics of daily estimates of the five VDOs (Volumebased Differences of Opinion measures) during the pre-event period for the sample of
spinoffs during 1964-2005. To be included in the table, a sample firm is required to have
80% of daily VDO estimates in the pre-event period. On day t in the pre-event period,
five VDOs are estimated as follows with a 200-day control period prior to day t: Log
Turnover (LNTO) is the natural logarithm of daily volume turnover. Volume turnover is
the ratio of the number of the shares traded to the total number of shares outstanding on
that day. Detrend is calculated by subtracting the average of daily trading volume over
the control period. Unexplained Volume (UV) is computed by first subtracting the
market-wide log turnover, which gives the market-adjusted turnover (MATO). And it is
further adjusted by the mean of MATO over the control period. RESD is the residual from
a one-factor market model of daily log turnover that is estimated over the control period.
A market-wide daily log turnover is the value-weighted log turnovers of NYSE/AMEX
firms. Standardized Unexplained Volume (SUV) is the residual from a two-factor model
of daily log turnover, which is further scaled by the standard deviation of the error terms
of the model. The model takes daily absolute return (separately depending on the sign of
daily return) as the independent variables is estimated over the control period. The
samples are grouped into four size groups. Group 1, which is the smallest, consists of
firms with size decile 1 to 6, Group 2 with size decile 7 to 8, Group 3 with size decile 9,
and Group 4 with size decile 10. A sample firm based on its market capitalization by the
end of the year prior to its spinoff announcement year is assigned to one of the deciles
constructed with the same year-end market capitalizations of the universe of
NYSE/AMEX/NSADAQ firms. A reported figure is the cross-sectional mean of a
statistic in a size group.
Size Group
Obs
LNTO
Detrend
UV
RESD
SUV
Mean
1
21
-6.996
-0.025
-0.042
-0.039
-0.031
2
36
-6.682
0.008
-0.008
0.000
-0.022
3
41
-6.434
-0.044
-0.054
-0.052
-0.039
4
104
-6.027
0.027
0.006
0.008
0.031
Standard Deviation
1
21
1.388
1.402
1.386
1.392
1.019
2
36
0.989
0.999
0.978
0.983
1.015
3
41
0.890
0.898
0.875
0.873
1.032
4
104
0.596
0.599
0.557
0.557
1.042
Minimum
1
21
-11.346
-4.466
-4.516
-4.553
-3.605
2
36
-10.028
-3.397
-3.281
-3.343
-3.683
3
41
-9.153
-2.771
-2.627
-2.642
-3.251
4
104
-7.741
-1.671
-1.359
-1.370
-3.133
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Table 6. Summary Statistics of Five Daily VDOs during the Pre-Event Period, Continued
Size Group
Obs
LNTO
Detrend
UV
RESD
SUV

1
2
3
4

21
36
41
104

-3.647
-3.897
-3.716
-3.979

3.419
2.802
2.695
2.079

1
2
3
4

21
36
41
104

-0.541
-0.253
0.034
0.281

-0.435
-0.245
0.054
0.308

1
2
3
4

21
36
41
104

1.556
1.099
0.502
0.913

1.318
1.076
0.527
0.908

Maximum
3.427
2.790
2.686
2.052
Skewness
-0.388
-0.192
0.139
0.553
Kurtosis
1.336
0.963
0.549
1.155

3.538
2.792
2.686
2.050

2.703
2.969
3.139
3.573

-0.369
-0.191
0.132
0.543

-0.521
-0.290
-0.004
0.200

1.285
1.013
0.585
1.159

1.437
1.345
0.554
0.950

no such relationship is observed between all the other VDO estimates and firm size
groups in our analysis. In those measures, there is no such pattern suggesting that they
reflect liquidity.
Finally, we check whether a secular time trend identified in log turnover exist in
the other VDO estimates as well. If trading shares has become easier and cheaper over
the sample period, it might as well influence trading activity driven by divergence of
investors’ opinion. If investors were able to express their valuation of a firm by trading
shares (i.e., more frequent changing hands between optimists and pessimists) because of
improving trading conditions, we would observe an uptrend in a VDO as well. In Table7,
we again assign a sample firm to one of the seven sub-period groups as in Table 4.
Compared log turnover, which is shown to have a secular trend, the other VDO estimates
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Table 7. Ex-Ante Levels of DO of the Sample
This table presents the sub-period means of the ex-ante levels of DO calculated with five
VDO (Volume-based Differences of Opinion measures) estimates during the pre-event
period. To be included in the table, a sample firm is required to have 80% of daily
estimates of a VDO in the pre-event period. The sample firms grouped into one of the
seven 5-year sub-periods based on the year end prior to the announcement year. On day t
in the pre-event period, five VDOs are estimated as follows with a 200-day control period
prior to day t: Log Turnover (LNTO) is the natural logarithm of daily volume turnover.
Volume turnover is the ratio of the number of the shares traded to the total number of
shares outstanding on that day. Detrend is calculated by subtracting the average of daily
trading volume over the control period. Unexplained Volume (UV) is computed by first
subtracting the market-wide log turnover, which gives the market-adjusted turnover
(MATO). And it is further adjusted by the mean of MATO over the control period. RESD
is the residual from a one-factor market model of daily log turnover that is estimated over
the control period. A market-wide daily log turnover is the value-weighted log turnovers
of NYSE/AMEX firms. Standardized Unexplained Volume (SUV) is the residual from a
two-factor model of daily log turnover, which is further scaled by the standard deviation
of the error terms of the model. The model takes daily absolute return (separately
depending on the sign of daily return) as the independent variables is estimated over the
control period. The ex-ante level of differences of opinion is calculated as follows:
_
∑
, for VDO = LNTOi,t, Detrendi,t, UVi,t, RESDi,t, and SUVi,t and
t is the announcement date, For Size decile, a sample firm based on its market
capitalization by the end of the year prior to its spinoff announcement year is assigned to
one of the deciles constructed with the same year-end market capitalizations of the
universe of NYSE/AMEX/NSADAQ firms.
Period
Obs
SIZE
1971 - 1975
6
-7.561
-0.018 -0.049 -0.028 -0.051
9.83
1976 - 1980
9
-6.445
0.140
0.068
0.032
0.156
8.89
1981 - 1985
24
-6.739
0.011 -0.022 -0.025
0.026
8.83
1986 - 1990
52
-6.511
0.019
0.034
0.039
0.011
8.87
1991 - 1995
30
-6.443
-0.036 -0.040 -0.035 -0.035
8.83
1996 - 2000
37
-6.070
0.027 -0.018 -0.009 -0.002
8.92
2001 - 2005
43
-5.796
-0.035 -0.057 -0.053 -0.017
8.44
201

do not follow a similar upward trend in log turnover. This evidence suggest that a secular
trend in daily log turnover is not a serious concern for the ex-ante level of DO estimated
with the other VDOs in the cross-section of the sample.

55

In sum, we find the evidence that VDOs have a stable empirical distribution,
which in turn allows us to measure the ex-ante level of DO appropriately. The
preliminary evidence suggests that the ex-ante level of DO is not related to liquidity and
void of a secular trend observed for log turnover. In next two sections, therefore we
attempt to establish the more robust empirical relevance of the volume-based measures of
differences of opinion first by comparing with widely-used liquidity proxies and second
by relating to extant disagreement proxies.
Ex-Ante Disagreement Proxies versus Liquidity Proxies
In the next two sections, we examine further on the relationship between
and other popular liquidity proxies as well as the relation between
the extant proxies for DO. We will attempt to establish

and

as a proxy for DO rather

than for liquidity.
In the literature, there are two views on the role of trading volume on stock
returns. One view is the liquidity premium hypothesis, which states that trading volume
contains information about a firm’s market liquidity. Therefore, firms with high trading
volume require lower expected return than firms with low trading volume. Brennan et al.
(1998) investigate whether non-risk factors (size, book-to-market ratio, trading volume,
price, dividend yield and lagged returns) have marginal explanatory power for stock
returns for NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ non-financial firms for the period 1966-1995. They
find that dollar trading volume has a strong negative effect on excess returns (over the
risk-free rate) as well as risk-adjusted returns. Their finding implies that trading volume
(i.e., non-risk factor) provides incremental power to explain a part of expected returns
that are not related to the Fama-French risk factors. Thus, their study renders a strong
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support for trading volume as a proxy for market liquidity, validating the existence of
liquidity premiums in stock returns.
Datar et al. (1998) implement a similar empirical study (a cross-sectional asset
pricing test) to Brennan et al. (1998). A major difference between these two studies is a
method for measuring trading activity. They use monthly volume turnover (the average of
the previous three-month volume divided by shares outstanding) while Brennan et al.
(1998) use dollar trading volume (monthly trading volume times monthly stock price).
Their finding is in accord with Brennan et al. (1998) that low turnover stocks tend to earn
higher returns than high turnover stocks.
While it seems that there are robust empirical evidences for the role of trading
volume as an indicator of market liquidity and its effect on returns, Lee and Swaminathan
(2000) provide an alternative view on the role of trading volume on stock returns.
Specifically, they link the joint effect of past trading volume and past return to future
returns from momentum strategies. With the sample firms drawn from NYSE/AMEX
from 1965 to 1995, they sort them first based on their past j-month returns and then
independently sort them based on the averages of daily volume turnover for the same
period. Thus, they form the two-way sorted portfolios. They find that conditional on past
returns, low-volume portfolios outperform high volume portfolios regardless of their
ranks in the past j-month returns. While this result corroborates the liquidity premium
hypothesis, they report that returns on a zero-investment portfolio (i.e., long in the winner
and short in the loser) in a low volume portfolio are lower than those of a high volume
portfolio. It means that the momentum premium is higher in supposedly more liquid
(high volume) portfolios, even though according to the liquidity premium hypothesis
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these liquid firms (i.e., firms with high trading volume) should earn low expected returns.
Investigating this puzzle further by implementing time-series regression based on the
three factor Fama-French (1993), they find that the factor loadings on HML are positively
higher for low volume portfolios than high volume portfolios regardless of their past
performances. In other words, low volume stocks act like a value stock (i.e., high bookto-market ratio) while high volume stocks behave like a glamour stock. Their finding
sheds light on an alternative role of or information content of trading volume. That is, the
level of trading activity is related to the pricing of a stock, not to market liquidity.
Similar to Lee and Swaminathan (2000), Piqueria (2006) tests the role of trading
volume for forecasting future returns using NYSE and NASDAQ samples for the period
from 1993-2002.18 Controlling illiquidity in addition to size, book-to-market, and
momentum, she shows that the coefficient of turnover is significant and strongly negative:
one standard deviation increase in monthly turnover is translated to a decline in expected
return of 0.34 % and 0.74 % for NYSE and NASDAQ firms, respectively. Her finding
provides an empirical support for an alternative interpretation to liquidity premium
regarding the role of trading turnover. That is, a firm with a higher level of volume
turnover, or equivalently with a higher degree of disagreement about its value among
investors, earns lower returns. She shows that lower future returns are forecasted not
18

She points to empirical evidences that bid-ask spread—when entered into a crosssectional asset-pricing regression—tends to have an insignificant or negative slope coefficient. To
overcome the ineffectiveness of the bid-ask spread, she derives alternative illiquidity or price
impact measures based on the theoretical model of Glosten and Harris (1988). Specifically, these
measures are designed to capture a better estimate of the adverse selection component of a trade
than the bid-ask spread. She documents that her illiquidity measures are positively related to
percentage quoted and effective spread, yet they have greater variances (two times greater than)
than the spread measures do, thereby being a better approximation of the difference in trading
cost considered by investors. She further shows that volume turnover is not significantly
correlated with these illiquidity cost measures.
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because of better liquidity, but because of overpricing of stocks, which is captured by
volume turnover.
In summary, these studies indicate that trading volume is a multi-faceted variable
and challenges a simplistic one-way interpretation. That is, it is used as a proxy for
market liquidity of a stock. Therefore, it is important to not only specify what one does
measure from trading volume but also establish the relevance of the measurement. To
establish

as a proxy for investor disagreement rather than for liquidity, we

compare

measured with five VDOs with other popular liquidity proxies. We

estimate four liquidity proxies which are most frequently used in the literature: Daily
dollar trading volume, the bid-ask spread, idiosyncratic volatility, and firm size. Except
for firm size, we estimate the other three liquidity proxies over the pre-event period.
For each day in the pre-event period, daily trading volume is multiplied by the
closing price to get daily dollar trading volume. For bid-ask spreads, we employ the
estimation method (i.e., high-low estimator of bid-ask spreads) recently developed by
Corwin and Schultz (2011). Their estimator is based on the notion that daily high and low
prices are most likely for buy and sell orders, respectively. Therefore, the ratio of the
highest price to the lowest price of a day represents the fundamental volatility of a stock
and its bid-ask spread. Assuming that the variance and the spread over two single trading
days are constant, and that return are serially uncorrelated, the sum of each day’s highlow price ratio over the two days should reflect twice of the daily variance and the spread,
while the high-low price ratio over a single two-day period should reflect two days’
volatility and one-day spread. They subsequently derive a close form solution for the
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spread. Hence, their estimator only requires daily high and low prices, which are readily
available in CRSP for all of our sample firms to compute daily spread.
In addition, we include idiosyncratic volatility of stock return as an additional
proxy for liquidity. Over our 41-year study period, trading volume and the cost of trading
have a strong time trend that is caused by regulatory changes and rapid technological
developments. For the period from 1988 to 1998, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam
(2001) document a steady decline in both quoted and effective bid-ask spreads, which
are accompanied by a concomitant upward trend in trading volume for NYSE stocks.
These trends in bid-ask spread and trading volume continued after 1998 as Chordia, Roll,
and Subrahmanyam (2011) document.19 Because a downward trend in the spread
complicates a cross-sectional comparison of the sample firms’ spread estimates, we add
idiosyncratic volatility of stock return to liquidity proxies. For the pre-event period, we
estimate the market model of daily returns for a sample stock, and compute the standard
deviation of the residuals from the regression. Finally, the sizes of the sample firms are
the market capitalizations by the year end prior to the year in which the spin-off
announcements are made.
In Table 8, we present the Pearson correlations between the natural log of the
liquidity proxies (dollar trading volume:

, firm size: SIZE, the idiosyncratic

volatility: SIGMA, and Corwin and Schultz (2011)’s measure of the effective

19

They show that the value-weighted average monthly share turnover of NYSE stocks
increases from about 5% in 1993 to about 26% in 2008, while, on average, the effective spread is
about eight cents lower in 2001-2008 than in 1993-2000. Moreover, they stress that an upward
trend in trading volume and downward trend in trading cost is a market-wide phenomenon,
affecting all firms irrespective of their sizes.
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Table 8. Pearson Correlations between Liquidity and Volume-based DO Proxies
The table shows Pearson correlations between liquidity proxies:(DOLVOL, SIZE, SIGMA,
and CSSPRD) and the proxies for the ex-ante level of DO estimated from five VDO
(volume-based measure of differences of opinion (LNTO, Detrend, UW, RESD, and SUV)
To be included in the table, a sample firm is required to have 80% of daily estimates of a
VDO in the pre-event period.
is the mean of the products of daily trading
volumes and the closing prices of a stock (DOLVOL).
is the mean of daily bidask spreads (CSSPRD), which are measured by the estimation method proposed by
Corwin and Schultz (2011). SIGMA is the standard deviation of the residuals from the
market model of daily stock returns estimated over the pre-event period. SIZE is the
market capitalization of a sample firm by the year end prior to the spinoff announcement
year. On day t during the pre-event period, each VDO is estimated, and averaged over the
pre-event period to calculate the ex-ante level of differences of opinion
,
,
,
). On day t in the pre-event period, five VDOs are estimated as
,
follows with a 200-day control period prior to day t: Log Turnover (LNTO) is the natural
logarithm of daily volume turnover. Volume turnover is the ratio of the number of the
shares traded to the total number of shares outstanding on that day. Detrend is calculated
by subtracting the average of daily trading volume over the control period. Unexplained
Volume (UV) is computed by first subtracting the market-wide log turnover, which gives
the market-adjusted turnover (MATO). And it is further adjusted by the mean of MATO
over the control period. RESD is the residual from a one-factor market model of daily log
turnover that is estimated over the control period. A market-wide daily log turnover is the
value-weighted log turnovers of NYSE/AMEX firms. Standardized Unexplained Volume
(SUV) is the residual from a two-factor model of daily log turnover, which is further
scaled by the standard deviation of the error terms of the model. The model takes daily
absolute return (separately depending on the sign of daily return) as the independent
variables is estimated over the control period. The pre-event period is defined as a 250trading-day period that ends 11 days before the announcement date. All correlations are
calculated by taking the natural log of the liquidity proxies. The sample size is 207 for all
the reported correlations.
SIZE SIGMA
a

0.91
-0.34a -0.54a
-0.05d -0.28a
0.79a
0.18a
0.34a
0.67a 0.35a
0.21a 0.14b
0.07b
0.09a 0.28a
0.21a 0.14b
0.05a
0.07a 0.29a
0.96a
0.07a
0.09a 0.28a
0.94a 0.99a
0.20a 0.13c
0.21a 0.19a
-0.02a
0.00a 0.22a
0.90a 0.85a
a,b,c
indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively.
SIZE
SIGMA
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0.84a

spread:
or

) and
,

,

(VDO =LNTO, Detrend, UW, RESD, and SUV)
,

,

. Recall that the ex-ante level of DO is the

mean of daily VDO estimates measured over the pre-event period.
As can be seen, all the liquidity proxies are highly correlated with expected signs.
For example, SIGMA is positively significantly related to

(correlation = 0.79),

while it is negatively associated with SIZE (correlation = -0.54) and
(correlation = -0.34). Consistent with the stylized fact documented in the literature, the
large sample firms are characterized by high trading volume, low spread, and low
residual standard deviation of returns compared to small firms. Since we are interested in
, we focus on the comparison of

the information content of

and

in terms of their relationship with the other liquidity proxies. While the
correlation between SIZE and
between SIZE and

is 0.91, it declines to 0.35 for the correlation

. Moreover, if one considers both

liquidity proxy, the relationship between

and

as a

and SIGMA is the opposite of what one

would expect (correlation = 0.18). As a liquidity proxy,

should be negatively

has the expected negative sign on its

correlated with SIGMA. On contrary,

correlation with SIGMA (correlation = -0.34). A similar inference can be made for
since

is negatively related with

liquidity proxy. However, again
Therefore, while

, albeit insignificantly, as a

is significantly positively related with

still has significant relationships with

.

and SIZE

(correlation = 0.67 and 0.35), the results in Table 8 indicate the information content of
volume turnover, more specifically daily turnover, is not limited to or include more than
liquidity. This finding is consistent with Lee and Swaminathan (2000).
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,

For

,

,

liquidity proxies except

, they are all insignificantly related to the
and SIZE. Yet, they are significantly related to

at the 1 % level, which is expected, given that all these variables are

and

essentially measured from daily trading volume. Therefore, our evidence in Table 8
suggests that dollar trading volume is more closely associated with liquidity. But when it
is scaled by the number of shares outstanding (i.e.,
,

,

), it represents more than

liquidity as does

,

proposition that

does not merely capture liquidity, but it may mirror the level of

. Furthermore, it renders support for our

DO among investors
As we discuss in Section 4.B, one of the main predictions of dynamic DO models
is a positive relation between return volatility and volume (e.g., Banerjee & Kremer,
2010; Harris & Raviv, 1993; Scheinkman & Xiong, 2003). Consistent with this
implication, we find that the correlation between

and SIGMA equals to 0.18, and is

statistically significant at the 1 % level. This evidence supports DO models’ prediction if
we regard

as a proxy for disagreement. In the case of

, interestingly, the

sign of the correlation with SIGMA reverses. As SIGMA is also widely used to measure
information asymmetry in literature, then its negative correlation of -0.34 with
shows its relevance as a measure of liquidity. These results point to two alternative
interpretations or the duality of idiosyncratic volatility, which is revealed when it is
related to

as a liquidity proxy and

as a disagreement proxy. Therefore,

our results in Table 8 give us the confidence that the ex-ante levels of DO extrapolated
from daily estimates of VDOs, especially

, do not simply mirrors the market

liquidity of the samples.
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Ex-Ante Disagreement Proxies versus Extant Disagreement Proxies
In this section, we attempt to establish empirical relevance of

as a proxy

for investor disagreement by directly comparing them with the extant DO proxies
developed in literature, namely the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts by Diether
et al. (2002) and breadth of ownership by Chen et al. (2002).
The dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts for a given month is defined as the
standard deviation of analysts’ earnings-per-share (EPS) estimates for a current fiscal
year. Since this measure shows how diverse analysts’—market participants who are
deemed to be an efficient information processor, yet not privately informed—predictions
about a firm’s annual earnings, the more spread it is, the more obscure the firm’s
information environment. Thus, it is intuitively appealing as a proxy for information
asymmetry, and has been used widely by researchers. In particular, Krishnaswami and
Subramaniam (1999) utilize the analysts’ forecasts of earnings in their analysis of the
effect of information asymmetry on spinoff announcement returns. They show that,
controlling for other known factors affecting the announcement returns, the dispersion of
analysts’ forecasts is positively related to the abnormal returns of a sample of spinoffs
from 1979 to 1993.
However, Diether et al. (2002) suggest an alternative interpretation of the
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. They posit that the dispersion of analysts’
forecast represents disagreement about the value of a stock rather than its level of
information asymmetry and find that stocks with higher dispersion earn significantly
lower future returns than stocks with lower dispersion. Their investigation is a direct test
of Miller (1977)’s insight on the pricing of a stock. If the dispersions of analysts’
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forecasts on earnings reflect the level of DO among investors, a higher DO on the value
of a stock (or the greater the slope of the demand curve of the stock) implies a greater
upward bias in the market price relative to its true value, and hence its future return is
expected to be lower.
Thus, the information content of the analysts’ forecast dispersion seem open to
dispute. Nonetheless, as our paper is closely related to Diether et al. (2002), we use it as a
proxy for disagreement, and examine how it is related to the ex-ante level of DO. We
utilize the Summary file from the Institutional Broker Estimate System (IBES). The
Summary file is available in two versions, adjusted and unadjusted. Each version
calculates monthly summary statistics (e.g. the mean and the standard deviation) of
effective analyst forecasts on the earnings in a current fiscal year either from the adjusted
or the unadjusted Detail file. The adjusted version uses analysts’ earnings forecasts by
taking into account of the effect of stock splits, which IBES applies to smooth the time
series of the forecasts. Since Diether et al. (2002) point out rounding errors in the
adjusted Detail file—though they show that the summary statistics from both files closely
match each other—we use the unadjusted Summary file to collect the means and the
standard deviations of analysts’ earnings-per-share (EPS) forecasts for a current fiscal
year (IBES fiscal period=1) for a period of 12 months ending a month prior to the month
of a spinoff announcement. Further, following Garfinkel (2009) we scale a standard
deviation of forecasts in month m with the absolute value of the mean of forecasts
(DISP1) in that month or with the average of a monthly stock price as of month m-1 and
month m (DISP2). DISP1 can be excessively large when the mean of forecasts are close
to zero. To mitigate this concern, we estimate DISP2 as well. In addition, we collect from
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the Summary file the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts on the long-term earnings growth
(DISP3). According to IBES, it is defined as a three- to five-year forecast of the expected
annual increase in operating earnings over a firm’s next full business cycle. Moeller et al.
(2007) propose this measure as a proxy for disagreement for testing the effect of diversity
of opinion on abnormal returns around acquisition announcements.20 To be consistent
with the method implemented for

, for each sample we calculate the

mean of DISP1, DISP2 and DISP3 over the pre-spinoff period or 12 months prior to the
month of a spinoff announcement.
Finally, we add another proxy for DO, breadth of ownership. This measure is
borne out of the theoretical and empirical work of Chen et al. (2002). Similar to Diether
et al. (2002), the main focus for their work is based on Miller (1977) idea on investor
disagreement and stock pricing. In search of more powerful proxy for investor
disagreement, they demonstrate that breadth of ownership, which is defined as the
number of investors in possession of a stock, can be a valuation indicator, hence a
predictor for future returns. In other words, the breadth of ownership of a stock represents
the slope of its demand curve in Miller (1997)’s model. When a small fraction of
investors owns the stock (i.e., optimists), while other pessimistic investors are kept out of
the market due to short-sale constraints, the price of the stock is set at the valuation of a
small fraction of optimistic investors. Thus, as the breadth of ownership reduces, the

20

Moeller et al. (2007) argue that the advantages of long-term forecasts over yearly or
quarterly forecasts on earnings are that 1) they are less affected by the timing of forecast issuance
(or how close to a quarterly or yearly fiscal year end) and 2) that they are free of noise that are
usually introduced to yearly or quarterly forecasts through normalization for comparison purpose
across the sample firms. Since the long term forecasts are reported as a percentage, they are
directly comparable across the sample firms and hence do not require any normalization.
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Table 9. Spearman Correlations between Volume-based DO and Extant DO Proxies
The table shows Spearman rank correlations between various proxies for the ex-ante levels of differences of opinion and the
extant difference-of-opinion proxies. Extant proxies: BREADTH and HI is the breadth of ownership and the Hirfindahl index
of mutual fund holdings respectively as of quarter q-1 where q is the quarter in which a spinoff is announced. DISP1 is the
standard deviation of analysts' forecasts on the current year's earnings divided by the average of forecasts. DISP2 is the
standard deviation of analysts' forecasts on the current fiscal year's earnings scaled by the average of the current and the
previous month-end stock price. DISP3 is the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts on three- to five-year expected annual
increase (%) in operating earnings over the firm’s next full business cycle. Over the pre-event period (i.e., 12 months), monthly
estimates of DISP1, DISP2, and DISP3 are averaged to calculate the disagreement proxies. On day t during the pre-event
period, each VDO is estimated, and averaged over the pre-event period to calculate the ex-ante level of differences of
,
,
,
,
). On any day in the pre-event period, five VDOs are estimated as follows
opinion
with a 200-day control period prior to day t: Log Turnover (LNTO) is the natural logarithm of daily volume turnover. Volume
turnover is the ratio of the number of the shares traded to the total number of shares outstanding on that day. Detrend is
calculated by subtracting the average of daily trading volume over the control period. Unexplained Volume (UV) is computed
by first subtracting the market-wide log turnover, which gives the market-adjusted turnover (MATO). And it is further adjusted
by the mean of MATO over the control period. RESD is the residual from a one-factor market model of daily log turnover that
is estimated over the control period. A market-wide daily log turnover is the value-weighted log turnovers of NYSE/AMEX
firms. Standardized Unexplained Volume (SUV) is the residual from a two-factor model of daily log turnover, which is further
scaled by the standard deviation of the error terms of the model. The model takes daily absolute return (separately depending
on the sign of daily return) as the independent variables is estimated over the control period. The pre-event period is defined as
a 250-trading-day period that ends 11 days before the announcement date. BK/MKT is the book-to-market ratio calculated by
dividing the book value of a sample firm (the sum of common equity, deferred taxes, and investment tax credit minus the book
value of preferred shares) with the market capitalization by the fiscal year end prior to the announcement year. E/P is the
earnings of a sample firm divided by the stock price by the fiscal year end prior to the announcement year.
Obs BREADTH
HI
DISP1 DISP2 DISP3
a
205
-0.77
HI
-0.34a 0.49a
DISP1 171
-0.38a 0.57a
0.90a
DISP2 171
-0.16c
0.12d
0.53a
0.41a
DISP3 140
187
0.45a -0.61a -0.21a -0.31a
0.21a
a,b,c
indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively.
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BK/MKT

Table 9. Spearman Correlations between the Volume-Based and the Extant Differences-of-Opinion Proxies, Continued
Obs BREADTH HI

DISP1 DISP2 DISP3

187
0.13c -0.05d -0.06a -0.05a -0.04d
187
0.12c -0.03d -0.02a -0.05c -0.01a
187
0.10a -0.03d 0.01a -0.04b 0.01a
187
0.15b -0.08d -0.04a -0.05c -0.04a
-0.36a 0.44a 0.52a
0.63a 0.25a
BK/MKT 162
145
-0.06a 0.15c -0.04a
0.19b -0.12a
E/P
a,b,c
indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively.
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BK/MKT

0.19a
0.17b
0.16b
0.19a
-0.28a
-0.18b

0.93a
0.91a
0.95a
-0.02a
0.05a

0.98a
0.90a
0.01a
0.04a

0.89a
0.02a
0.02c

-0.01d
0.04c 0.42a

stock is more overpriced relative to its fundamental value since the ownership of the
stock become more concentrated to investors with the highest valuation of the stock.
Following Chen et al. (2002), we gather quarterly equity holdings of the mutual
funds established in the U.S for our study period from CDA/Spectrum. The Breadth of
ownership (BREADTHq) of a sample firm is defined as the ratio of the number of mutual
funds that own the sample stock to the total number of mutual funds in quarter
q. We measure it by the quarter end prior to the quarter in which a spinoff announcement
is made. In addition, as a complementary measure to BREADTHq, we estimate a change
in the Herfindahl Index of mutual fund holding (HIq). For a sample stock, we compute
the percentages of mutual funds’ holding of the stock, and square and sum them to get
HIq. One advantage of this measure is that it reflects a degree of concentration of a
sample firm’s share within mutual funds industry, while BREADTHq mirrors a degree of
ownership concentration (i.e., the number of mutual funds that own the stock).
In Table 9,21 we present the Spearman rank correlations between the extant
disagreement proxies (BREADTH, HI, DISP1, DISP2, and DISP3) and the proxies for the
ex-ante level of DO measured fom daily VDO estimates (
,

,

,

,

). In the first column, as we expect, BREADTH is highly

negatively correlated with HI (correlation = -0.77); notice that all the correlations of HI
have the opposite sign of those of BREADTH. As the shares of a sample firm become
more concentrated (i.e., higher HI ratio), the breadth of ownership or the number of
21

Obs in the first column in Table 9 shows the numbers of the sample firms in the
correlation between BREADTH and all the other DO proxies. The number of observation changes
because of differential availability of the data for BREADTH, HI, DISP 1 to 3, BK/MKT, and E/P
for the sample firms. Requiring the complete data, we have 96 firms. Since there is no material
difference between correlation computed with all the available data or the complete data set, we
report the correlations computed with all the available data.
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mutual funds that are in long position of the stock decreases as well. In other words,
when the stock is owned by a small number of mutual funds relative to all existing
mutual funds, these mutual funds also tend to have a large position in the stock.
Observe that BREADTH and HI (in the first and second column) have the
significant correlations with correct directional signs with DISP1 and 2, but not with
,

,

,

,

. As a lower BREADTH and a higher HI implies

a higher level of disagreement, BREADTH and HI are negatively and positively
correlated with DISP1 and 2 respectively. Firms with a lower BREATH (HI) have a
greater (less) dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. But, this interpretation is based on the
implicit assumption that the proxies measured from analyst forecasts on earnings
properly capture disagreement among investors. As we addressed previously, there is a
little consensus about the role of the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts in the literature. For
the volume-based DO proxies, the correlation signs are opposite of what we expect:
Positive correlations with BREADTH and negative correlation with HI. With the sample
of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks for a period 1979 – 1998 Chen et al. (2002) find
that breath of ownership in level is in effect a permanent firm characteristic marked by a
high correlation with firm size and volume turnover as well as a high first order
autocorrelation. Thus, the correlations between disagreement proxies measured with the
mutual fund ownership data and the volume-based DO proxies seem to reflect the fact
that mutual funds tend to hold large, liquid stocks.
In most cases, DISP’s correlations with

are negative, which is opposite

of what we expect since a higher level of DISP would indicate a higher level of
assuming both represent a degree of disagreement about the values of a sample firm
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,

among investors. However, an exceptional case is the relationship between

and

DISP3. Consistent with Moeller et al. (2007)’s use of DISP3 as a proxy for investor
opinion divergence, DISP3 is positively and significantly associated with
(correlation = 0.21). As can be seen in Table 9, it is the only statistically significant
relationship with the correct sign (as a disagreement indicator) among correlations
between the extant disagreement proxies (including BREADTH and HI) and
Note also that DISP1 and DISP2 are highly correlated with

.

, but with a opposite

directional sign. The correlation should be positive because a higher level of DO implies
a higher dispersion in the analysts’ forecasts and a higher value of

.

Since DISP1 and DISP2 have been widely used as a measure of liquidity, we
examine whether the interpretation of DISP1 and DISP2 as a liquidity proxy rather than a
disagreement proxy is more relevant. We choose dollar trading volume as a liquidity
indicator to highlight dissimilarity between dollar trading volume (
turnover (

) and volume

). Above all, we note that there is a strong trend in DISP1 and DISP 2

over our study period. The correlation with the sub-periods assigned to the samples is 0.35 for DISP1 and -0.48 for DISP2, while it is -0.06 for DISP3. Because of a secular
upward trend in

and

and a downward trend in DISP1 and 2 across the

sample firms over the study period, we control for the sub-periods in computing the
following correlations.
When DISP1 and DIPS2 is correlated with

, we find that they are

significantly associated, having the correlation coefficient of -0.38 and -0.43, respectively.
In contrast, the corresponding correlations of DISP1 and DISP2 with

are

insignificant with the correlation of -0.05 and -0.11 respectively. Moreover, consistent
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with the interpretation of DISP3 as a disagreement proxy, DISP3 is insignificantly related
(correlation = -0.05), but it is significantly positively related to

to

(correlation = 0.26). Therefore, we argue that this result shows that the information
content of

and

clearly differ in that the latter represents the extent of

investor disagreement rather than the market liquidity of the sample firms.
Finally, we investigate how the proxies for DO are related to pricing indicators
(i.e., the book-to-market ratio and the earnings-to-price ratio). As we discussed in
Hypothesis Development, if disagreement among investors causes the slope of the
demand curve for a firm to become downward sloping (Miller, 1977), firms with a higher
level of

and the extant DO proxies (i.e., a higher slope of the demand curve)

should be overpriced compared to those with a lower level of DO in the pre-event period.
For BREADTH, we expect a positive correlation with those pricing indicators and for the
rest of the DO proxies a negative correlation. Following French and Fama (1993), we
define the book-to-market ratio (BK/MKT) as the ratio of the book value to the market
value of a firm by the fiscal year-end prior to a spinoff announcement year. The book
value of the common equity is the sum of common equity, deferred taxes, and investment
tax credit minus the book value of preferred shares and the market value is the product of
the number of shares outstanding and the stock price by the fiscal year end. The earningsto-price ratio (E/P) is the earnings of a sample firm divided by the stock prices by the
fiscal year end prior to the announcement year.
As can be seen in the 11th and 12th row in Table 9, only

has both the correct

negative sign and the significant correlations with BK/MKT and E/P (correlation = -0.28
and -0.18, respectively). However, all the other volume-based DO proxies have
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statistically insignificant correlation with the pricing indicators. Firms with higher
volume turnover tend to have lower BK/MTK ratios, consistent with the prediction of
Miller (1977) and the finding of Lee and Swaminathan (2000) in which stocks with low
turnover have greater factor loading in HML than those with high turnover.22 For
BREADTH and HI, the correlations with both value indicators are in the opposite
direction to what we expect, reflecting a tendency that mutual funds hold glamour stocks
(Chen, Hong, & Stein, 2002).
All the dispersion measures of analysts’ forecasts have positive and significant
correlation with BK/MKT, which contradicts the expected negative correlation, if they are
a proxy for disagreement. In particular, the correlation is especially strong for DISP1 (=
0.50) and DISP2 (= 0.61), while it declines almost by half for DISP3 (= 0.23) though
DISP1 and DISP3 have the expected, but insignificant correlation with E/P. Therefore,
we conclude this evidence strengthen our previous finding that DISP1 and DISP2 do not
capture the level of DO, but rather reflect market liquidity.
In sum, our analysis of the correlations between the extant disagreement proxies
and the volume-based DO (

) proxies—in an attempt to establish them as proper

proxy for the level of investor disagreement or the slope of the demand curve for a
sample firm —reveals the followings: First,

that involves no adjustment at all

except scaling daily trading volume by outstanding shares, seems to reflect more about

22

Piqueria (2006), using NYSE and NASDAQ samples for the period from 1993-2002
documents the correlation between volume turnover and BK/MKT of -0.06 for NYSE firms and 0.143 for NASDAQ firms. Similarly, Chen et al. (2002), for the sample of NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ stocks from 1979 to 1998, report the correlation of -0.10 between volume turnover and
BK/MKT and the correlation of -0.09 between volume turnover and E/P. Both studies use
monthly volume turnover demeaned by a corresponding exchange trading volume.
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the extent of diversity of investors opinion regarding the value of a stock than the level of
liquidity. Second, as we show in the previous and this section,
,

,

,

are related neither to the popular liquidity proxies or to the extant

disagreement proxies. Nonetheless, in addition to the evidence that they are highly
positively correlated with

, we argue that their empirical relevance as a proxy for

disagreement are validated by the test results of the hypotheses in the next section.
Disagreement and Abnormal Return in the Spinoff Announcement Period
For the estimation of abnormal returns, we implement the standard event-study
methodology in which benchmark parameters are measured during the pre-event period.
We use two different benchmarks: The mean of daily stock return over the pre-event
period (AD-260, AD-11), and the expected stock return calculated with the parameters of
the market model for daily return estimated over the same period. During the event
period (AD-1, AD+1), we compute a mean-adjusted abnormal return by subtracting the
mean daily return from a daily stock return. Similarly, we calculate a market-adjusted
abnormal return by subtracting the expected stock return estimated with the parameters
from a daily return. The market returns in the calculation of the market-adjusted
abnormal return is based on the returns on the CRSP value- as well as equal-weighted
portfolio of returns for all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks. To test statistical significance
of abnormal return (AR) or three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR), we use the
standard deviation of AR and CAR in the cross-section of the sample. Specifically, the tstatistic for AR (or CAR) on day t is given by

,

√
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(10)

where

and

,

are, respectively, the sample average and the standard deviation

of abnormal returns, which are calculated in the cross-section of n sample firms (Barber
& Lyon, 1997).
The same approach is implemented for testing statistical significance of the level
of disagreement in the event period. The statistic is given by

(11)

,

√

∑

where
∑

,

,

and the five volume-based measure of DO ( or VDO) are LNTO,

Detrend, UV, RESD, and SUV. On event day t,

and

,

are the sample

average and the standard deviation of VDO, both of which are calculated in the crosssection of n sample firms.
Table 10 reports daily abnormal return from AD-10 to AD+10 in which AD is the
date of a spinoff announcement. Since there is no material difference in either using the
value-weighted or the equal-weighted market returns, we report abnormal returns
computed with the value-weighted market returns. There is no discernible abnormal price
reaction before AD-1. But, the abnormal return on AD-1, AD and AD+1 is significantly
positive in both measures of abnormal return. Note that on AD+2, the market-adjusted
AR is significantly negative at the 5% level. Following AD+2, most of days are marked
by negative ARs. There appears to be a reversal of the returns earned during the
announcement period in the days following the announcement. For the event window
(AD-1, AD+1), the mean of three-day market-adjusted and mean-adjusted CARs equals
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Table 10. Abnormal Returns in the Announcement Period
This table reports the abnormal returns of the spinoff sample days surrounding the date of
a spinoff announcement. The sample consists of 221 spinoff announcements undertaken
by the publicly traded U.S firms from 1964 to 2005. The sample firms are further
required to have at least 80% of daily returns during the pre-event period. The final
sample consists of 202 firms. The pre-event period is defined as a 250-trading -day
period over AD-260 to AD-11 (AD is the announcement date). A market model for daily
returns is estimated over the pre-event period to compute a market-model adjusted
abnormal return in an event day. The market returns are the CRSP value-weighted
portfolio of returns of all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks. A mean-adjusted abnormal
return is calculated by subtracting the mean of daily returns during the pre-event period
from a daily return. CAR is the cumulated abnormal returns for the announcement period,
(AD-1, AD+1). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Market-model adjusted abnormal
return (%)

Mean-adjusted abnormal
return (%)

Date

Obs

-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
(AD) 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
201
201
200

0.134
-0.138
0.169
0.180
-0.122
-0.058
-0.141
0.103
0.119
1.367
1.647
0.439
-0.335
-0.127
-0.288
-0.070
0.142
-0.228
-0.214
0.257
0.097

(0.833)
-(0.845)
(1.006)
(1.199)
-(0.792)
-(0.276)
-(0.808)
(0.505)
(0.472)
(5.230)
(3.901)
(1.541)
-(2.043)
-(0.708)
-(1.338)
-(0.304)
(0.813)
-(1.631)
-(1.217)
(1.253)
(0.610)

0.109
-0.134
0.204
0.218
-0.131
0.058
-0.185
0.022
0.157
1.478
1.589
0.545
-0.254
-0.052
-0.184
-0.163
0.130
-0.190
-0.134
0.158
0.127

(0.640)
-(0.765)
(1.105)
(1.314)
-(0.842)
(0.261)
-(0.955)
(0.104)
(0.607)
(5.519)
(3.756)
(1.956)
-(1.449)
-(0.286)
-(0.809)
-(0.658)
(0.681)
-(1.221)
-(0.723)
(0.757)
(0.741)

CAR (AD-1, AD+1)

3.452

(6.160)

3.612

(6.400)

to 3.45% and 3.61% with the t-statistic of 6.16 and 6.40, respectively. Our result is
consistent with the finding of the prior spinoff literature. For example, Veld and Veld76

Merkoulova (2009) review 26 empirical studies on spinoff announcements, and find that
spinoff announcements generate, on average, a 3.02% of abnormal return. In all our
subsequent tests to follow, we focus on CARs in this event window. As can be seen in
Table 10, a significant market reaction starting AD-1 suggests a leakage of news, partial
anticipation of news, or delayed news reporting. Hence, we use three-day CAR around
the announcement for testing our hypotheses.
In Table 11, we report the cross-sectional mean of the event level of DO, or
∑

,

, for each day from AD-10 to AD+11. For any measure of VDO, there

is no significant change in the disagreement level before the announcement period (i.e.,
AD-1, AD+1). However, starting from AD-1 it increases significantly, peaks in the actual
announcement date, and then gradually declines until AD+10. Even after the
announcement date, the level of DO is significantly larger than the ex-ante level of DO.
This pattern in abnormal trading activity has been also observed for other important
corporate announcements.23 In the rational expectation paradigm in which investors have
common priors and interpret information in the same way, the same pattern does not
emerge since investors reach consensus quickly regarding the firm value following the
announcement (Hong & Stein, 2007). Thus, this pattern seems to suggest that investors
continue to trade based on their own interpretations even several days after the
announcement.
At the bottom of Table 11, we present the test result for Hypothesis 1. For each
sample firm, we calculate the event level of DO as the mean of a VDO over the

23

For example, see Figure 4 in Hong and Stein (2007) for quarterly earnings
announcement and Table 3 in Chae (2005) for acquisition announcement.
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Table 11. Event Level of DO in the Announcement Period
The sample consists of 221 spinoff announcements undertaken by the publicly traded U.S firms from 1964 to 2005. The
sample firms are further required to have at least 80% of daily VDOs (volume-based measure of difference of opinion) during
the pre-event period. The final sample consists of 202 firms. The table presents the cross-sectional means of the event level of
differences of opinion in the announcement period starting from 10 days before and ending 10 days after the announcement
date (AD). Five VDOs are LNTO, Detrend, UV, RESD, and SUV. On any day in the pre-event period, five VDOs are estimated
as follows with a 200-day control period prior to day t: Log Turnover (LNTO) is the natural logarithm of daily volume turnover.
Volume turnover is the ratio of the number of the shares traded to the total number of shares outstanding on that day. Detrend
is calculated by subtracting the average of daily trading volume over the control period. Unexplained Volume (UV) is
computed by first subtracting the market-wide log turnover, which gives the market-adjusted turnover (MATO). And it is
further adjusted by the mean of MATO over the control period. RESD is the residual from a one-factor market model of daily
log turnover that is estimated over the control period. A market-wide daily log turnover is the value-weighted log turnovers of
NYSE/AMEX firms. Standardized Unexplained Volume (SUV) is the residual from a two-factor model of daily log turnover,
which is further scaled by the standard deviation of the error terms of the model. The model takes daily absolute return
(separately depending on the sign of daily return) as the independent variables is estimated over the control period. The preevent period is defined as a 250-trading-day period that ends 11 days before the announcement date. The t-statistic for testing
the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the ex-ante level of disagreement and the event level of disagreement is
given by

,

∑

,

,

√

∑
and
, . On day t in the event period, (AD-10, AD+10),
, are the sample average and the
standard deviation of VDOs, both of which are calculated in the cross-section of the sample firms. The t-statistics are reported
in parenthesis.
Date(t)

Obs

-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5

202
202
202
202
202
202

LNTO
-6.27
-6.32
-6.26
-6.29
-6.37
-6.28

(0.63)
(0.11)
(0.73)
(0.49)
-(0.45)
(0.56)

Detrend
0.05
0.01
0.06
0.04
-0.04
0.04

UV

(0.76)
(0.06)
(0.90)
(0.53)
-(0.78)
(0.66)
78

0.04
-0.01
0.03
0.01
-0.04
0.02

(0.89)
-(0.01)
(0.81)
(0.44)
-(0.43)
(0.65)

RESD
0.04
-0.02
0.03
0.02
-0.03
0.03

(0.84)
-(0.06)
(0.63)
(0.44)
-(0.24)
(0.61)

SUV
0.07
0.00
0.01
-0.01
-0.07
0.00

(0.90)
-(0.05)
(0.16)
-(0.18)
-(1.01)
(0.05)

Table 11. Event Level of DO in the Announcement Period, Continued
Date(t)

Obs

-4
-3
-2
-1
(AD) 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
202
201
201
200

Difference

LNTO
-6.32 (0.10)
-6.20 (1.42)
-6.20 (1.48)
-5.90 (4.57)
-5.38 (10.94)
-5.65 (7.46)
-5.84 (5.99)
-6.02 (3.40)
-6.05 (3.44)
-6.01 (4.15)
-6.12 (2.39)
-6.21 (1.26)
-6.10 (2.76)
-6.14 (2.16)
-6.14 (2.18)
-5.64
-6.33
0.68 (8.94)

Detrend

UV

0.01 (0.03)
0.12 (1.72)
0.12 (2.02)
0.42 (5.65)
0.94 (13.86)
0.67 (9.14)
0.47 (7.24)
0.29 (4.23)
0.25 (4.06)
0.30 (4.71)
0.19 (2.81)
0.09 (1.37)
0.20 (3.21)
0.16 (2.39)
0.16 (2.25)
0.68
0.00
0.67 (12.73)
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-0.02 -(0.04)
0.11 (1.80)
0.10 (2.03)
0.38 (5.61)
0.91 (13.84)
0.63 (9.19)
0.46 (7.71)
0.27 (4.41)
0.26 (4.53)
0.29 (5.04)
0.19 (3.09)
0.11 (2.23)
0.22 (4.07)
0.18 (2.89)
0.15 (2.53)
0.64
-0.01
0.65 (12.96)

RESD
-0.01 -(0.04)
0.10 (1.71)
0.10 (1.99)
0.38 (5.56)
0.89 (13.46)
0.62 (8.78)
0.44 (7.29)
0.27 (4.21)
0.25 (4.29)
0.28 (4.88)
0.18 (2.92)
0.10 (1.89)
0.22 (3.86)
0.17 (2.69)
0.15 (2.44)
0.63
-0.01
0.64 (12.62)

SUV
0.04 (0.45)
0.12 (1.62)
0.12 (1.58)
0.34 (4.16)
0.88 (10.26)
0.77 (8.54)
0.64 (7.82)
0.41 (4.98)
0.36 (4.55)
0.29 (3.73)
0.20 (2.67)
0.15 (2.08)
0.27 (3.65)
0.20 (2.85)
0.22 (2.66)
0.66
0.00
0.66 (10.83)

announcement period (

∑

,

). As can be seen in Table 11, in support

of Hypothesis1, the mean of the event levels of DO (i.e.,

∑

) is

significantly larger than that of the ex-ante level of DO (i.e.,
∑

) in all VDOs with the t-statistics greater than 8.94. As the news of a

corporate spinoff arrives in the market, it spurs differential interpretation among investors
regarding the prospect of the firm following spinoff. Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 1,
the event level of disagreement is significantly larger than the ex-ante level of
disagreement. This implies that the announcement of a spinoff trigger highly differential
interpretation of the announcement among investors.
Test Results of Hypotheses
A. The Event Level of Disagreement and Abnormal Return. We first test a
prediction of Banerjee and Kremer (2010)’s model: When there is a sharp increase in
investor disagreement prompted by a public announcement of the news, the model
predicts that trading volume and return are increasing in proportion to the degree of
disagreement. Therefore, firms affected by greater disagreement about the announcement
of a spinoff (i.e. higher event level of DO) should earn higher returns. We sort the sample
firms into the quintiles based on their estimated event levels of DO (as we defined in the
previous section) and compute the mean of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns in
each quintile.
Table 12 reports the relationship between the event level of DO (henceforth Event
DO) and the three-day CARs. Consistent with the model, as Event DO quintile increases,
the mean of CAR rises in tandem. This positive relation between Event DO and CAR is
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Table 12. Event Level of DO and Announcement Abnormal Return
This table presents the relations between the event levels of DO and the abnormal announcement returns. On any day in the
pre-event period, five VDOs are estimated as follows with a 200-day control period prior to day t: Log Turnover (LNTO) is
the natural logarithm of daily volume turnover. Volume turnover is the ratio of the number of the shares traded to the total
number of shares outstanding on that day. Detrend is calculated by subtracting the average of daily trading volume over the
control period. Unexplained Volume (UV) is computed by first subtracting the market-wide log turnover, which gives the
market-adjusted turnover (MATO). And it is further adjusted by the mean of MATO over the control period. RESD is the
residual from a one-factor market model of daily log turnover that is estimated over the control period. A market-wide
daily log turnover is the value-weighted log turnovers of NYSE/AMEX firms. Standardized Unexplained Volume (SUV) is
the residual from a two-factor model of daily log turnover, which is further scaled by the standard deviation of the error
terms of the model. The pre-event period is defined as a 250-trading-day period that ends 11 days before the announcement
date. On day t during the event window of (AD-1, AD+1), each VDO (LNTO, Detrend, UV, RESD, SUV) is estimated, and
averaged over the same window to calculate the event level of DO. The sample firms are sorted into the quintile based on
the estimated event levels of DO (EventDO). In each qunitle, the mean of EventDO and cumulative abnormal returns
(CAR) over the event window is calculated across the samples. The t-tests for the difference in the means (Panel 1),
assuming an unequal variance, and the Wilcoxon-rank-sum tests for difference in the medians (Panel 2) are calculated by
using cross-sectional distribution of CARs and EventDOs. The Spearman rank correlations are the sample correlations
between EventDOs and CARs of the entire sample firms.
Panel 1. The mean of the event-levels of differences of opinion and three-day CARs
LNTO
Detrend
UV
RESD
SUV
Rank Obs EventDO CAR
EventDO CAR
EventDO CAR
EventDO CAR
EventDO CAR
(Low)1 40
-7.22 2.54
-0.31 0.64
-0.27 1.43
-0.29 1.28
-0.51 1.59
2 41
-6.17 2.29
0.29 1.74
0.27 0.70
0.25 1.40
0.21 4.34
3 40
-5.56 2.53
0.58 2.79
0.55 3.18
0.53 3.15
0.62 4.94
4 41
-5.05 5.20
1.02 3.82
0.91 3.30
0.90 3.24
1.08 3.30
(High)5 40
-4.22 4.69
1.80 8.30
1.75 8.72
1.76 8.25
1.93 3.08
202
Difference:
High-Low
3.00a 2.15
2.11a 7.66a
2.02a 7.29a
2.05a 6.97a
2.44a 1.49
a
a
a
a
Rank correlation
0.17
0.34
0.34
0.32
0.09
a,b,c

indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively.
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Table 12. Event Level of DO and Announcement Abnormal Return, Continued
Panel 2. The median of the event-levels of differences of opinion three-day CARs
LNTO
Detrend
UV
RESD
Rank Obs EventDO CAR
EventDO CAR
EventDO CAR
EventDO CAR
(Low)1 40
-6.98 1.49
-0.21 0.18
-0.17 1.22
-0.20 0.92
2 41
-6.14 2.22
0.30 1.46
0.27 0.56
0.26 1.75
3 40
-5.53 1.75
0.58 3.05
0.57 2.60
0.53 2.99
4 41
-5.12 4.68
1.05 3.96
0.89 3.81
0.92 3.43
(High)5 40
-4.33 5.72
1.71 8.58
1.70 8.58
1.65 8.46
202
Difference:
High - Low
2.65a 4.23c
1.92c 8.40a
1.87a 7.36a
1.85a 7.54a
a,b,c
indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively.
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SUV
EventDO
-0.46
0.21
0.61
1.10
1.74

CAR
1.22
3.04
2.42
3.43
4.74

2.20a 3.52c

consistently observed for any VDO except SUV. For example, when the quintiles are
formed based on detrended turnover (Detrend), firms in the lowest quintile—equivalently
firms with the lowest level of disagreement on their valuation following the
announcement of a spinoff — earn the mean CAR of 0.64%, while those in the highest
quintile earn 8.30%. Using the unpaired t-test for the difference in the mean CAR and the
nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for the difference in the median CAR, we find
that the difference in the mean CAR (difference = 7.66%) and the median CAR
(difference= 8.40%) between the highest and the lowest quintile are significant at the 1%
level.
In addition, we measure the strength of the relationship between Event DO and
CAR across all the sample firms by a Spearman rank correlation. For all Event DO,
except SUV, the correlations range from 0.17 to 0.34, and are significant at the 1% level.
In the case of SUV, recall that SUV is intended to measure a portion of disagreementdriven trading volume after controlling for the average firm-specific level of liquidity
trading and trading motivated by private information (see equation 7). The measurement
of SUV treats a whole announcement return as if it is solely driven by informed trading.
Therefore, during the announcement period the expected daily volume turnover estimated
by SUV might also capture a portion of volume turnover related to disagreement, which
should be reflected on announcement returns. We find no such pattern emerge between
CAR and SUV.
B. Disagreement Shock and Abnormal Return. We test the second hypothesis in
this section by combining Banerjee and Kremer (2010)’s time-varying level of DO with
Miller (1977)’s DO model. Hypothesis 2 states that there should be a positive correlation
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between disagreement shock and abnormal return in the announcement period. If a firm
publicly announces its spinoff decision, the announcement sparks heterogeneous
interpretation about the news among investors, raising the level of DO to the event level
during the event period from the ex-ante level in the pre-event period. In Miller (1977)’s
model, it is the presence of disagreement about the valuation of the stock that induces its
demand curve downward-sloping. Thus, in this two-period setting (i.e., the pre-event and
the event period), a change in the level of DO implies a corresponding change in the
slope of the demand curve. Since a spinoff announcement entails no change in the float
(i.e., the supply curve), firms affected by a larger change in the slope of a demand curve,
or a greater change in the level of DO, should have larger abnormal returns. Note that in
the prior section we examined the relationship between the event level of DO and
abnormal return. But, in this section we focus on the magnitude of a change in the level
of DO or disagreement shock and its effect on the prices of the sample during the event
period.
We define the disagreement shock (henceforth SHOCK) as a difference between
. As we discussed in

the event and the ex- ante level of DO or (∆
Methodology section,

is measured to reflect the normal level of DO of a firm in

a typical trading day and thus can be considered as a pre-spinoff firm characteristic.
Similarly,

proxies for the elevated or abnormal level of DO in the announcement

period.
In Table 13, we sort the sample firms into the quintiles according to their sizes of
SHOCK, and compute the mean and the median of CAR and SHOCK in each quintile.
Under Hypothesis 2, as the mean value of SHCOK in each quintile increases, so does the
84

Table 13. Disagreement Shock and Announcement Abnormal Return
This table presents the relations between the disagreement shocks and the abnormal announcement returns. The shock on the
level of difference of opinion (DO) or the disagreement shock is calculated by subtracting the ex-ante level of differences of
opinion (DO) from the event level of DO. The event level of DO is measured by averaging daily estimates of a VDO (VDO =
LNTO, Detrend, UV, RESD and SUV) over the event window of (AD, AD+1). The ex-ante level of DO is measured by
averaging daily estimates of a VDO over the pre-event period or (AD-260, AD-11). During the pre- and event period on any
day, five VDOs are estimated as follows with a 200-day control period prior to day t: Log Turnover (LNTO) is the natural
logarithm of daily volume turnover. Volume turnover is the ratio of the number of the shares traded to the total number of
shares outstanding on that day. Detrend is calculated by subtracting the average of daily trading volume over the control period.
Unexplained Volume (UV) is computed by first subtracting the market-wide log turnover, which gives the market-adjusted
turnover (MATO). And it is further adjusted by the mean of MATO over the control period. RESD is the residual from a onefactor market model of daily log turnover that is estimated over the control period. Standardized Unexplained Volume (SUV) is
the residual from a two-factor model of daily log turnover, which is further scaled by the standard deviation of the error terms
of the model. A daily abnormal return is a residual calculated from the market model, using the value-weighted market returns,
estimated over the pre-event period. CAR is the sum of abnormal returns during the announcement period. The t-tests for the
difference in the means (Panel 1), assuming an unequal variance, and the Wilcoxon-rank-sum tests for the difference in the
medians (Panel 2) are calculated by using the cross-sectional distribution of CARs and Shocks. The Spearman rank
correlations are the sample correlations between Shocks and CARs of the entire sample firms.
Panel 1. The mean of disagreement shocks and three-day CARs
LNTO
Detrend
UV
RESD
SUV
Rank Obs
Shock CAR
Shock CAR
Shock CAR
Shock CAR
Shock CAR
(Low)1 40
-0.30 0.59
-0.37 0.80
-0.29 0.67
-0.29 0.85
-0.55
1.12
2 41
0.29 2.59
0.28 1.61
0.28 0.99
0.26 0.40
0.21
5.43
3 40
0.58 2.48
0.62 2.25
0.58 2.42
0.55 3.26
0.62
4.53
4 41
1.02 3.57
1.05 5.15
0.96 4.95
0.95 4.03
1.07
2.33
(High)5 40
1.84 8.06
1.79 7.46
1.74 8.26
1.74 8.79
1.96
3.82
202
Difference:
2.16a 6.66a
2.03a 7.59a
2.03a 7.94a
2.51a 2.70c
High - Low
2.14a 7.47a
Rank correlation
0.33a
0.38a
0.39a
0.38a
0.14b
a,b,c

indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively
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Table 13. Disagreement Shock and Announcement Abnormal Return, Continued
Panel 2. The median of disagreement shocks and three-day CARs
LNTO
Detrend
UV
Rank Obs
Shock CAR
Shock CAR
Shock CAR
(Low)1 40
-0.19 0.67
-0.27 0.67
-0.14 0.27
2 41
0.29 2.54
0.28 0.96
0.28 0.96
3 40
0.57 2.48
0.61 2.38
0.58 2.11
4 41
1.03 3.81
1.06 5.49
0.94 4.89
(High)5 40
1.76 8.09
1.71 8.58
1.62 8.66
202
Difference:
High - Low
1.95a 7.42a
1.98a 7.91a
1.76a 8.39a
a,b,c
indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively
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RESD
Shock CAR
-0.20 0.27
0.27 0.96
0.56 2.42
0.93 4.97
1.66 8.66

1.86a

8.39a

SUV
Shock CAR
-0.42
0.92
0.24
2.79
0.63
3.04
1.06
3.32
1.83
4.78

2.25a

3.86a

mean CAR. The differences in the mean CAR and the median CAR between the top and
the bottom quintiles are significant at the 1 % level regardless of a VDO we choose to
measure SHOCK except SUV, which is significant at the 10 % level. The sample firms in
the top quintile on average earn about 7% more than those in the bottom quintile during
the announcement period. Moreover, in the cross-section of the entire sample, SHOCK is
significantly and positively related to CAR with the Spearman rank correlation ranging
from 0.39 to 0.14.
Frazzini and Lamont’s (2006) study of stocks returns and trading volume around
earnings announcement offers the findings that can be interpreted within our analytical
framework. They document that abnormal returns are on average positive, and trading
volume increases sharply around earnings announcement dates. Since those
announcements include both good and bad news, the on-average positive abnormal return
(i.e., the earnings announcement premium) can be explained by disagreement shock
resulted from a heightened level of disagreement among investors that is brought forth by
earnings announcements. The elevated level of disagreement is also reflected in
abnormally high trading volume during the earnings announcement period. Note that this
event itself does not involve a change in the float as the announcement of a spinoff does
not. As we discussed in the preceding two sections, spinoff announcements also elicit
such market reactions as highly elevated level of trading volume and positive abnormal
return.
Note that the overall correlations reported in Table 13 are higher than those in
Table 12. In particular, the correlation between SHOCK measured with SUV and CAR is
significant at the 5 % level. But, recall that the correlation between the event level of DO
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and CAR is insignificant in Table 12. This suggests that disagreement shock rather than
disagreement in levels better captures the variations in the abnormal returns during the
event period. More importantly, our result implies further that the interpretation of the
level of DO as the slope of the demand curve is pertinent because we find a significantly
positive correlation between CAR and SHOCK measured with any VDOs.
Accordingly, we conclude that VDOs employed in this study adequately capture
the degree of disagreement among investors in the pre-event as well as in the event
period. Thus, by extrapolating the ex-ante and the event level of DO from daily estimates
of VDOs, we are able to measure a change in the level of DO from the typical trading day
to the event day, and its effect on announcement return.
C. Ex-Ante Level of Disagreement, Disagreement Shock and Abnormal Return. In
this section, we examine a dynamic relationship between the ex-ante level of DO and the
event level of DO, and its linkage to price reactions of the sample stocks in the
announcement period. In Hypothesis 3, we posit that the pre-event level of DO is
negatively correlated with disagreement shock. This proposition is based on the idea of
limited attention on the part of investors (e.g., Hirchleifer & Teoh, 2003; Peng & Xiong,
2006) which states that cognitively overloaded investors pay attention to only a certain
subset of information. Because of this type of cognitive constraint, a firm that, for
example, is not frequently covered by the media would have a low level of DO. In other
words, it is less susceptible to heterogeneous interpretations by investors. However, when
the firm announces its plan to spin off, which is very likely to receive a wide and intense
media coverage, this firm that has a lower ex-ante levels of DO (i.e., a low-disagreement
firm) is expected to incur larger disagreement shock than a firm with a higher ex-ante
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Table 14. Ex-Ante Level of DO, Disagreement Shock and Announcement Abnormal Return
This table presents the relation between the ex-ante levels of difference of opinion (DO) and the disagreement shocks (Shock).
The shock on the level of difference of opinion (DO) or the disagreement shock is calculated by subtracting the ex-ante level
of differences of opinion (Ex-Ante) from the event level of DO. The event level of DO is measured by averaging daily
estimates of a VDO (VDO = LNTO, Detrend, UV, RESD and SUV) over the event window of (AD, AD+1). The ex-ante level
of DO is measured by averaging daily estimates of a VDO over the pre-event period or (AD-260, AD-11). See the Table 13 for
the details about the measurement of VDOs. A daily abnormal return is a residual calculated from the market model, using the
value-weighted market returns, estimated over the pre-event period. CAR is the sum of abnormal returns during the
announcement period. The t-tests for the differences in the means (Panel 1), assuming an unequal variance, and the Wilcoxonrank-sum tests for the differences in the medians (Panel B) are calculated by using cross-sectional distribution of Ex-Ante,
Shocks and CAR. For the entire sample firms, Rank correlation 1 is the Spearman rank correlation between Ex Ante and Shock.
Rank correlation 2 is the Spearman rank correlation between Ex Ante and CAR.
Panel 1. The mean of the ex-ante level of DO, disagreement shock and three-day CAR
LNTO
Detrend
UV
Ex
Ex
Ex
Rank
Obs
Ante Shock CAR
Ante Shock CAR
Ante Shock CAR
(Low)1
40
-7.69
0.79
5.47
-0.27
0.95
5.66
-0.28 0.86 5.72
2
41
-6.72
0.82
5.15
-0.08
0.79
3.81
-0.09 0.66 3.58
3
40
-6.25
0.67
2.84
0.01
0.64
1.91
0.00 0.67 2.60
4
41
-5.86
0.70
2.05
0.09
0.37
1.46
0.07 0.58 1.88
(High)5
40
-5.13
0.43
1.73
0.27
0.61
4.45
0.23 0.50 3.52
202
Difference:Q1-Q5
2.56a -0.36b -3.74c
0.54a
-0.34
-1.21
0.51a -0.36c -2.20
Rank Correlation 1
-0.15b
-0.20a
-0.15b
Rank Correlation 2
-0.19a
-0.19a
-0.22a
a,b,c
indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively.
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Table 14. Ex-Ante Level of DO, Disagreement Shock and Announcement Abnormal Return. Continued
Panel 1. The mean of the ex-ante level of DO, disagreement shock and three-day CAR
RESD
SUV
Rank Obs
Ex Ante
Shock
CAR
(Low)1 40
-0.27
0.89
5.74
2 41
-0.08
0.59
3.44
3 40
0.00
0.65
2.78
4 41
0.07
0.45
2.08
(High)5 40
0.22
0.63
3.25
202
Difference:Q1-Q5
0.49a
-0.26
-2.49
b
Rank Correlation 1
-0.14
Rank Correlation 2
-0.22a
a,b,c
indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively.

Ex Ante
-0.33
-0.13
0.00
0.14
0.32

Shock
0.98
0.73
0.64
0.63
0.33

CAR
4.50
5.85
1.42
1.18
4.31

0.65a

-0.65a
-0.22a

-0.19
-0.19a

Table 14. Ex-Ante Level of DO, Disagreement Shock and Announcement Abnormal Return. Continued
Panel 2. The median of the ex-ante level of DO, disagreement shock and three-day CAR
LNTO
Detrend
UV
Ex
Ex
Ex
Rank
Obs
Ante Shock CAR
Ante Shock CAR
Ante Shock
(Low)1
40
-7.46
0.64
3.82
-0.24
0.80
5.77
-0.24
0.76
2
41
-6.69
0.66
4.22
-0.08
0.62
3.72
-0.09
0.45
3
40
-6.23
0.56
2.13
0.01
0.60
0.91
0.00
0.59
4
41
-5.86
0.62
1.46
0.09
0.33
1.73
0.08
0.50
(High)5
40
-5.22
0.42
1.95
0.23
0.70
2.02
0.18
0.49
202
Difference:Q1-Q5
2.24a -0.22b -1.87
0.47a
-0.10
-3.75c
0.42a
-0.27
a,b,c
indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively.
90

CAR
5.88
2.66
1.52
1.77
1.56
-4.32b

Table 14. Ex-Ante Level of DO, Disagreement Shock and Announcement Abnormal Return. Continued
Panel 2. The median of the ex-ante level of DO, disagreement shock and three-day CAR
RESD
SUV
Rank Obs
Ex Ante
Shock
CAR
Ex Ante
Shock
CAR
(Low)1
40
-0.24
0.76
5.77
-0.29
0.87
5.22
2
41
-0.08
0.44
2.30
-0.13
0.60
4.97
3
40
0.00
0.59
2.21
0.01
0.67
1.46
4
41
0.07
0.44
1.77
0.14
0.61
1.75
(High)5
40
0.18
0.56
0.87
0.29
0.24
1.85
202
Difference:Q1-Q5
0.42a
-0.20
-4.90b
0.58a
-0.63a
-3.37c
a,b,c
indicate the significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively.
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level of DO (i.e., a high-disagreement firm). Consequently, the former should earn higher
announcement abnormal return than the latter. Furthermore, we argued in Section 3 that
this relationship—a negative correlation between the ex-ante level of DO and
disagreement shock— will give rise to a negative correlation between the ex-ante level of
DO and announcement abnormal return.
We sort the sample firms into the quintile based on the values of proxies for their
ex-ante levels of DO. Table 14 shows the mean (Panel 1) and the median (Panel 2) of the
ex-ante level of DO, SHOCK, and CAR in each quintile. As can be seen, in all VDOs, as
the ex-ante level of DO increases, SHOCK and CAR decrease. The difference of the
mean or the median of SHOCK and CAR between the top and the bottom quintile are
negative, but insignificant in some VDOs. In particular, the test for the difference in the
mean CAR appears inconclusive because the mean CAR is larger in the fifth (largest)
quintile as compared to that in the third or in the fourth quintile. It seems to suggest that
the existence of some outliers in CAR that mitigate a negative association between the
ex-ante DO and CAR.
However, across the entire sample we find that the correlations between the exante level of DO and SHOCK (rank correlation 1) are significantly negative in all VDOs.
The correlations range from -0.14 to -0.22, and are significant at least 5 % level. This
result confirms Hypothesis 3 that low-disagreement firms tend to experience larger
disagreement shocks—greater changes in the level of DO in the announcement period
relative to the ex-ante level of DO—than high-disagreement firms.
Finally, we confirm an inverse relation between the ex-ante DO and CAR, which
is implied by a negative correlation between the ex-ante DO and SHOCK, in the cross92

section of the entire sample by Spearman rank correlations (Rank correlation 2). As
reported in Table 14, the correlations range from -0.19 to -0.22 in all VDOs, and are
significant at the 1 % level. As we postulated, it is a negative relationship between the exante level of DO and SHOCK that gives a negative correlation between the ex-ante level
of DO and CAR.
In other words, compared to a high-disagreement firm, a low-disagreement firm,
or a firm with a low slope of the demand curve, sustains a large (negative) change in the
slope in the announcement period because it is affected by a large disagreement shock
triggered by the spinoff announcement. Thus, CARs are higher for low disagreement
firms than for high-disagreement firms. Therefore, it follows that for our sample of
spinoffs the ex-ante level of DO can be a potentially significant factor for explaining the
cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns days surrounding spinoff announcements.
Moreover, we argue that the-ex-ante level of DO of a firm can be considered as a firm
specific characteristic because its measurement reflects the average extent to which a firm
is affected by investor who have different beliefs about its value and interpret information
differently over a period of time. Therefore, we re-define the ex-ante level of DO as the
disagreement factor in Part Two. In that part of the dissertation, we will analyze the
relevance and robustness of disagreement factor for abnormal gains in the announcement
period by controlling for the known determinants that have identified in the literature.
Conclusions
Excessive trading volume accompanied by overpricing in the U.S stock market
(especially the IT boom in the late 1990) and highly abnormal volume behavior around
an information event such as earnings, acquisition, and spinoff announcements are not
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easily explained by the traditional asset pricing models because these models have no
role for trading volume. However, the development in disagreement models attempts to
overcome this difficulty, and are able to explain a positive relation between trading
volume and overpricing. Unlike these risk-based rational asset pricing models, the
disagreement models set forth a market model in which investors have heterogeneous
beliefs and interpret public information differently, and that investors are bounded by
short sales restrictions.
Building on differences-of-opinion (DO) models of Banerjee and Kremer (2010)
and Miller (1977), we empirically examine changes in the levels of DO among investors
and their impacts on price reactions days surrounding the announcements of corporate
spinoffs. We use a sample of spinoffs undertaken by the U.S public firms from 1964 to
2005. As an empirical investigation strategy, we adopt a two-period setting (i.e., the preevent and the event period) which allow us to estimate the ex-ante level of DO prior to
the announcement of a spinoff and the event level of DO in the three-day period
surrounding the announcement. The ex-ante level of DO is measured to proxy for the
degree of disagreement about a sample firm in a typical trading day and can thus be
regarded as its firm specific characteristic ex ante. The event level of DO mirrors the
degree of disagreement that is triggered by differential interpretation of the
announcement by investors. Thus, we propose and test the following hypotheses: 1) the
announcement spinoff will spark a high degree of differential interpretation about the
announcement, 2) disagreement shock (i.e., the event level of DO minus the ex-ante level
of DO) will be positively correlated with abnormal announcement return, and 3) the exante level of DO will be negatively correlated with disagreement shock.
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With theoretical guidance from dynamic models of DO, we use daily trading
volume turnover, which is the basic ingredient for measuring disagreement. Following
Garfinkel (2009), we estimate five volume-based measures of DO (VDO) including
volume turnover itself in each trading day during both the pre-event and the event period,
and extrapolate the ex-ante and the event level of DO from these daily estimates.
Since volume turnover is widely regarded as an indicator of liquidity, and VDOs
are constructed to isolate extra portion of volume turnover after controlling for its known
determinants, we first substantiate proxies for the ex-ante level of DO or the ex-ante DO
proxies for a sample firm as relevant and adequate measures for investor disagreement by
comparing with the popular proxies for market liquidity of the firm in the literature
(dollar trading volume, firm size, the effective spread, and the standard deviation of
return residuals). We find that ex-ante DO proxies (except one based on daily turnover)
are not correlated with these liquidity proxies. Interestingly, while the ex-ante DO based
on volume turnover is positively associated with dollar trading volume and firm size,
which is consistent as a liquidity proxy, it has also significantly positive correlations with
the effective spread and the residual standard deviation, which is inconsistent as a
liquidity proxy. Considering that the effective spread and the standard deviation of return
residuals trace the market liquidity of a stock more closely, we conclude that the ex-ante
DO proxies does not reflect liquidity. Further, we compare our DO proxies with the
extant DO proxies (i.e., breadth of ownership by Chen et al., 2002; the dispersion of
analysts’ earnings forecasts by Diether et al., 2002; and the dispersion of analysts’
forecasts on the long-term earnings growth by Moeller et al., 2007). We, however, find
no significant relationship between them except the DO proxy measured with volume
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turnover, which has a significant correlation with the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts on
the long-term earnings growth. Furthermore, we find that this DO proxy also has a
significant negative correlation with the pricing indicators (i.e., book-to-market ratio and
earning-to-price ratio). This is consistent with the prediction of Miller (1977)’s DO
model, namely positive relation between trading volume and overpricing. Hence, our
results overall indicate that ex-ante DO proxies for a sample firm seem to properly
capture the degree of disagreement among investors about its value prior to the
announcement of a spinoff.
Our tests of the three hypotheses reveal the following results. We find that there is
a sharp increase in the level of DO in the announcement period. For example, the means
of ex-ante DO proxies are around zero, but those of event DO proxies, or the level of DO
in the three-day period around the date of a spinoff announcement, surge up to around 0.6.
This implies that the announcement is a significant information event that generates large
disagreement among investors about the prospect of a sample firm following spinoff. In
support of Hypothesis 2, we find that firms impacted by higher disagreement shocks—the
difference between the ex-ante level of DO and the event level of DO—earn higher
abnormal returns generated from their spinoff announcements. We argue that this
evidence provides empirical support for the interpretation of a change in the level of DO
as a shift in the slope of demand curve in the framework of Miller (1977)’s model.
Furthermore, we find that the abnormal returns have a statistically significant positive
correlation with the disagreement shocks for all the VODs used to measure them
including the one that control for information related trading volume in the
announcement period. Finally, we find that firms characterized by low disagreement (i.e.,
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a lower level of ex-ante level of DO) in the pre-event period evoke higher disagreement
(i.e. a higher event level of DO)—hence higher disagreement shock— upon a spinoff
announcement than do firms with a higher level of ex-ante level of DO. This result is
consistent with the idea of limited attention on the part of investors. This negative
correlation between the ex-ante and the event level of DO further suggests a negative
correlation between the ex-ante level of DO and the abnormal returns. We find the
evidence in support of this implication. Therefore, the ex-ante levels of DO of the sample
firms can be an important determinant helpful in understanding the cross-sectional
variation in the abnormal returns days surrounding spinoff announcements.
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Part 2
Introduction
A. Recapitulation. In Part One, we empirically investigate the effect of changes in
the levels of differences of opinion (henceforth DO) on stock prices during the three-day
period around the date of a spinoff announcement. Our sample consists of 202 corporate
spinoffs that announced (during the period between 1964 and 2005) and successfully
completed. Specifically, we combine analytical properties of Miller (1977)’s static DO
model with those of Banerjee and Kremer (2010)’s dynamic DO model, and propose and
test three hypotheses. The nature of the hypotheses and our findings are:
1) As prognosticated by Banerjee and Kremer’s (2010) dynamic model, the
announcement of a spinoff sets off a sudden jump in the level of DO, which
reflects widely differential interpretation about the news among investors
(Hypothesis 1).
2) Interpreting the observed sudden increase in the level of DO from a normal
level in the framework of Miller (1977)’s model, we measure “disagreement
shock.” We find that there is a positive relationship between the disagreement
shock abnormal return in the three-day period surrounding the announcement
(Hypothesis 2).
3) The Ex-ante levels of DO of sample firms, which we define as the normal
levels of disagreement, or more specifically the levels of DO in a typical
trading day—in contrast to the levels of DO in the announcement day or the
event levels of DO—among investors about their values, are negatively
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correlated with their disagreement shocks (Hypothesis 3). It is our contention
that it is the relationship between the ex-ante levels of DO and the
disagreement shocks that renders a negative correlation between the ex-ante
levels of DO and the abnormal returns.
In addition, we investigate the firm size effect on gains in the firm’s market value ex post
and find that the pre-spinoff parent size is significantly inversely related to the market
value gain from the spinoff. We also evaluate our ex-ante DO proxies as appropriate
measures for investor disagreement by comparing our ex-ante DO proxies not only with
several widely used liquidity proxies but also with the extant DO proxies in the form of
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts and breadth of ownership. In summary, we
demonstrate that our trading volume-based ex-ante DO proxies capture investor
disagreement, and therefore are potentially cogent explanatory variables for the crosssectional variation in abnormal returns observed immediately following the
announcement of a spinoff.
It should be noted that our analysis in Part 1 is based on comparative statistics in
the form of behavioral equations that are both bivariate (see equation (1) and equation (6))
and partial multivariate (see equation (7) and Table 8)). Thus, we focus largely in Part 1
on the statistical relationship between “disagreement proxies” and abnormal returns from
spinoff announcements. In this respect, we may not sufficiently control for the effect of
other independent variables which may determine the abnormal returns.
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B. Purpose and Overview. The primary purpose of Part 2 is to broaden our
investigation by extending the bivariate analyses in Part 1 to multiple regression analyses.
We test whether the cross-sectional variation in announcement abnormal returns can be
accounted for with our key variable, the ex-ante level of DO, which we rename it as
disagreement factor in Part 2, when controlling for other known sources for these returns
reported in the literature. Our multivariate analyses set a stringent test for the ability of
disagreement factor to explain the abnormal returns.
Note that since spinoff announcements have shown to generate, on average,
positive abnormal returns as we also verify this stylized fact in Part 1, it is often referred
to as wealth gain or wealth effect in the literature. We select the following three
determinants that have received strong empirical support as the sources for wealth gains
or “announcement abnormal returns”: relative size which is the portion of a (parent)
firm’s assets assigned to its spun-off subsidiary, the level of information asymmetry of
the firm prior to a spinoff announcement, and focus factor which indicates whether the
firm split up a related or unrelated subsidiary to its core business (i.e., the focusincreasing or non-focus-increasing spinoff).
Part 2 considers disparities in available evidence related to the effects of
information asymmetry and focus factor on wealth gain. First, regarding information
asymmetry, in their work on the information hypothesis, Krishnaswami and
Subramaniam (1999) postulate that information asymmetry between outside investors
and managers can cause undervaluation of a firm. Management uses this valuation “error”
as an opportunity to undertake a spin-off and correct for the valuation discrepancy, or
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enhance the firm’s value. The authors find evidence for the hypothesis that firms with
higher information asymmetry earn higher abnormal returns because investors rationally
expect greater improvement in information asymmetry for these firms than firms with
lower information asymmetry. Moreover, they show that there is a significant decline or
improvement in information asymmetry after the completion of spinoffs. However,
Huson and MacKinnon (2003) document that information asymmetry worsens after the
completion of spinoff. Furthermore, Veld and Veld-Merkoulova’s (2004) study of
spinoffs in the E.U also reach a similar conclusion in that they find no relation between
information asymmetry and abnormal announcement return.
It is also important to note that a majority of the empirical literature that analyzes
the “focus factor” effect uses spinoffs that were undertaken in the U.S before the year of
1992. These studies (e.g., Daley et al., 1997; Desai & Jain, 1999; Krishnaswami &
Subramaniam, 1999) find that spinoffs which involve splitting up an unrelated subsidiary
(i.e., improvement in industrial focus or focus-increasing spinoff) earns larger
announcement abnormal returns than non-focus-increasing spinoffs. Moreover, this
wealth gain is confined to focus-increasing spinoffs. However, a recent study by Veld
and Veld-Merkoulova (2008) examines the U. S. spinoff experience from 1995 to 2002
and does not find an association between wealth gain and either focus factor or
information asymmetry.
The apparent contradictory findings on information asymmetry effects and the
inconsistency of findings related to the effect of focus factor on wealth gain warrant the
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examination of these variables individually. Given the breadth and scope of our dataset1,
it is our hope that we might shed some new light on these important empirical issues.
First, our analysis of information asymmetry shows a significant deterioration in all
proxies employed from the pre- to the post-spinoff period. Moreover, the observed
deterioration displays two important characteristics; first, it is observed only in focusincreasing firms, and second, it is observed to a high degree. These findings serve as a
fundamental challenge to the underlying intuition of the information hypothesis, which
clearly would expect that focus-increasing firms would experience diametrically opposite
results. In other words, under the hypothesis, focus-increasing firms would achieve
greater improvement in information asymmetry.
For the effect of focus factor, we find that spin-off type (i.e., focus increasing or
non-focus increasing spinoff) had no effect on announcement abnormal returns for the
entire 41-year study period. However, for the first study period that include spinoff
announcements made from 1964 to 1991, we find that only focus-increasing firms earn
significantly positive abnormal returns, while non-focus increasing firms’ abnormal
returns are, on average, not statistically different from zero. This finding corroborates the
result of the prior studies that cover a similar time period. But, in the second study period
from 1992 to 2005, we find no statistically significant differences in abnormal returns
between focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing firms. Investors’ responses appear to
be equally positive to both types of spinoff.

1

The dataset (i.e., the sample size) which we use is approximately twice as large as those
previously used in the literature. Further, our dataset covers a longer study period from 1964 and
2005 as compared to any other published studies to date.
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In a multiple regression analysis covering the entire study period, we find that
announcement abnormal returns are strongly inversely related to disagreement factor
after controlling for the known determinants for these returns. Moreover, disagreement
factor adds explanatory power as large as that provided by all the control variables
combined. This result confirms the significance of disagreement factor as our bivariate
analysis in Part 1 indicates that this factor could serve as a potent explanatory variable for
the abnormal returns. The economic effect of the relationship between disagreement
factor and the abnormal return is substantial. For instance, when there is one standard
deviation increase (from the mean) in disagreement factor, the abnormal return decreases
roughly by 1.11%. Moreover, confirming the results of the preliminary analyses of
information asymmetry and focus factor, we find that these determinants are no longer
significantly correlated with the abnormal returns.
Further, when disagreement shock is included in a regression, the coefficients of
relative size and focus factor decrease monotonically. This indicates a dependence
relationship between disagreement shock and these two variables. Analyzing
relationships between disagreement shock and the other determinants (disagreement
factor, information asymmetry, focus factor, and relative size), we find that disagreement
shock is significantly negatively associated with disagreement factor. This result
confirms our bivariate test result of Hypothesis 2 in Part 1. Furthermore, we find that
disagreement shock is larger for a firm that has a lower level of information asymmetry,
that engages in focus-increasing spinoff, and that splits up a larger portion of its assets to
its spun-off subsidiary. In other words, if investors perceive that a firm is mired by a
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higher level of information asymmetry (i.e., a firm with high information asymmetry
prior to its spinoff announcement), they seem to inhibit expression of their disagreement
about its spinoff decision and refrain from trading based on their own interpretations.
Consequently, trading is less intensive compared to a firm with a lower level of
information asymmetry. However, a firm implementing a focus-increasing spinoff and
assigning a large fraction of its assets to its spun-off subsidiary incur a high degree of
disagreement among investors.
Finally, in the sub-period analysis, our regression results are considered in the
light of previous studies’ findings that focus factor and relative size jointly explain the
cross-sectional variation in announcement abnormal returns. Our regression results for
the first study period from 1964 to 1991 did indeed support these earlier results. However,
conducting the same analyses on the data from the period 1992-2005 produced results
which disagree with the first period (and earlier studies) findings. When analyzing the
data from the later study period, we find that both focus factor and relative size become
insignificant. More importantly, information asymmetry is not associated with the
abnormal returns in both study periods. Across both study periods, only disagreement
factor is consistently negatively related to the abnormal returns, and thus account for a
significant faction of the cross-sectional variation in these returns.
Control Variables: the Known Determinant of Spinoff Abnormal Returns
A. Information Asymmetry. Based on the theoretical work of Nanda and Narayana
(1997),2 Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) argue that for firms with multiple
2

Similarly, Habib, Johnsen, and Naik (1997) show that the informativeness of price can
be improved through a spinoff (i.e., splitting a parent firm into separately traded firms). In turn, it
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business units, information asymmetry between managers and investors arises because
investors observe an aggregate cash flow to the entire firm while managers discern actual
cash flows to individual divisions. Hence, if a firm is undervalued due to information
asymmetry problem, then the management has an incentive to split up the firm into
independently traded units through a spinoff to attain a fair market value. Krishnaswami
and Subramaniam propose the information hypothesis that there should a decline in
information asymmetry after the completion of a spinoff, and abnormal returns during the
spinoff-announcement period should be greater the higher the level of information
asymmetry since investors anticipate a higher valuation of a firm as a result of reduction
in information asymmetry.
Using several proxies for information asymmetry based on analysts’ earnings
forecasts, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam document a significant decrease in those
proxies from the pre-spinoff (i.e., the year-end month prior to the year in which a spinoff
announced) to the post-spinoff period (i.e., a month after the ex-date of a spinoff). They
also find that their sample firms have significantly larger values in those proxies than the
control samples do. These results seem to clearly show that information asymmetry
problem is motivation behind a decision to implement a spinoff. Furthermore, they find a
significantly positive relationship between the level of information asymmetry and
announcement abnormal returns.

improves the quality of managers’ investment decisions and reducing uninformed investors’
uncertainty about asset values. An implication of their theoretical work is that a greater
diversification of a firm’s business exacerbates information asymmetry between managers and
outsiders.

105

However, Huson and MacKinnon (2003) offer an opposite view. They argue that
corporate spinoff will not improve information asymmetry problem, but rather to
exacerbate it. They contend that a spin-off can provide an informational advantage to
informed investors who possess superior knowledge about either a parent firm or its
subsidiary. For the parent firm prior to spinoff, there is no informational edge for the
informed over the uninformed because the complexity of the parent’s operations may be
equally daunting to both groups of investors. But a spinoff creates an opportunity to
capitalize on the informed investors’ specialized knowledge on the parent or the
subsidiary.3 This exposition contrasts the information hypothesis of Krishnaswami and
Subramaniam (1999).
Huson and MacKinnon (2003) use the residual standard deviation of stock returns
as an indicator of information environment, and document a significant increase in the
indicator from the pre-spinoff to the post-spinoff period.4 Interestingly, they find that the
significant increase in the indicator is only observed for the firms that engage in focusincreasing spinoff. This evidence further supports their contention that the exploitation of
informational advantage by the informed investors would be greater for focus-increasing
spinoffs. Huson and MacKinnon characterize this evidence for the deterioration in
information asymmetry as “reduction in any diversification effect.” In other words, a
spinoff reduces the inherent diversification benefit, or the mitigation in the information
3

Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) and Subrahmanya (1991) present models in which a
basket security is less subject to information asymmetry than individual securities that constitute
the basket security because aggregation cash flows for the basket security have an effect of
diversifying information asymmetry across those individual securities.
4

In contrast, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) document a significant decrease
from the pre-spinoff to the post-spinoff period for a sample of spinoffs from 1973 to 1993.
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asymmetry engendered by having multiple business units within a firm (i.e.
conglomerate). The authors also present the evidence for the deterioration in information
asymmetry from the pre- to the post-spinoff using proxies derived from market
microstructure theories (i.e., the effective spread and price impact), and show that the
increase is restricted to focus-increasing firms.
An out-of-sample test of the information hypothesis comes from Veld and VeldMerkoulova (2004). For a sample of 156 spinoffs which occurred in 15 different
European countries for the period 1987-2000, they find no evidence of a significant
relationship between announcement abnormal returns and the levels of information
asymmetry though they employ the same proxies for information asymmetry as
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) use.
With the conflicting evidence on the effect of information asymmetry on spinoff,
we investigate whether the information hypothesis holds with our spinoff sample, which
is larger in size and covers a longer period as compared to the studies by Krishnaswami
and Subramaniam (1999) and Huson and MacKinnon (2003).5 We use the following four
proxies for information asymmetry which are measured in Part One: DISP1, DISP2,
CSSPRD, and SIGMA (see Section 8 and 9 for the estimation details for these proxies). In
addition, we include a measure of liquidity developed by Amihud (2002). It is defined as
the daily ratio of absolute stock return to its dollar trading volume, or ILLIQ. Since it
measures a daily price change per dollar trading volume, it is in fact a measure of price
impact or market illiquidity for a stock.

5

Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) analyze 118 spinoffs from 1979 to 1993, while
Huson and MacKinnon (2003) do 84 spinoffs from 1984 to 1994.
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First, we test statistical significances of the differences in changes in those five
proxies for information asymmetry from the pre-spinoff to the post-spinoff period. Note
that we examine changes in information asymmetry for the parent firms. To measure the
proxies (DISP1, DISP2,

,

and SIGMA) in the post-spinoff period, we use

the same length of the estimation period as the pre-spinoff (or pre-event) period. The
post-spinoff period begins on the day following the ex-date and ends on the 250th-trading
day or (ED+1, ED+250) in which ED stands for the ex-date of a spinoff. In this time
window, we also calculate the mean of daily estimates of CSSPRD and ILLIQ, and
estimate SIGMA for each sample firm. For DISP1 and DISP2, we compute the mean of
monthly estimates of DISP1 and DISP2 based on the standard deviation of analysts’
earnings forecasts from the Unadjusted Summary File in the Institutional Broker Estimate
System (IBES) database for a 12-month period, starting from a month after the ex-date
month.
Table 15 shows the sample mean and the median of each liquidity measures in the
pre- and post-spinoff periods. In Panel 1, we group CSSPRD, ILLIQ, and SIGMA together,
and label them as market-based liquidity. In Panel 2, we put DISP1 and DISP2 together
since these measures are derived from the analysts’ earnings forecasts. Note that DISP1
and DISP2 capture information asymmetry between insiders of a firm and analysts who
follow the firm. It means that DISP1 and DISP2 reflect information asymmetry among a
subset of market participants. However, the market-based liquidity proxies estimated with
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Table 15. Changes in Information Asymmetry from the Pre-Spinoff to the Post-Spinoff
Period
This table presents the means and the medians of the market-based proxies for
information asymmetry and the proxies based on the analysts’ earnings forecasts in the
pre-spinoff and the post-spinoff period. The sample consists of the U.S firms that
engaged in a corporate spinoff during the period 1964-2005. The sample firms are
required to have at least 80% of daily returns during the pre-event period. The pre-spinoff
period is defined as a 250-trading day ending 10 days prior to the announcement date of a
spinoff, (AD-260, AD-11). The post-spinoff period is defined as a 250-trading-day
starting a day after the ex-date, (ED+1, ED+250). The market-based proxies are as
follows: CSSPRD is the bid-ask (effective) spread estimated by the method proposed by
Corwin and Schultz (2011). SIGMA is the standard deviation of the residuals from the
market model of daily stock returns. ILLIQ is the ratio of absolute stock return to its
dollar trading volume. In the pre- and post-spinoff period, daily estimates of CSSPRD
and ILLIQ is measured and averaged over the respective period. For the proxies based on
analysts’ forecasts, DISP1 is the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts on the current
year's earnings divided by the average of forecast. DISP2 is the standard deviation of
analysts' forecasts on the current fiscal year's earnings scaled by the average of the
current and the previous month-end stock price. Over the pre-and the post-spinoff period
(i.e., 12 months), monthly estimates of DISP1and DISP2 are averaged to calculate these
proxies. A sample firm (i.e., parent) is classified as focus-increasing spinoff if its twodigit primary SIC code is different from that of its subsidiary. Otherwise, it is classified
as non-focus-increasing spinoff. The statistical significances are estimated using the
parametric paired t-tests for the differences in the means and the non-parametric
Wilcoxon signed rank tests for the differences in the medians. a, b,and c indicate the
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% respectively.
Mean
Median
Obs
Pre
Post
Diff
Pre
Post
Diff
Panel 1. Market-based liquidity
202
0.775
202
0.023
SIGMA
(x 106)

202

0.145

0.968
0.025

-0.193a
-0.002a

0.650
0.020

0.709
0.021

-0.058a
-0.001b

0.311

-0.166a

0.008

0.009

-0.001a

0.035s
-0.005b

0.051
0.003

0.074
0.005

-0.024a
-0.001a

Panel 2. Analysts' earnings forecasts
DISP1
DISP2

163
163

0.227
0.007

0.192
0.013
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Table 15. Changes in Information Asymmetry from the Pre-Spinoff to the Post-Spinoff
Period, Continued
Mean
Median
Obs
Pre
Post
Diff
Pre
Post
Diff
Panel 3. Focus-increasing and Non-Focus-increasing sample (market-based
liquidity)
Focus

134

SIGMA
(x 106)
Non-Focus
SIGMA
(x 106)

0.725
0.022
0.133

0.939
0.025
0.344

-0.214a
-0.003a
-0.211b

0.600
0.019
0.015

0.658
0.020
0.015

-0.058a
-0.001a
0.000a

0.875
0.024
0.168

1.027
0.025
0.245

-0.152b
-0.001s
-0.077s

0.690
0.021
0.005

0.822
0.022
0.005

-0.133a
0.000s
0.000s

68

Panel 4. Focus-increasing and Non-Focus-increasing sample (analysts' earnings
forecasts)
Focus 106
0.049 0.071 -0.021a
0.095
0.143 -0.047a
DISP1
0.007
0.013 -0.005c
0.003 0.005 -0.002a
DISP2
Non-Focus
57
0.471
0.282 0.189s
0.054 0.081 -0.027c
DISP1
0.003 0.004 -0.001s
0.007
0.012 -0.005c
DISP2

the data generated from the market seem to be a better proxy for information asymmetry,
since they reflect information asymmetry between the informed and the uninformed more
broadly.
As shown on Table 15, for all the proxies for information asymmetry, there is a
significant deterioration from the pre-spinoff period to the post-spinoff period. The
differences in the means (except DISP1) and the medians of all market-based liquidity
measures are negative and significant at the 1% level. The cost of trading shares
(CSSPRD) on average increases by 0.19% and the price impact of trading volume is also
larger in the post-event period. The presence of the informed traders seems to be more
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intensified as it is indicated by the greater mean value of SIGMA in the post-spinoff
period. In particular, even in DISP1 and DISP2, the worsening information environment
after the completion of a spinoff is evident. Though DISP1 decreases in the post-event
period, it is not significant.6 Yet, because of the high non-normality of DISP1 and DISP2,
the test of the difference in the median of DISP1 and DISP2 is more reliable. We find the
differences in the medians are significantly negative for both measures at the 1% level.
Therefore, we find no support for the information hypothesis related to corporate
spinoff. As our results show, there is no enhancement, but rather deterioration in
information asymmetry. It also implies that a positive relation between spinoff
announcement returns and information asymmetry might not be due to investors’
recognitions of expected improvement in a firm’s value through a spinoff. Perhaps, there
is no relation at all between these two variables. In fact, none of the Spearman
correlations between the liquidity proxies and announcement abnormal returns are
significant except ILLIQ.
In Panel 3, we examine whether the exacerbation of information asymmetry is
confined to the sample firms that spin off unrelated subsidiaries (i.e., focus-increasing
spinoff). We define a focus-increasing spinoff as a firm that creates a subsidiary whose
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code is different from that of the parent
(Desai & Jain, 1999). Otherwise, we classify a firm as a non-focus-increasing spinoff.

6

DIPS1 and DISP2 are not the exact replications of Krishnaswami and Subramaniam
(1999)’s measures. They use the standard deviation of the analysts’ earnings forecast as of the last
month of the fiscal year prior to the announcement of a spinoff. Moreover, they do not scale those
forecasts as we do either by stock price or the mean of forecasts. Scaling the dispersion by either
the mean of forecasts or the price of a stock gives comparability of a measure based on analysts’
earnings forecasts across a sample of stocks.
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Consistent with Huson and MacKinnon (2003), we find that all measures of market-based
liquidity in the focus-increasing sample decreases significantly in the post-spinoff period,
while those of the non-focus-increasing sample experiences no significant change from
the pre-spinoff to the post-spinoff period (except CSSPRD, which increase on average by
0.15%). For the focus-increasing firm, the differences in the means and the medians of all
the market-based liquidity proxies between the pre-spinoff and the post-spinoff period are
significant at the 1% level.
In addition, in Panel 4 the same inference can be drawn from DISP1 and DISP2.
A significant increase in both measures is consistently observed only in the focusincreasing firms. Thus, the results in Panel 3 and 4 reinforce the finding in the Panel 1
and 2. If the information hypothesis is valid, we should observe a greater improvement in
information asymmetry for focus-increasing spinoffs than for non-focus-increasing
spinoffs. Our findings here contradict the hypothesis.
B. Industrial Focus. A conventional view in corporate finance is that the
diversification of a firm’s business portfolio destroys shareholders’ value (see Martin &
Sayrak, 2003 for a review on the topic). Under this view, the stocks of diversified firms
are traded at a discount, which is commonly known as a conglomerate (diversification)
discount. Originally, Berger and Ofek (1995) document that diversified firms (compared
to the sum of imputed stand-alone values of their segments) are, on average, valued at a
discount of 13% to 15% and that the extent of loss in value is less severe for a diversified
firm composed of related business units. John and Ofek (1995) study the effect of
corporate divesture in the form of sales of assets. They show that disposition of assets
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leads to an increase in profitability of the remaining assets, and document that the
improvement in profitability is generally limited to firms that sold off assets unrelated to
their core business.
Corporate spinoffs offer a relative simple way to eliminate diversification
discount by providing a demonstrable mean for a firm to improve its business focus.
Daley et al. (1997) initially find that significantly positive announcement abnormal
returns are limited to focus-increasing spinoffs because investors rationally expect
performance improvement only from these spinoffs. Desai and Jain (1999) examine the
long-term performance of a sample of spinoffs from 1975 to 1991, and document that
only focus-increasing firms earn significantly positive announcement and long-term
abnormal returns.
If one believes in the existence of diversification discount, the decision to reduce
diversification obviously signals positive news to the market. Furthermore, the decision
to divest non-core or unrelated business units will logically attract a more positive
response from investors. Nevertheless, our result in the previous section may provide a
somewhat nuanced view on the role of “focus factor” (i.e., whether a spinoff is focusincreasing or not). As we show in the previous section, there are significant deteriorations
across all the measures of information asymmetry only for focus-increasing firms. This
result suggests that if investors expect reduction in information asymmetry only for
focus-increasing spinoff, then this expectation might have a negative effect on the
announcement returns of firms which implement a focus-increasing spinoff. However,
given our strong evidence for the positive effect of focus factor on announcement returns,
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we consider that the effect of focus factor dominates any negative effect of exacerbated
information problem involving a spinoff.
We also note that virtually all previous empirical works on the determinants of
announcement abnormal returns study the corporate spinoffs undertaken in the United
States before the year of 2000. In fact, a majority of these works collect a sample of
spinoffs occurred prior to 1992.7 Moreover, a recent study of Veld and Veld-Merkoulova
(2008) provide an interesting result: focus factor and information asymmetry do not have
the expected significant positive relation with abnormal announcement returns for a
sample of U.S. spinoffs from 1995 to 2002.
Therefore, we reexamine the validity of the stylized fact: Only focus-increasing
firms experience positive abnormal returns. Our analysis has the benefit of a sample that
is both larger in number of spin-off events and also captures information from a longer
time period, compared to the prior literature on this topic. To do so, we divide the entire
study period (1964-2005) into two sub-periods: the first study period from 1964 to 1991
and the second study period from 1992 to 2005. We intentionally segment the entire
sample period into the two sub-periods around 1991 because, as we pointed out above, a
majority of the evidence for a positive relation between focus factor and announcement
abnormal return comes from this period.
We define a focus-increasing spinoff as a firm that creates a subsidiary whose
two-digit SIC code is different from that of its parent. Otherwise, we classify a firm as a
non-focus-increasing spinoff. In Table 16, we report the mean and the median of the
7

See Table 1 of Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2009). It documents the lists of empirical
papers on the wealth effect of spinoff announcement including such information as research
period and sample size, etc.
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Table 16. Raw and Abnormal Returns During the Spinoff Announcements: the Entire
Period and Two Sub-Periods
This table reports the cumulative raw returns and the cumulative abnormal returns in the
announcement period, (AD-1, AD+1), for a sample of spinoff. The sample consists of the
U.S firms that engaged in a corporate spinoff during the period 1964-2005. The sample
firms are required to have at least 80% of daily returns during the pre-event period. The
pre-event period is defined as a 250-trading day ending 10 days prior to the
announcement date of a spinoff, (AD-260, AD-11). A market model for daily returns is
estimated over the pre-event period to compute a market-model adjusted abnormal return.
The market returns are the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of returns of all
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks. A mean-adjusted abnormal return is calculated by
subtracting the mean of daily returns during the pre-event period from a daily return.
Each sample firm is classified as focus-increasing spinoff if a parent firm’s primary two
digit of SIC code is identical to that of its subsidiary. Otherwise, it is classified as nonfocus-increasing spinoff. The means and the medians are tested against the null of zero
cumulative raw and abnormal return, using the t-tests and the Wilcoxon sign rank tests
respectively. Difference is the mean (the median) of the focus-increasing minus that of
the non-focus-increasing sample. The statistical significances are estimated using the
parametric t-tests for the differences in the means and the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank
sum tests for the differences in the medians. a, b,and c indicate the significance at the 1, 5,
and 10% respectively.
Raw return
Market-model
Mean adjusted
(RAW)
adjusted (CAR1)
(CAR2)
Obs

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean Median

Panel 1. The entire study period, 1964 to 2005
All sample
218 3.93a
2.76a
3.36a
Focus
146 4.37a
2.76a
4.08a
Non-focus
72 3.03a
2.76a
1.89b
Difference
1.34d
0.00d
2.19c

2.58a
2.50a
2.72a
-0.22d

3.52a
3.97a
2.62a
1.35d

2.59a
2.69a
2.39a
0.30d

Panel 2. The first study period, 1964 to 1991
All sample
109 2.89a
2.53a
2.40a
Focus
79 3.52a
2.67a
3.42a
Non-focus
30 1.23d
0.84d
-0.30dd
Difference
2.29c
1.83c
3.72a

2.46a
2.71a
0.19d
2.52a

2.50a
3.11a
0.89d
2.22c

2.37a
2.52a
0.78d
1.74c

Panel 3. The second study period, 1992 to 2005
All sample
109 4.97a
3.10a
4.32a
Focus
67 5.38a
3.10a
4.86a
Non-focus
42 4.31a
4.70a
3.46b
Difference
1.07d -1.60dd
1.41d

2.66a
2.22a
3.70a
-1.48dd

4.55a
4.98a
3.86a
1.12d

2.97a
2.87a
4.14a
-1.27dd
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cumulated raw returns (RAW) and the cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) over the threeday event period, (AD-1, AD+1) for the entire study period (Panel1), for the first study
period (Panel 2) and for the second study period (Panel 3). AD stands for the
announcement date of a spinoff. In addition, in each panel we also report the mean and
the median of the focus-increasing and the non-focus-increasing samples (See Section 10
for the estimation details of announcement abnormal returns).
In Panel 1 of Table 16, for the entire sample period, both the mean and the median
of RAW and CAR are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. However, notice
that for the focus-increasing as well as for the non-focus-increasing firms, the means and
the medians are positive and significantly different from zero mostly at the 1% level,
which indicates that abnormally positive price reaction is not merely confined to the
focus-increasing samples. Furthermore, we find that the means and the medians of RAW
and CAR for the non-focus-increasing sample do not differ significantly from those of
the focus-increasing sample, except the mean of market-adjusted abnormal returns
(significant at the 10% level). This result does not corroborate the stylized fact
documented in the literature that the market reacts more positively to focus-increasing
spinoffs or the notion that significantly positive abnormal returns are restricted to focusincreasing spinoffs. Though in general the focus-increasing sample earns higher
abnormal returns during the announcement period, there is no statistically significant
differences in CAR between the focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing spinoffs.
However, in Panel 2, for the first study period from 1964 to 1991, the result is
consistent with the literature: The mean and the median CAR of the focus-increasing
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sample are significantly positive, while those of the non-focus-increasing sample are not
statistically different from zero. Moreover, the differences in RAW and CAR between the
focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing firms are also statistically significant. Hence,
the results in Panel 2 confirm the differential market reaction to the announcement of a
spinoff in which abnormal announcement return is much larger for the focus-increasing
than the non-focus-increasing firms.
Interestingly, in Panel 3, for the second study period from 1992 to 2005, the
results found from the first study period do not hold. First, the sample firms in this period
on average earn greater raw returns and abnormal returns in the announcement period
than do those in the first study period. For instance, the firms in the second study period
earn on average 1.92% of additional market-adjusted abnormal return (CAR 1) compared
to the firms in the first study period. Second, observe that there is overall increase in
abnormal returns both for the focus-increasing and the non-focus-increasing firms, yet the
increase is larger for the latter. For the focus-increasing firm, the mean CAR1 (CAR2) in
the second study period increases by 1.44% (1.87%) from the first study period. Likewise,
the mean CAR1 (CAR2) of the non-focus-increasing group rises by 3.76% (2.97%). Thus,
our results show that market reactions to spinoff announcement are positively larger in
the second study period, but this increase in the announcement abnormal return is much
larger for the non-focus-increasing group. Consequently, in the second study period the
mean and the median RAW, CAR1, and CAR2 of the non-focus-increasing firms are all
positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level, which is not the case in the
first study period. Furthermore, even the tests for the difference in the mean and the
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median RAW, CAR1, and CAR2 between the focus-increasing and the non-focusincreasing groups give no statistical significance in the second study period.
Therefore, a reason for no statistically significant difference in the abnormal
announcement return between the two focus groups for the entire study period in Panel
1can be attributed to the fact that the non-focus-increasing firms in the second study
period receives as large positive market reactions as the focus-increasing firms do. At
first glance, we suspect a possible effect of the bull market period from the late 1990s to
the early 2000 for no difference in the announcement abnormal returns between the two
focus groups. Perhaps, investors during the bull market might have reacted to the
announcement of a non-focus-increasing spinoff as positively as for that of a focusincreasing spinoff. But, we do not find a pattern such as a clustering of positive and large
abnormal returns either for the focus-increasing or the non-focus-increasing firms during
the bull market. At this point, we can only conjecture about possible explanations for
overall increase in the wealth gain for both focus groups, especially for the non-focusincreasing spinoffs. A further investigation of this result is beyond the scope of this paper.
We leave it for a future research.
C. Size of Spun-off Subsidiary. In corporate spinoffs, the proportion of a parent
firm’s assets split to its subsidiary has been shown to be a strong explanatory variable for
wealth effect (i.e., an on-average positive abnormal return) from spinoff announcements.
We refer the variable as the relative size of a subsidiary (henceforth relative size), which
is the ratio of the size of a parent to that of its spun-off unit. Miles and Rosenfeld (1983)
show that large spinoffs (i.e., large values in relative size) earn significantly larger
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positive abnormal returns than small-size spinoffs. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam
(1999) with a sample of spinoffs in the U.S and Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) with a
similar sample in Europe confirm that relative size is an important determinant for the
cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns associated with spinoff.
However, we note that the effect of relative size is a unique empirical
phenomenon rather than a validation of a theoretical prediction. It lacks a prior reasoning
as to why there is a negative correlation between relative size and announcement
abnormal return. One possible link is advanced by Maxwell and Rao (2003).That link is
the transfer of wealth from bondholders to stock holders, or the wealth transfer
hypothesis. They note that while the prior literature on this topic (Hite & Owers, 1983;
Schipper & Smith, 1983) finds no evidence for the hypothesis, these studies are
constrained by the limited sample size and access to bond price data. They posit a
specific source of the wealth transfer, namely collateral loss. The idea is that since a
spinoff involves a transfer of a portion of a (parent) firm’s assets, the spinoff leads to a
loss in collateral to the bondholders (Galai & Masulis, 1976). This is because the firm’s
assets are served as collateral to current bondholders. An empirical implication of this
theory is that the greater is the size of a subsidiary relative to its parent, the returns to the
stockholders would be greater, but those to the bondholders would be lower.
Using comprehensive bond price data for a sample of spinoffs from 1974 to 1997,
Maxwell and Rao (2003) find that, on average, stockholders earn a positive abnormal
return while bondholders earn a negative abnormal return. More importantly, using
relative size as a proxy for the collateral loss, they find that stockholders in large

119

spinoffs—the percentage of the parent’s assets assigned to its spun-off subsidiary is
greater than 20%—gain 2.06% more in abnormal stock returns than do those in small
spinoffs, while bondholders in large spinoffs suffer 1.23% more loss in abnormal bond
returns than those in small spinoffs. More importantly, in a pooled regression for bond
and stock abnormal returns, they show that relative size enters negatively for bond
abnormal returns, but positively for stock abnormal returns. Hence, the effect of relative
size on announcement abnormal returns can be partially attributable to a transfer of
wealth from bondholders to stock holders.
Accordingly, we include “relative size” as a control variable in the regression
analyses in the sections to follow. We define the relative size of a subsidiary as the ratio
of its market capitalization at the end of the month in which the ex-date occurs to the
market capitalization of its parent firm at the end of the month prior to a spinoff
announcement month (Krishnaswami & Subramaniam, 1999). We also add a proxy for
financial risk8 to control variables. We measure a leverage ratio by dividing total debt
with the market value of equity. For each sample, the data for the leverage ratio is
collected from COMPUSTAT as of the fiscal year end prior to a spinoff announcement
year. In addition, in Section 5.D, we find a negative correlation between firm size and
announcement abnormal return, which is implied by the fact that small firms tend to split
a larger percentage of their assets than large firms do. We referred to it as firm size effect.

8

Maxwell and Rao (2003) hypothesize that the riskier a firm’s debt, the greater the
importance of collateral to bondholders. It implies that for a firm with greater financial risk, a
spinoff will renders a larger loss to its bondholders, but a greater gain to stock holders.
Accordingly, they find that a leverage ratio, which reflects financial risk of a sample firm, is
negatively correlated to bond abnormal returns, but it is positively related to abnormal stock
returns.
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Thus, we include the natural log of the market capitalization of a parent firm at the month
end prior to the announcement month as an additional control variable in the expectation
that it might add incremental explanatory power for the abnormal returns over relative
size.
Cross-Sectional Analysis
A. Confirmation of the Prior Literature. In this section, before we evaluate
disagreement factor and disagreement shock in multiple regressions, we examine whether
the results reported in the literature on the relationship between each of the control
variables (information asymmetry, focus factor, relative size, and leverage) and
announcement abnormal returns hold with our extended sample of spinoffs. In Section
14.A, we show that there is a statistically significant deterioration from the pre-spinoff to
the post-spinoff period in all the measures of information asymmetry and that the
deterioration is observed only for the focus-increasing spinoffs. This evidence is in direct
contrast with the information asymmetry hypothesis, and hence casts doubt on a positive
relation between announcement abnormal returns and the pre-spinoff level of information
asymmetry. In addition, we show that the positive effect of focus factor on the
announcement returns vanishes in the second study period from 1992 to 2005.
Thus, we test the information hypothesis and the effect of focus factor with
multiple regression analysis for our full-study period from 1964 to 2005. We begin by
regressing CAR on a constant, a proxy for the pre-spinoff level of information (IA), a
dummy variable for focus factor (Focus), and the relative size of a subsidiary (Relative
size): Model 1. Because of extreme values in some of independent variables, we
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Table 17. Cross-Sectional Regressions with Information Asymmetry for the Full Sample of Spinoffs, 1964-2005
This table presents the estimates of the OLS regressions on the abnormal announcement returns. The sample consists of the
U.S firms that engaged in a corporate spinoff during the period 1964-2005. The sample firms are required to have at least 80%
of daily returns and trading volume during the pre-event period. The pre-event period is defined as a 250-trading -day period
over AD-260 to AD-11 (AD is the announcement date). The dependent variable is the abnormal return cumulated over the
three days surrounding the date of a spinoff announcement, (AD-1, AD+1).A market model for daily returns is estimated over
the pre-event period to compute abnormal returns. The market returns are the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of returns of all
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks.
is the mean of daily bid-ask spreads (CSSPRD), which are measured by the
estimation method proposed by Corwin and Schultz (2011), in the pre-event period. DISP2 is the standard deviation of
analysts' forecasts on the current fiscal year's earnings scaled by the average of the current and the previous month-end stock
price. Over the pre-event period (i.e., 12 months), monthly estimates of DISP2 are averaged to calculate the proxy for
information asymmetry. The value of 1 is assigned to a sample firm if its two-digit primary SIC code is different from that of
its subsidiary (i.e., focus-increasing spinoff). Otherwise, zero is assigned to the firm (i.e., non-focus-increasing spinoff). The
relative size of a subsidiary (Relative Size) as the ratio of the market capitalization of the subsidiary measured by the end of the
month in which the ex-date occurs to the market capitalization of the parent firm by the end of the month prior to a spinoff
announcement month (Size). Leverage is total debt divided by the market value of equity as of the end of fiscal-year end prior
to a spinoff announcement year. Size, Relative size, and
are transformed by taking the natural logarithm. The p-values
for the significance of the coefficients are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and shown in parenthesis. The adjusted R2 and the
model F-statistic probability in parenthesis are reported in the last row. A coefficient with its p-values in bold indicate the
significance at the minimum of the 10% level.
Panel 1. Information Asymmetry:

Panel 2. Information Asymmetry: DISP2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Constant

0.078
(0.202)

0.158
(0.035)

0.125
(0.085)

0.090
(0.100)

0.017
(0.490)

0.098
(0.029)

0.074
(0.114)

0.082
(0.145)

IA

0.007
(0.551)

0.006
(0.624)

0.004
(0.701)

0.004
(0.382)

-0.004
(0.363)

-0.007
(0.135)

-0.008
(0.106)

-0.011
(0.067)

Focus

0.023
(0.060)

0.020
(0.100)

0.021
(0.072)

0.017
(0.157)
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0.020
(0.105)

0.017
(0.155)

0.019
(0.120)

0.019
(0.201)

Table 17. Cross-Sectional Regressions with Information Asymmetry for the Full Sample of Spinoffs, 1964-2005, Continued
Panel 1. Information Asymmetry:
Model 1
Relative size

Model 2

0.015
(0.001)

Size

-0.008
(0.024)

Model 3

Model 4

Model 1

0.012
(0.009)

0.010
(0.077)

0.012
(0.005)

-0.004
(0.204)

-0.003
(0.845)

Leverage
Obs
Adjusted R2

Panel 2. Information Asymmetry: DISP2
Model 2

-0.008
(0.030)

Model 3

Model 4

0.009
(0.036)

0.006
(0.205)

-0.006
(0.153)

-0.008
(0.112)

0.009
(0.489)
202
0.054
(0.003)

202
0.036
(0.016)

202
0.058
(0.003)

168
0.064
(0.007)
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0.000
0.995
173
0.034
(0.033)

173
0.026
(0.060)

173
0.040
(0.027)

139
0.023
(0.152)

transform IA and Relative size by taking the natural logarithm. We run the same
,

regression for the various proxies of IA (market –based proxies:
SIGMA; analysts’ earnings forecasts-based measure:
the parameter estimates for

and

1and

and

2). Table 3 present

2 with their heteroskedasticity adjusted p-

values in parenthesis. For the other proxies for IA, we omit their regression results since
there is no material difference in the parameter estimates.
As can be seen in Panel 1 of Table 3, none of the coefficient of

is

significant in all regression models. In line with our findings in the bivariate analysis of
information asymmetry in Section 14.A, we find no evidence for the information
hypothesis. Our finding suggests that abnormal returns are not related to the pre-spinoff
levels of information asymmetry of the sample firms. However, consistent with the prior
literature, we find that the coefficient of Focus is significant at 10% level for all models
except Model 4. Similarly, Relative size is significant at least at the 10% level for Model
1, 3 and 4. In Model 2, we drop Relative size from Model 1 and include the pre-spinoff
size of a parent firm (Size). In Section 5.D, we find that Size is negatively correlated with
Relative size, which implies that smaller firms tend to spin off a larger fraction of assets
to their subsidiaries. Because Relative size is positively correlated with CAR, we would
expect the coefficient of Size to be negative. As expected, the coefficient is negative and
significant at the 5 % level.
In Model 3, we include both Relative size and Size to see whether Size can provide
incremental power in explaining the cross-sectional variation in CARs. Regardless of a
proxy of IA, Size still enters negatively, but its coefficient becomes insignificant. Hence,
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a firm-size related variation in CARs seems to be captured by Relative size. Finally, in
Model 4 we add Leverage9 to Model 3 to evaluate how financial risk affects the abnormal
returns. According to Maxwell and Rao (2003), financial risk should be positively related
to abnormal returns since there is a greater wealth transfer from bondholders from stock
holders for a firm with greater financial risk. However, we do not find such relationship
for our sample of spinoff firms.
Therefore, the results of the regression analysis in Table 3 suggest that only
Relative size and Focus are the significant determinants for the announcement abnormal
returns. But, note that this is the case for the models with the market-based AI proxy for
which the sample size is 202. Though our inference drawn from DISP2 (the IA proxy
based on analysts’ earnings forecasts: Panel 2) are similar to those from

(the

market-based IA proxies: Panel 1), in Panel 2 Focus is consistently insignificant for all
the regression models. In fact, Focus also enters insignificantly in Model 4 in Panel.
Notice that the sample firms included in Model 4 in Panel 1 requires
COMPUSTAT data for the calculation of Leverage, which reduces the sample size from
202 to 168. Likewise, for Panel 2 the sample firms must have analysts’ earnings forecasts
data from IBES database to compute DISP2, which reduces the sample size further to 173.
This may suggest that the effect of an approximate 15% reduction in the sample size is
large enough to make the coefficient of Focus insignificant. It further casts doubt on the
generality of the effect of Focus on the abnormal announcement returns or the notion that

9

We also use a different definition of leverage as in Maxwell and Rao (2003); the ratio of
total debt to the book value of equity. But, the result is identical.
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concentrating on a firm’s core business by spinning off unrelated business increases the
wealth of shareholders.
B. Analysis of Outliers. In Section 11.C (Table 14), forming the quintile based on
the ex-ante level of DO or disagreement factor, the difference in the mean CAR between
the top and the bottom quintile is insignificant, though we find a significant correlation
between disagreement factor and CAR. This suggests an extremely large CAR in the top
quintile, which might weaken the strength of a negative relationship between
disagreement factor and CAR. Thus, to confirm our bivariate results in Table 14 in which
we find a negative correlation between disagreement factor and CAR, we regress
disagreement factor (

,

,

,

,

) on CAR without controlling

for the other determinants: Model 0.
Recall that the disagreement factor of a firm is the mean of daily estimates of a
volume-based measure of DO (VDO) for the pre-event period, which is 250 trading days
prior to the announcement of a spinoff. We estimate five different VDOs (LNTO,
Detrend, UV, RESD, and SUV) on each day in the pre-event period. As we show in
Section 7, disagreement factor is measured as a proxy for the (normal or representative)
level of disagreement among investors about a firm on the typical trading day, which thus
can be reasonably considered as a firm characteristic prior to a spinoff announcement. In
Table 18, we report the result for Model 0. To our surprise, we find that none of the
proxies for disagreement factor except

and
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is significantly related to CAR.

Figure 2. Abnormal Return and Disagreement factor
The three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the spinoff announcement
dates are sorted in ascending order, and plot them with their corresponding values of the
ex-ante level of DO (
) or the disagreement factors for the U.S firms that engaged in
corporate spinoff from 1964 to 2005. The bracket in both ends is set for observations
below the 5th percentile of and above the 95th percentile of CAR.
This result confirms our concern about a possible weakening effect of extreme
announcement returns on the relation between disagreement factor and CAR. In Figure 2,
we present the scatter plot of CAR and

. 10 In particular, we plot CARs sorted in an

ascending order and the corresponding

. At first glance, a negative relation between

CAR and

is quite visible. However, observe CAR and

within two

bracketed areas that are set for observations below the 5th percentile and above the 95th

We choose
among five proxies for disagreement factor (
,
,
,
,
) since there is no material difference in the plot with the other proxies for
.
disagreement factor except
10
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percentile of CAR (10 firms in each bracket). Some of CARs with an extremely high
(low) value are associated with an extremely high (low) value of

.

Thus, it appears that the effect of a positive relationship between outliers of CAR
and large values of

is disproportionally large so as to reduce a negative

relationship between CAR and

observed for a majority of the sample, hence

resulting in an insignificant coefficient in Model 0. Moreover, our inspection of the
sample firms in the brackets reveals that among the firms above the 95th percentile of
CAR, 9 out of 10 firms are focus-increasing spinoffs. Interestingly, all nine firms come
from the second study period from 1992 to 2005 for which period we find no differences
in the mean and median of CAR between focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing
spinoffs, shown in Table 16. For those below the 5th percentile of CAR, 5 out of 10 firms
are non-focus-increasing spinoffs in which two firms have the lowest values of CAR (-35%
and -20% respectively). These observations suggest that a positive correlation between
Focus and CAR reported in Panel 1 of Table 17 with the full sample might merely reflect
a disproportionally strong effect of these outliers of CAR rather than that of a majority of
the sample. In fact, these outliers explain why the coefficient of Focus in Panel 2 of Table
17 is insignificant, as some of them are dropped from the sample due to the unavailability
of analysts’ earnings forecasts data. Moreover, notice that the distribution of CAR,
though symmetrically distributed, has a heavy fat tails with the kurtosis of 6.30. But,
excluding the outliers of CARs, the kurtosis reduces to -0.53.
In sum, the outliers of CAR in Figure 2 have the following properties: i) the
outliers of CAR are positively associated with disagreement factor, while the majority of
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CAR exhibits a negative relationship; ii) They tend to belong to focus-increasing (at the
positive-end of distribution of CAR) and non-focus-increasing (at the negative-end of
distribution of CAR) spinoffs; iii) Their existence results in a highly non-normal
distribution of CAR. Hence, to make sure that result in the following regression analyses
are not driven by these outliers and in order to draw robust inferences, we exclude these
outliers from the sample or include sample firms that lie between the 5thand the 95th
percentiles of CAR.
Cross-Sectional Tests for Disagreement Factor
A. Full Study Period from 1964 to 2005. We evaluate the effect of disagreement
factor on price reactions around the announcement of a spinoff by multiple regressions.
In all regressions, we include entire control variables that are used in the estimation of a
regression in Table 17 while excluding the proxy for financial risk.11 Including these
variables in a regression sets a stage for a stringent test for the explanatory power of
disagreement factor for announcement abnormal returns. Thus, we regress CAR on a
constant, disagreement factor (

,

,

,

,

) and control

variables (IA, Focus, Relative size and Size).For a proxy for information asymmetry (IA),
we choose

among the IA proxies we analyzed previously.12 In addition, as we

discussed in the preceding section, we estimate a regression model with the sample firms

11

An incremental explanatory power gained by leverage is minimal or negative.
Moreover, due to an issue of data availability for calculation of leverage, including this variable
reduces the sample size from 187 to 135.
12

We estimate all OLS models in Table 4 with five different proxies for information
asymmetry employed in Table 15 and find that there is no material differences in regression
estimates regardless of the choice of a proxy for information asymmetry.
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Table 18. Determinants of Announcement Abnormal Returns
This table presents the estimates of the OLS regressions on the abnormal announcement returns with the trimmed sample. The
sample firms between the 95 and the 5 percentile of CAR are removed from the sample. The pre-event period is defined as a
250-trading -day period over AD-260 to AD-11 (AD is the announcement date). The dependent variable (CAR) is the
abnormal return cumulated over the three days surrounding the date of a spinoff announcement, (AD-1, AD+1). A market
model for daily returns is estimated over the pre-event period to compute abnormal returns. The market returns are the CRSP
value-weighted portfolio of returns of all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks. The ex-ante level of DO (
) or
disagreement factor is measured by averaging daily estimates of a volume-based measure of DO (VDO = LNTO, Detrend, UV,
RESD and SUV)† over the pre-event period. Similarly, the event level of DO (
) is the mean of daily VDO estimates in
the announcement period from AD-1 to AD+1. Disagreement Shock (Shock) is calculated by
minus
.
is the mean of daily bid-ask spreads (CSSPRD), which are measured by the estimation method proposed by Corwin
and Schultz (2011), in the pre-event period. A dummy variable equal to 1 is assigned to a parent firm (i.e., focus-increasing
spinoff) if its two-digit primary SIC code is different from that of its subsidiary. Otherwise, zero is assigned (i.e., non-focusincreasing spinoff). The relative size of a subsidiary (Relative Size) is the ratio of the market capitalization of the subsidiary
measured by the end of the month in which the ex-date occurs to the market capitalization of the parent firm by the end of the
month prior to a spinoff announcement month (Size). Size, Relative size, and
are transformed by taking the natural
logarithm. The p-values for the significance of the coefficients are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and shown in parenthesis.
The adjusted R2 and the model F-statistic probability in parenthesis are reported in the last row. A coefficient with its p-values
in bold indicates the significance at the minimum of the 10% level.
Model
0

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
0

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
0

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Constant

0.049
0.052
0.035
0.031
0.048
0.056
0.034
0.030
0.046
0.052
0.034
0.030
(0.000) (0.000) (0.280) (0.236) (0.000) (0.000) (0.285) (0.210) (0.000) (0.000) (0.309) (0.242)

Dis. Factor

-0.04 -0.082 -0.063 -0.058 -0.026 -0.068 -0.052 -0.038 -0.035 -0.078 -0.059 -0.050
(0.408) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.555) (0.000) (0.003) (0.053) (0.483) (0.000) (0.003) (0.016)

Shock

0.021
(0.003)

0.020
(0.003)
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0.021
(0.003)

Table 18. Determinants of Announcement Abnormal Returns, Continued
Model
0

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
0

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
0

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

0.003
0.006
(0.724) (0.392)

0.003
0.008
(0.687) (0.231)

0.002
0.007
(0.781) (0.344)

Focus

0.010
0.005
(0.214) (0.465)

0.010
0.006
(0.191) (0.419)

0.009
0.005
(0.238) (0.531)

Relative size

0.004
0.009
(0.012) (0.265)

0.005
0.010
(0.007) (0.149)

0.004
0.009
(0.010) (0.248)

Size

0.000
0.000
(0.917) (0.994)

0.001
0.001
(0.824) (0.772)

0.000
0.000
(0.911) (0.934)

Obs
Adjusted R2

202

183

183

183

202

183

183

183

202

183

183

183

0.004
0.002
0.076
0.107
0.169 -0.001
0.064
0.100
0.167
0.072
0.102
0.168
(0.193) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.360) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.241) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table 18. Determinants of Announcement Abnormal Returns, Continued
Model
0

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
0

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Constant

0.043
0.051
-0.06
0.020
0.059
0.067
0.035
0.031
(0.000) (0.000) (0.340) (0.273) (0.251) (0.477) (0.283) (0.240)

Dis. Factor

0.000
0.001
-0.039 -0.050 -0.035 -0.030 -0.015 -0.002
(0.058) (0.000) (0.011) (0.035) (0.072) (0.673) (0.949) (0.865)

Shock

0.006
(0.257)

0.019
(0.008)

0.002
0.002
(0.786) (0.765)

0.006
0.012
(0.586) (0.236)

Focus

0.010
0.009
(0.217) (0.248)

0.010
0.007
(0.203) (0.393)

Relative size

0.010
0.009
(0.006) (0.023)

0.012
0.008
(0.001) (0.035)

Size

0.001
0.000
(0.804) (0.906)

0.001
0.001
(0.805) (0.693)

Obs
Adjusted R2

202

183

183

183

202

183

183

183

0.008
0.051
0.086
0.090
0.025 -0.005
0.062
0.120
(0.107) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.679) (0.006) (0.000)
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whose CAR is between the 5thand the 95th percentile. This reduces the size of the sample
to 183 firms (the trimmed sample).
Table 18 presents the parameter estimates for different OLS models and their
heteroskedasticity adjusted p-values in parenthesis. First, to confirm the effect of the
removal of the outliers from the full sample, we regress CAR on a constant and
disagreement factor: Model 1. Note that Model 0 is estimated with the full sample (202
firms). As can be seen in Table 18, for any proxy for disagreement factor (except

),

it is significantly negatively related to CAR at the 1% level of significance. The
insignificant relation between

and CAR can be attributed to an upward secular

trend in trading activity in the U.S. stock market over the study period. Such trend is not
observed for the other proxies for disagreement factor (See Section 6.A for a detailed
discussion). Thus, it seems that the effect of a secular trend in
the relationship between

confounds

and CAR. However, the coefficient of

negative, though insignificant. Given the effect of a secular trend in

is still
, our

discussion will focus on the interpretation of the result from the other four proxies for
disagreement factor

,

,

,

).

In Model 2, controlling for the known determinants of CAR, we find that the
coefficient of disagreement factor, regardless of its proxy, is negative and significant at
the 1% level though its magnitude declines slightly from Model 1. For instance, the
coefficient of

is -0.063. To gauge the economic impact of

change in CAR when we increase

, we estimate the

by one standard deviation (from the mean of

). Given that the standard deviation of
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is 0.176, one standard deviation

increase in

roughly corresponds to a decrease of 1.11% of CAR. In other words,

the difference of one standard deviation in

is translated to the difference of 1.45%

in CAR.
For the information asymmetry proxy (

), inconsistent with the

information hypothesis, we do not find evidence for a positive association between CAR
and

for all regressions in Table 18. As suggested by the results of the bivariate

analysis of the information asymmetry in which we find a significant deterioration in the
information asymmetry of the sample after the completion of a spinoff, there is no
connection between the levels of information asymmetry ex ante and CARs. Under the
information hypothesis as we discussed previously, firms with higher levels of
information asymmetry is expected to earn higher abnormal returns because investors
would rationally anticipate greater reductions in information asymmetry, hence higher
valuations for these firms.13This evidence suggests further that there might be no
empirical ground for the notion that it is undervalued firms with severe information
problem that engage in a corporate spinoff.

13

In a similar vein, Thomas (2002) takes an issue with the notion that corporate
diversification strictly aggravates information asymmetry. He notes that if errors in forecasting
segment cash flows are not perfectly correlated, consolidated forecasts for a diversified firm’s
cash flow can be more accurate than forecasts for a focused firm, effectively a diversification of
information asymmetry across business divisions. Empirically, he finds that firms with greater
diversification are not associated with greater errors and dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts
(i.e., information asymmetry). If diversification does exacerbate information problem, a reversediversification should mitigate the problem, which is consistent with the information hypothesis
for corporate spinoffs. However, if diversification does not lead to greater information asymmetry
problem, then it is not clear how a reverse-diversification would affect the information
environment of a firm. Though our study of corporate spinoff is a subset of corporate reversediversification, at least in the case of spinoffs the problem of information asymmetry appears to
become more severe after the completion of spinoff.
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In all the regressions in Table 18, inconsistent with the prior literature we find that
focus factor is not significantly related to CAR. This result provides a support for the
outlier analysis in the preceding section. That is, a significantly positive coefficient of
Focus reported in Table 17 for the full sample (before trimming the outliers) seem to
reflect the fact that extremely positive (negative) abnormal returns tend to be observed
for focus-increasing (non-focus-increasing) firms. However, given that there is strong
empirical support for the effect of Focus in the literature for the first study period from
1964 to 1991, and that a majority of the outliers are observed in the second study period,
we will implement a sub-period analysis to examine the stability of focus factor over the
entire study period in the final section of Part Two.
In Model 3, we add disagreement shock (Shock) to Model 2. In Section 11.B of
Part one, our bivariate analysis shows that there is a strong positive correlation between
Shock and announcement abnormal return. Recall that Shock is the magnitude of a change
in the degree of disagreement from a normal level in the pre-event period (
disagreement factor) to an event level in the announcement period (

or

). This surge in

the level of disagreement is caused by differential interpretation about the information
content of a spinoff announcement among investors. Based on Miller (1977)’s model in
which disagreement induces a downward-sloping demand curve, we interpret a change in
the level of disagreement as a change in the slope of the demand curve of a firm. Thus, a
firm with a greater change in the slope (or disagreement shock) should earn a higher
abnormal return. On Model 3 in Table 18, we find that in all measure of Shock (
) except

, the coefficient of Shock is positive and significant at
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the1% level, which confirms a positive relation between Shock and CAR found in the
bivariate analysis in Part One.
Notice that the coefficient of disagreement factor is still negatively significant
while its size decreases slightly from Model 2. The relative size of a subsidiary (Relative
size) is positively and significantly related to CAR in Model 2, consistent with the prior
literature. But, when Shock is included (Model 3), it is no longer significant except

.

It appears that the effect of Relative size on CAR is captured by Shock. Moreover, the
coefficient of Focus and Relative size also monotonically declines from Model 2 to
Model 3in all measures of Shock. This suggests that disagreement shock itself might
depend on these factors. Thus, we investigate possible linkages between Shock and these
variables in the next section.
B. Determinants of Disagreement Shock. In our model, disagreement shock
(Shock) represents the magnitude of a change in the degree of disagreement, which is
triggered by the announcement of a spinoff, from the normal level in the pre-event period
to the event level. Then, such questions might follow: What do cause the change in the
level of disagreement? To answer the question, we hypothesize that the information
content in relative size (i.e., the portion of assets that a firm split up to its spun-off
subsidiary) and focus factor (i.e., the type of a division that the firm spins off) could be
sources of disagreement. We also hypothesize that investors’ perception regarding the
level of information asymmetry about the firm would affect the degree of differential
interpretations about the announcement. Therefore, we investigate how Shock is related
to these variables. More specifically we want to examine the extent to which Shock is
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Table 19. Determinants of Disagreement Shock
This table presents the estimates of the OLS regressions on the disagreement shocks of the trimmed sample. The sample firms
between the 95 and the 5 percentile of CAR are removed from the sample. The pre-event period is defined as a 250-trading day period over AD-260 to AD-11 (AD is the announcement date). The dependent variable Disagreement Shock (Shock) is
calculated by
minus
. The ex-ante level of DO (
) or disagreement factor is measured by averaging
daily estimates of a volume-based measure of DO (VDO = LNTO, Detrend, UV, RESD and SUV) over the pre-event period.
Similarly, the event level of DO (
) is the mean of daily VDO estimates in the announcement period from AD-1 to AD+1.
is the mean of daily bid-ask spreads (CSSPRD), which are measured by the estimation method proposed by Corwin
and Schultz (2011), in the pre-event period. A dummy variable equal to 1 is assigned to a parent firm (i.e., focus-increasing
spinoff) if its two-digit primary SIC code is different from that of its subsidiary. Otherwise, zero is assigned (i.e., non-focusincreasing spinoff). The relative size of a subsidiary (Relative Size) is the ratio of the market capitalization of the subsidiary
measured by the end of the month in which the ex-date occurs to the market capitalization of the parent firm by the end of the
month prior to a spinoff announcement month (Size). Size, Relative size, and
are transformed by taking the natural
logarithm. The p-values for the significance of the coefficients are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and shown in parenthesis.
The adjusted R2 and the model F-statistic probability in parenthesis are reported in the last row. A coefficient with its p-values
in bold indicates the significance at the minimum of the 10% level.

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Constant

0.586
(0.000)

-0.148
(0.775)

0.619
(0.000)

-0.373
(0.494)

0.596
(0.000)

-0.261
(0.612)

0.655
(0.000)

-1.348
(0.052)

-0.189
(0.640)

-0.541
(0.457)

Dis. Factor

-0.781
(0.008)

-0.263
(0.352)

-1.125
(0.000)

-0.708
(0.008)

-0.889
(0.002)

-0.390
(0.153)

-0.979
(0.001)

-0.792
(0.005)

-0.128
(0.042)

-0.016
(0.836)

Focus

-0.173
(0.048)

-0.262
(0.005)

-0.214
(0.013)

-0.029
(0.799)

-0.254
(0.016)

0.202
(0.049)

0.199
(0.064)

0.212
(0.037)

0.136
(0.317)

0.170
(0.119)
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Table 19. Determinants of Disagreement Shock, Continued

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Relative size

0.250
(0.000)

0.223
(0.000)

0.243
(0.000)

0.256
(0.000)

0.205
(0.000)

Size

0.011
(0.706)

-0.007
(0.822)

0.003
(0.907)

0.154
(0.000)

0.001
(0.981)

183

183

183

183

183

Obs
Adjusted R2

0.033
(0.008)

0.192
(0.000)

0.080
(0.000)

0.218
(0.000)

0.046
(0.002)
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0.211
(0.000)

0.058
(0.001)

0.167
(0.000)

0.017
(0.042)

0.131
(0.000)

capturing the information in these determinants for announcement abnormal returns. We
regress Shock against disagreement factor and the control variables ((CSSPRD), Focus,
Relative size, and Size).
We present the results of regressions in Table 19. First, regressing Shock on a
constant and disagreement factor: Model 1, we find that all the proxies for disagreement
factor are negatively related to Shock at the 1% level of significance, confirming the
result in Part One, specifically Hypothesis 2. In Part 1, we postulated that firms
characterized by lower disagreement factor prior to spinoff announcements are expected
to incur larger disagreement shock than firms with higher disagreement factor. We argue
that this relationship occurs due to limited attention of investors. Because cognitively
overloaded investors pay attention to only a subset of information most of time, a firm
that is not frequently covered by the media would have a low value of disagreement
factor. In other words, it is less susceptible to heterogeneous interpretations by investors.
However, when a corporate spinoff is announced (i.e., a material news), which is very
likely to receive a wide media coverage, the firm becomes susceptible to a high degree of
differential interpretation among investors relative to its disagreement factor (i.e. the
normal level of disagreement).
Recall that the methodology in measuring any volume-based measure of DO
(VDO) from which Shock is measured is essentially structured to estimate a portion of
trading volume after controlling for the market-wide trading volume and the average
level of firm-specific trading volume (i.e., idiosyncratic liquidity). Hence, one
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interpretation is that firms with a lower level of information asymmetry seem to be more
exposed to a higher level of disagreement triggered by spinoff announcements.
Alternatively, trading activity is more intensive for these firms as compared to those with
greater information asymmetry. Thus, investors’ perception about a firm’s information
asymmetry problem appears to reduce or perhaps, inhibit differential interpretation
among investors about the announcement, and consequently abates trading activity in the
market in the announcement period.
On the other hand, a firm’s decision to split an unrelated subsidiary from its main
business (Focus) has a significantly positive effect on Shock. The coefficient of Shock is
positive for all measures of Shock and significant for

,

, and

.Thus, a

firm engaging in focus-increasing spinoff invites a greater level of disagreement about
the prospect of the firm following a spinoff compared to a firm engaging in non-focusincreasing spinoff. This result lends some support for the prediction of the dynamic
disagreement model developed by Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). Specifically, they
present a case in which the respective value of two subsidiaries—whose cash flows are
perfectly negatively correlated— can exceed the value of a hypothetical parent firm,
which consists of these two subsidiaries in the presence of heterogeneous belief among
investors about these subsidiaries’ values. Moreover, their model predicts more intensive
trading in a subsidiary than in the parent. While their model would be suitable for testing
a case of corporate carve-outs rather than a corporate spinoff, the implication of their
model can be applied to our analysis of corporate spinoff dealing with the announcement
effect of a spinoff. That is, the announcement itself incurs excessive trading volume and
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positive price reaction, which are shown to be more pronounced for focus-increasing
spinoffs.
C. Sub-Period Analysis. In Section 16.A, the cross-sectional regression (Model 3
in Table 18) for the determinant of spinoff abnormal returns shows that the extant
determinants found in the literature enters insignificantly for our full study period from
1964 to 2005. We find that only disagreement factor and disagreement shock explain the
variation in abnormal returns. Nevertheless, this finding does not necessarily refute the
previous findings. As we addressed in Section 14.B, the majority of the literature on
corporate spinoffs draw a sample of spinoffs (announcements) occurred in the U.S before
the year of 1992.
Thus, we examine the stability of the determinants for spinoff abnormal returns
over the whole study period by segmenting the sample into two sub-periods: The first
study period from 1964 to 1991 and the second study period from 1992 to 2005. Then,
we estimate Model 3 in Table 18 for each study period. We omit disagreement shock
from the regression because in this analysis we intend to confirm the findings in the
previous literature. It should be recalled that we show in the preceding section that
disagreement shock absorbs the variability in some of the determinants, namely,
information asymmetry, Focus, and Relative size.
In Table 20, we present the result of the regression for the first study period
(Panel 1) and for the second study period (Panel 2). First, notice that consistent with the
prior literature, the coefficient of Focus and Relative size is positive and significant for
the sample firms in the first study period. For example, on average, focus-increasing
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Table 20. Determinants of Announcement Abnormal Returns: Two Sub-Periods Analysis
This table presents the estimates of the OLS regressions on the abnormal announcement returns with the trimmed sample for
the first and the second sample period. The sample firms between the 95 and the 5 percentile of CAR are removed from the
sample. The pre-event period is defined as a 250-trading -day period over AD-260 to AD-11 (AD is the announcement date).
The dependent variable (CAR) is the abnormal return cumulated over the three days surrounding the date of a spinoff
announcement, (AD-1, AD+1). A market model for daily returns is estimated over the pre-event period to compute abnormal
returns. The market returns are the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of returns of all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks. The exante level of DO (
) or disagreement factor is measured by averaging daily estimates of a volume-based measure of
DO (VDO = LNTO, Detrend, UV, RESD and SUV) over the pre-event period.
is the mean of daily bid-ask spreads
(CSSPRD), which are measured by the estimation method proposed by Corwin and Schultz (2011), in the pre-event period. A
dummy variable equal to 1 is assigned to a parent firm (i.e., focus-increasing spinoff) if its two-digit primary SIC code is
different from that of its subsidiary. Otherwise, zero is assigned (i.e., non-focus-increasing spinoff). The relative size of a
subsidiary (Relative Size) is the ratio of the market capitalization of the subsidiary measured by the end of the month in which
the ex-date occurs to the market capitalization of the parent firm by the end of the month prior to a spinoff announcement
are transformed by taking the natural logarithm. The p-values for the
month (Size). Size, Relative size, and
significance of the coefficients are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and shown in parenthesis. The adjusted R2 and the model Fstatistic probability in parenthesis are reported in the last row. A coefficient with its p-values in bold indicates the significance
at the minimum of the 10% level.
Panel 1. The first sample period, 1964 to 1991

Panel 2. The second sample period, 1992 to 2005

Constant

-0.039
(0.670)

0.009
(0.901)

0.012
(0.866)

0.013
(0.854)

0.002
(0.972)

0.086
(0.231)

0.057
(0.369)

0.053
(0.407)

0.058
(0.362)

0.056
(0.385)

Dis. Factor

-0.006
(0.434)

-0.036
(0.092)

-0.044
(0.073)

-0.051
(0.045)

-0.030
(0.117)

0.003
(0.675)

-0.072
(0.028)

-0.067
(0.053)

-0.070
(0.048)

-0.042
(0.042)

0.001
(0.949)

0.000
(0.975)

-0.001
(0.940)

0.000
(0.967)

-0.001
(0.930)
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-0.010
(0.485)

-0.004
(0.707)

-0.005
(0.652)

-0.005
(0.700)

-0.006
(0.573)

Table 20. Determinants of Announcement Abnormal Returns: Two Sub-Periods Analysis, Continued
Panel 1. The first sample period, 1964 to 1991

Panel 2. The second sample period, 1992 to 2005

Focus

0.024
(0.018)

0.027
(0.007)

0.026
(0.008)

0.027
(0.006)

0.027
(0.006)

-0.002
(0.895)

-0.005
(0.688)

-0.005
(0.681)

-0.005
(0.707)

-0.005
(0.687)

Relative size

0.011
(0.016)

0.010
(0.046)

0.009
(0.056)

0.009
(0.067)

0.010
(0.051)

0.010
(0.082)

0.007
(0.213)

0.007
(0.199)

0.007
(0.196)

0.007
(0.203)

Size

0.002
(0.630)

0.001
(0.840)

0.000
(0.925)

0.000
(0.925)

0.001
(0.802)

-0.004
(0.302)

-0.002
(0.575)

-0.002
(0.560)

-0.002
(0.553)

-0.002
(0.494)

Obs

88

88

88

88

88

95

95

95

95

95

Adjusted R2

0.106
(0.014)

0.124
(0.007)

0.126
(0.006)

0.133
(0.005)

0.119
(0.009)

0.031
(0.167)

0.081
(0.027)

0.074
(0.037)

0.076
(0.033)

0.062
(0.057)
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firms earns about 2.6% more announcement abnormal return than a non-focus-increasing
firms. However, in the second study period, as can be seen from Panel 2, these factors
become insignificant. Though the insignificance of Focus in the second study period as
expected, given the result in the bivariate analysis of this variable in Section 14.B, the
insignificance of Relative size is unexpected and striking. In the second study period,
investors seem not to take these factors into consideration in their re- valuation of the
sample firms upon the spinoff announcements as they did in the first study period.
Furthermore, as we showed previously, there is no relationship between information
asymmetry and abnormal returns in both sub-study periods. The only factor that remains
significant in both sub-periods is disagreement factor. Consistent with the result for the
full sample, it is significantly negatively associated with the abnormal returns in both
sub-study periods.
Therefore, the rationales that are hypothesized and tested by the prior literature
for the implementation of a spinoff seem to lack generality, and these rational
motivations apply for only a subset of corporate spinoffs, especially those occurred
before 1992 for which period most of empirical studies on the wealth effect of spinoffs
are done. However, our result shows that only the disagreement factor of a firm, or a
firm’s characteristic inferred from the behaviors of investors who have heterogeneous
beliefs and interpret public information differently, can consistently explain the abnormal
returns from the spinoff announcements in both sub-study periods.
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Conclusions
In Part 2, we examine the significance of disagreement factor as the determinant
for the cross-sectional variation of abnormal returns days surrounding the announcement
of a corporate spinoff. The disagreement factor (i.e., the ex-ante level of DO in Part One)
of a firm is defined as the level of disagreement among investors about its value in a
normal trading day prior to a spinoff announcement. Therefore, it is reasonably
considered as a firm-specific characteristic defined by investors who have heterogeneous
beliefs and interpret information differently. In Part 1, given a precipitous increase in the
level of DO induced by the announcement of a spinoff, we show that firms with lower
disagreement factors provoke more heterogeneous interpretations about their spinoff
announcements (i.e., disagreement shock) than do firms with higher disagreement factors
do. This result is consistent with the notion of limited attention hypothesis in the
literature. Furthermore, the implication of this result is a negative correlation between
abnormal announcement returns and disagreement factor. This implication renders
disagreement factor as a potent variable that can be helpful in understanding price
changes effected by spinoff announcements. Therefore, we intend to confirm that
whether the negative relationship between disagreement factor and the announcement
abnormal returns still remain significant after controlling for the known determinants
identified in the extant literature for these returns.
Among these determinants, or the sources of the abnormal returns, we choose
information asymmetry ex ante, change in industrial focus (focus factor), and the ratio of
the size of a spun-off to that of its parent (relative size), all of which have received strong
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empirical supports in the prior studies. However, our review of the literature reveals that
there is conflicting evidence for the effect of information asymmetry and that a majority
of empirical papers that studied focus factor are concentrated on spinoff announcements
occurred in the U.S before year 1992. Thus, we reexamine the validity of the information
(asymmetry) hypothesis and the role of focus factor because our sample data is larger in
size and cover a longer study period compared to the prior literature that examine these
variables.
Using a sample of spinoffs that were undertaken by the U.S publicly-traded firms
from 1964 to 2005, we find that information asymmetry problem, regardless of a proxy
for information asymmetry used, is aggravated after the completion of a spinoff. This is
inconsistent with the information hypothesis, which states that information asymmetry
should be improved following spinoff. Under this hypothesis, the undervaluation of a
firm due to information asymmetry between outside investors and managers is the
motivation for spinoff to gain a fair valuation by reducing information asymmetry.
Moreover, the deterioration in information asymmetry is much larger for and limited to
the sample firms engaged in focus-increasing spinoff. This result invalidates the
information hypothesis further because the focus-increasing samples should achieve a
greater improvement in information asymmetry according to the hypothesis.
Regarding the effect of focus factor, we show that the focus-increasing firms earn
significantly positively larger abnormal returns than the non-focus increasing firms only
in our first study period from 1964 to 1991. This confirms the result of the extant
literature that covered a similar time period. However, in our second study period from
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1992 to 2005 there is no statistically significant difference in the abnormal returns
between these two focus groups, and both groups, on average, earn significantly positive
abnormal returns.
In multiple regression analyses of the full sample, we find that disagreement
factor explains a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation in announcement
abnormal returns after controlling for the other known determinants. This finding
confirms the result of a bivariate test in Part 1 that firms with lower disagreement factors
earn higher abnormal returns. However, information asymmetry and focus factor are not
significantly related to the abnormal returns. Thus our full sample supports neither the
information asymmetry nor the industrial-focus hypotheses.
Furthermore, including disagreement shock in regression analyses, we find that
while disagreement factor remains significant, disagreement shock also is significantly
positively correlated to the abnormal returns. This result confirms Hypothesis 2 in Part 1.
However, all the other determinants (i.e., focus factor and information asymmetry)
including relative size become insignificant. This result suggests that the variations in
these determinants are captured by disagreement shock. This implication is reasonable
because the information content of these variables, which is known at the time of a
spinoff announcement, is potentially a source for investor disagreement. Thus, relating
these determinants with disagreement shock, we find that disagreement shock is smaller
if a firm has higher level of information asymmetry ex ante, but the shock is larger if the
firm implements a focus-increasing spinoff, and splits up a larger portion of its assets to
its subsidiary. Given that our proxies for disagreement shock in effect represent abnormal
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trading activity resulting from disagreement triggered by a spinoff announcement,
investors refrain from trading based on their own interpretation for firms that they
perceive to have high information asymmetry.
Regarding our sub-period analyses, we confirm the finding in the literature that
focus factor and relative size are indeed the sources of abnormal returns produced from
spinoff announcements in the first study period from 1964 to 1991. However, in the
second study period, we find that both focus factor and relative size no longer explain
these returns. Moreover, the effect of information asymmetry remains insignificant for
both sub-study periods. The only variable that can consistently explain the abnormal
returns in both sub-periods is disagreement factor.
In conclusion, we have combined Miller (1977)’s static DO model with Banerjee
and Kremer (2010)’s dynamic DO model and investigated the effects of investor’s
differential interpretations of spinoff announcements on price changes with the data on
221 corporate spinoffs in the U.S from 1964 to 2005. Investors’ differential interpretation
of corporate spinoff divestures is not a readily observable variable. Thus we have
transformed trading volume into two comparative statistics (the ex-ante level of DO, or
disagreement factor, and the event level of DO), and used them as the principal analytical
variables for the examination of contradictory evidence centered on the validity of the
three hypotheses for wealth gains prominently reported on the spinoff literature. The
three hypotheses are (i) the information asymmetry, (ii) the industrial focus (focusincreasing vs. non-focus increasing spinoffs), (iii) the wealth transfer (from bond holders
to stockholders) hypothesis.
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In Part 2, we have shown that when abnormal returns from spinoff (i.e., wealth
gains) are analyzed in multiple regressions along with disagreement factor, the
explanatory power of the four hypotheses is almost completely eclipsed by the robustness
of disagreement factor. This finding sheds light to why there is the contradictory evidence
from prior studies on the three hypotheses reported in the literature.
Together with Part 1, we have validated the analytical properties of the combined
models of Miller (1977) and Banerjee and Kremer (2010): Namely, Miller’s DO
proposition that under short-sale constraints, optimistic investors overprice stock, which
gives rise to a fleeting window of market anomaly, and Banerjee and Kremer’s model
specifications that impound a surge in trading volume which peaks at the announcement
date and then levels off after five to seven days. We have demonstrated how the
differential interpretation of firm-specific spinoff announcement by investors can be
transformed from time-series of daily stock trading volume series into the two principal
investigative variables: Disagreement factor and disagreement shock. By doing so, we
have elucidated the unique and potent attributes that are intrinsic to these volume raw
statistics.
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